Explanation. Methods and functions of scientific explanation

Logic and philosophy

Understanding cannot be confused with what is called insight or intuition, although all this is in the process of understanding. Along with description, explanation, interpretation, understanding refers to the basic procedures for the functioning of scientific knowledge. Therefore, understanding should not be identified with cognition; to understand means to express it in the logic of concepts or to confuse it with the procedure of explanation, although they are interconnected.

Explanation and understanding as a consequence of the communicative nature of science. Nature and types of explanations. Explanation as a function of theory and its result.

The routineness of understanding, the illusion of its easy, almost automatic achievability for a long time obscured its complexity and complex nature. Often they do without defining this concept or limit themselves to pointing out that it is fundamental for hermeneutics . The latter is most often presented as the theory and practice of interpretation (interpretation) of texts from the text of any literary or other source to world history like text.

First of all, it should be borne in mind thatunderstanding procedureshould not be classified as a purely irrational act,“emphatic comprehension living.”Although the irrational moment is present here, it is by no means the main one,and even more so, exhausting the whole essence of the matter. But one cannot downplay the significance of this moment, much less completely reject its “presence” in hermeneutic reasoning. The latter are closely connected with the “non-rational”, are unthinkable without it, and this important feature pumped-up reasoning. Understanding cannot be confused with what is called “illumination”, “insight”, intuition, although all this is in the process of understanding.

The process of understanding is organically connected with the process of human cognition of the surrounding world, howevercannot be reduced entirely to cognitive activity alone.The problems of understanding cannot supplant questions of the theory of knowledge, but must be analyzed on the basis of the dialectic of the unity of knowledge and objective-practical activity in a broad sociocultural context.

Along with description, explanation, interpretation (interpretation), understanding refers to the basic procedures for the functioning of scientific knowledge. Numerous approaches to the study of understanding show that this process has its own specifics, distinguishing it from other intellectual processes and epistemological operations.

That's why understanding should not be identified with cognition (“to understand means to express it in the logic of concepts”) or confused with the procedure of explanation,although they are related. However, most often the processunderstanding is associated with comprehension, i.e., identifying what has some meaning for a person.

Moreover Understanding can come from two perspectives: like communion to the meanings of human activity and howmeaning making. Understanding is precisely connected with immersion in the “world of meanings” of another person, comprehension and interpretation of his thoughts and experiences. Understanding this is a search for meaning: you can only understand what makes sense. This process occurs in conditions of communication, communication and dialogue. Understanding is inseparable from self-understanding and occurs in the element of language.

Thus the meaning this is what we appeal to when we assume the adequacy of the understanding (of the interlocutor or reader) of the information conveyed to him. Not only a word, sentence, text, etc., but also what happens around us can have meaning.

Speaking about understanding, you should pay attention to two more important points.

1. Its cornerstone is principle hermeneutic circle, expressing the cyclical nature of understanding. This principle links explanation and understanding: in order to understand something, it must be explained, and vice versa. This relationship is expressed as a circle of the whole and the part: to understand the whole it is necessary to understand its individual parts, and to understand the individual parts it is already necessary to have an idea of the meaning of the whole. For example, a word is part of a sentence, a sentence is part of a text, a text is an element of culture, etc.

The beginning of the process of understanding is pre-understanding, which is often associated with an intuitive understanding of the whole, with the pre-reflective content of consciousness. Pre-understanding is usually set by tradition, the spiritual experience of the corresponding era, personal characteristics individual.

Strictly speaking, the hermeneutic circle is not a “squirrel wheel”, not a vicious circle, because the return of thinking in it occurs from the parts not to the previous whole, but to the whole, enriched by the knowledge of its parts, i.e. to a different whole. Therefore, we should talk about the hermeneutic spiral of understanding, about its dialectical nature as a movement from a less complete and deep understanding to a more complete and profound one, in the process of which broader horizons of understanding are revealed.

2. Should understanding be related to the modern era? There are two main positions on this issue.

a) No need . According to this point of view, an adequate understanding of the text comes down to revealing the meaning that the author put into it, i.e. it is necessary to identify the author's meaning in its purest form. without allowing any distortions, additions or changes. However, this does not actually happen, because each era approaches texts (for example, works of art) with its own criteria.

b) The process of understanding is inevitably associated with giving additional meaning to what one is trying to understand. Therefore, to understand the text as the author understood it, not enough . This means that understanding is creative and does not come down to a simple reproduction of the author’s meaning, but necessarily includes a critical assessment of it, preserves the positive, enriches it with the meaning of modern realities and is organically connected with the meaning of the author’s position.

Thus, understanding is comprehension of the meaning of a particular phenomenon, its place in the world, its function in the system of the whole.It helps to reveal the endless semantic depths of existence.

The process of understanding includes the following necessary components: item , expressed in a text of any nature; presence in it meaning (“the essence of the matter”); pre-understanding initial, preliminary idea of this meaning; interpretation interpretation of texts aimed at understanding their semantic content; availability self-understanding at the interpreter; communication, communication in the “element of language”; ability to fully support dialogue ; the desire to say your word and give the floor to a dissenter, to be able to assimilate what he says; understanding that the same text hasseveral meanings(except copyright); correlation the substantive content of the text (“the essence of the matter”) with the cultural mental experience of our time. (On understanding in hermeneutics, see question 113.)

Along with understanding, there is such an important cognitive procedure as explanation . Its main goal is to identify the essence of the subject under study, bring it under the law, identifying the causes and conditions, sources of its development and the mechanisms of their action. Explanation is usually closely related to description and forms the basis for scientific prediction. Therefore, in the very general view an explanation can be called subsuming a specific fact or phenomenon under some generalization (law and reason, first of all). By revealing the essence of an object, an explanation also contributes to the clarification and development of knowledge that is used as the basis for an explanation. Thus, solving explanatory problems is the most important stimulus for the development of scientific knowledge and its conceptual apparatus.

In modern methodological literature, the following elements are distinguished in the structure of explanation: 1) initial knowledge about the phenomenon being explained (the so-called explanandum); 2) knowledge used as a condition and means of explanation, allowing us to consider the phenomenon being explained in the context of a certain system or structure (the so-called grounds of explanation, or explanans). Knowledge of various types and levels of development can be used as the basis for explanation; 3) cognitive actions that make it possible to apply knowledge, serving as the basis of explanation, to the phenomenon being explained.

The most developed and widely known form scientific explanation are explanations undertaken on the basis of theoretical laws (both dynamic and probabilistic-statistical) and involving the understanding of the explanatory phenomenon in the systemtheoretical knowledge.

This deductive-pomologicalmodel of scientific explanation. This model (scheme) brings the phenomenon being explained under a certain law; this is its peculiarity. In this model, explanation comes down to the deduction of phenomena from laws. In this model, not only causal, but also functional, structural and other types of regular and necessary relationships are considered as laws. It should be noted that the deductive-nomological model of explanation describes only the final result, and not the real process of explanation in science, which by no means comes down to the deduction of a fact from a law or an empirical law from a theory, but is always associated with very labor-intensive research and creative search.

In the field of humanities (social) sciences, the so-calledrational explanation. Its essence lies in the fact that when explaining the action of a certain historical figure, the researcher tries to reveal the motives that guided the acting subject and show that in the light of these motives the action was rational (reasonable).

Covers a much larger areateleological(intentional ) explanation. It does not indicate the rationality of an action, but simply its intention (aspiration), the goal pursued by the individual carrying out the action, and the intentions of the participants in historical events.

It should be borne in mind that, firstly, the deductive-nomological model (scheme) is sometimes proclaimed to be the only scientific form of explanation, which is incorrect (especially in relation to the humanities). Secondly, when explaining the behavior of individuals, this model is not applicable; rational and intentional schemes “work” here.

Both of these schemes have priority in social cognition in relation to deductive-nomological explanation, which, of course, is also used in the humanities, but occupies a more modest place here than in natural science.

As for scientific knowledge in general, it is necessary to combine (and not oppose each other) various types explanations for a deeper understanding of nature and social life.

Understanding and explanation are closely related. However, it must be borne in mind that understanding cannot be reduced to explanation, since especially in social cognition it is impossible to abstract from specific individuals, their activities, their thoughts and feelings, goals and desires, etc. In addition, understanding cannot be opposed explanation, and even more so to separate from each other these two research procedures, which complement each other and operate in any area of human knowledge. However, in social cognition, preference is given to understanding methods, determined primarily by the specifics of its subject, in natural science - to explanatory ones.

Explanation is one of the functions of theory and science in general. Explanation is a mental operation of expressing the essence of one object through another, through what is known, understandable, obvious, clear. Explanation is a necessary component of understanding any activity.

A scientific explanation must satisfy the requirements of adequacy (correctness) and fundamental verifiability. From a logical point of view, an explanation is the derivation of consequences from premises. Explanation is carried out both at the theoretical and empirical levels of the organization of scientific knowledge.

There are several models of scientific explanation:

1. Deductive-nomological explanation

A clear formulation of this model was carried out by K. Popper and K. Hempel. In a deductive-nomological explanation, we indicate the cause or conditions for the existence of some event. A set of initial conditions and general laws or hypotheses (major and minor premises) constitutes the explanans of an explanation. The big premise is universal or general laws or stochastic laws of a particular nature. Minor premise – initial or boundary conditions related to specific events or phenomena. The statement to be explained is an explanandum - the conclusion of a deductive conclusion from the premises, i.e. from the explanans.

If a cause or condition occurs, then a certain event occurs necessarily.

K. Hempel developed a model of inductive-probabilistic explanation, when instead of the law of science there is a position that has a probabilistic-statistical nature and the conclusion establishes only the probability of the occurrence of an event. In any case, an explanation based on a deductive-nomological model gives the event being explained a necessary character.

(Example with Faraday's explanation of Arago's experiment on the rotation of a copper disk above a rotating magnetic needle).

The deductive-nomological model of explanation is most characteristic of mathematics and natural science.

2. “Rational” explanation (teleological)

Canadian historian W. Dray showed that historical science uses other models of explanation. An explanation that indicates the connection between a person's actions and his motives and beliefs was called rational by Dray. The purpose of such an explanation is to show that some action is “reasonable” from the point of view of the person performing it. Basically, when explaining human actions, historians see not cause-and-effect relationships, but norms or rules of rational action.

In general, the explanation within this model is as follows: show that “in the given circumstances, the people of the period under study acted in such and such a way,” and then consider a specific case. Thus, a rational explanation justifies only the possibility of the event being explained, and not its necessity.

The main attention is paid to the goals, meaning and intentions of people's activities. The big premise is the sum of goals, motives, aspirations. Small parcel – amount of funds. Explanandum is an act, an action. A practical syllogism is a form of teleological explanation. The major premise is the goals of the action. In small - the means to achieve it. Explanandum is a statement that only when acting in accordance with the premises, i.e. with proper consideration of the goals and means of achieving it, one can hope for the success of the action.

3. Functional explanation

The functional explanation is close to teleological ones, because answers the question why? It is used when it is necessary to clarify the role and function of any element or subsystem of elements in a holistic system. (organ in a living organism). Widely used in biology after the creation of evolutionary theory by Charles Darwin.

4. Normative explanations

Normative explanations attempt to identify the meaning and role of norms in explaining the behavior of people in society. They take into account not only a person’s conscious activity, but also moral activity. It is based on the rules and norms established in society, which are fundamentally different from laws that are regular and stable.

5. Cause-and-effect explanation

Cause-and-effect explanations: during the period of classical science, mechanical movements and processes, natural phenomena were tried to be explained using the simplest causal or causal laws. It was also used by Galileo to explain the motion of freely falling bodies.

The preceding phenomenon is called the cause, and the given phenomenon (which is explained) is called the consequence. But a causal explanation is not limited to indicating the preceding and subsequent phenomena (P: night replaces day, but night is not the cause of day). For a causal explanation, it is necessary to determine the general causal law, which establishes a regular, necessary connection between cause and effect.

6. Intentional explanation

Intention means intention, goal, direction of consciousness towards a specific object. (From the Latin word intentio - desire). Intentional explanation is sometimes called teleological or motivational. The intentional explanation of human behavior consists of indicating the goal pursued by the individual, establishing the aspirations, intentions or motivations of current events. Such explanations are focused on revealing the aspirations of people; they can be used to explain the behavior of historical figures, to explain the actions of ordinary people. G. von Wright emphasized the importance of the so-called “practical syllogism” for the humanities and for history.

In all alternative models of explanation (Normative, functional, teleological, intentional), the main attention is paid to the specific features of a person’s conscious and purposeful activity, which is expressed in setting goals, clarifying his functions and role in society, and analyzing norms and rules of behavior.

EXPLANATION(in the methodology of science) is a cognitive procedure aimed at enriching and deepening knowledge about real world phenomena by including these phenomena in the structure of certain connections, relationships and dependencies, which makes it possible to reveal the essential features of a given phenomenon. In the simplest case, the subject of explanation is individual empirically recorded facts. In this case, the explanation is preceded by their description. But in principle, the subject of explanation can be reality of any kind in any of its manifestations and at any level of its expression in the system of scientific knowledge. So, say, the laws of science, empirical and theoretical, can be explained; the content of theories of a lesser degree of generality can find their explanation in theories of a more general level, etc. In the structure of explanation as a cognitive procedure, the following elements can be distinguished: 1) initial knowledge about the phenomenon being explained ( so-called explanandum); 2) knowledge used as a condition and means of explanation, allowing us to consider the phenomenon being explained in the context of a certain system or structure (the so-called basis of explanation, or explanans); 3) cognitive actions that make it possible to apply knowledge, serving as the basis of explanation, to the phenomenon being explained. Knowledge of various types and levels of development can be used as the basis for explanation, which makes it possible to distinguish different types and forms of explanation according to the type of explanans. At the same time, explanation procedures may differ depending on the cognitive techniques and actions used in the process of their implementation.

In the so-called The standard concept of the analysis of science, put forward by supporters of logical positivism and widespread in Western methodology of science in the 40–50s, was dominated by the deductive-nomological model of explanation formulated by K. Hempel and P. Oppenheim in 1948 (see: Hempel K.G. Logic of explanation. M., 1998, p. 89–146). This logical model of explanation was an application of the general hypothetico-deductive scheme (see Hypothetico-deductive method , Hypothetico-deductive model ) to the situation of explanation. In this scheme, we proceeded from considering the so-called explanans. nomological statements formulating the laws of science, and the deduction of knowledge about the phenomenon being explained from these nomological statements was used as a logical method of explanation. The feasibility of such an explanation was considered as a factor of confirmation, justification of the nomological statement (see. Justification of the theory ). Like any logical model of a real cognitive process, it had the character of a very strong idealization of it, exaggerating, firstly, the role of the laws of science as an explanans, and secondly, the outcome, like the standard concept of the analysis of science as a whole, from opposition opening context And context of justification , she could not take into account the processes of improving knowledge during the implementation of the explanation procedure. As for the role of the laws of science (the so-called nomological statements) in the processes of explanation, then, indeed, the most developed form of scientific explanation are explanations undertaken on the basis of theoretical laws and presupposing the understanding of the phenomenon being explained in the system of theoretical knowledge, its assimilation in scientific-theoretical picture of the world.

However, the author of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, K. G. Hempel, was subsequently forced to generalize it, formulating, along with the deductive probabilistic-inductive or statistical version of the homological model of explanation. But the main thing is that it would be wrong to underestimate the cognitive and methodological significance of various forms of explanation, the basis of which is not necessarily the laws of science. T.N. nomological explanations are characteristic of theoretical mathematized natural science, primarily physics, and in scientific disciplines where theories in the strict sense of the term are not crystallized (see. Theory ) with their laws, other forms of explanation are common. Thus, in social and humanitarian disciplines, typologies are often used as the basis of explanation. For example, an explanation of the characteristics of human behavior is given on the basis of a typology of characters in psychology, an explanation of social phenomena is based on the types of social structures and social actions in sociology, etc. The most important role in the sciences of living and inanimate nature, social and humanitarian disciplines is played by explanation by inclusion the phenomenon under consideration into the context of the systems, structures and connections that encompass it. This is how causal, genetically evolutionary, functional, structural-systemic, etc. arise. explanations, where the explanans are not theories or laws of science, but certain categorical schemes and pictures of the world that underlie scientific knowledge in a given subject area, for example, an explanation of any social or biological phenomena through the establishment of the functions that they perform in social system or a living organism.

A special problem that has caused lively debate in the philosophy and methodology of science is associated with the explanation of human actions and actions in various humanities, in history, in the social sciences, where one way or another we have to consider various motivational and semantic attitudes determined by the human mentality as the basis for explanation. In this context, the problem of explanation turns out to be closely related to the problem of understanding in the specific meaning of this term in the tradition coming from Dilthey, in which understanding as the comprehension of the mental prerequisites for the creation of a text or a cultural artifact in general is considered as a specific method of humanitarian knowledge.

From a methodological point of view, explanatory procedures cannot be reduced to the automatism of deductive conclusions. Already in itself, bringing phenomena under the general law according to the deductive-nomological scheme presupposes a certain constructive work of consciousness, which Kant called the “ability of judgment”, i.e. ability to apply general rule, general norm V specific situation. Real procedures of explanation in science, even those that can be represented in a deductive-nomological model, are associated with “building bridges” between the object of explanation and its explanans, clarifying the conditions of applicability general position, finding intermediate links, etc. The search for the basis of explanation where there is no ready-made knowledge under which the phenomena being explained can be subsumed becomes a powerful stimulus for the development of scientific knowledge and the emergence of new concepts and hypotheses. In particular, the search for explanatory factors is often a prerequisite for the theorization of knowledge, the transition from its empirical level to the formation of theoretical concepts, the development of what can be called primary explanatory schemes, which at first are ad-hoc (i.e., explanations this case), but can then be developed into a theoretical concept. So, let's say, Durkheim's explanation more murders in Protestant communities compared to Catholic ones, the lower degree of social cohesion in the former compared to the latter, which initially acted as an ad-hoc explanation, served as the basis for the creation of the concept of anomie, which is widely recognized in sociology, as a cause of social disorganization. In a situation where attempts to explain certain facts and circumstances within the framework of certain hypotheses, concepts or theories lead to a contradiction with the latter, i.e. real circumstances act as counterexamples to them (see. Counterexamples in science), the presence of such counterexamples - say, the contradiction of the planetary model of the atom with the stability of electrons in orbit - becomes a necessary condition critical analysis of relevant knowledge and a stimulus for its revision. This revision does not always lead to a rejection of this knowledge in the spirit of primitive falsificationism (see. Falsification , Falsifiability ), it leads to its clarification, specification, improvement and development. At the same time, it is desirable that the changes made to the theory or hypothesis would not be only ad-hoc explanations of the identified counterexamples, but would increase the explanatory and predictive capabilities of the theory or hypothesis in relation to other facts. The accumulation of a theory or hypothesis with a large number of ad-hoc explanations is evidence of its weakness.

Thus, explanation as a whole is a constructive, creative cognitive procedure, as a result of which not only knowledge about the phenomenon being explained is enriched and deepened, but, as a rule, knowledge used as the basis for explanation is clarified and developed. The solution of explanatory problems acts as the most important stimulus for the development of scientific knowledge and its conceptual apparatus, which indicates the inconsistency of the sharp opposition of the so-called. contexts of justification and discovery when treating explanation within the standard framework for the analysis of science.

The implementation of explanatory functions in science is organically connected with prediction and foresight. Essentially, considering scientific-cognitive activity as a whole, we can talk about a single explanatory and predictive function of scientific knowledge in relation to its object. Explanation, considered in this context, appears not as a private cognitive procedure, but as a necessary function of scientific thinking, its fundamental attitude.

Literature:

1. Nikitin E.P. Explanation is the function of science. M., 1970;

2. Hempel K.G. Motives and “encompassing” laws in historical explanation. – In the book: Philosophy and methodology of history. M., 1977;

3. Drey W. Once again to the question of explaining people's actions in historical science. - There;

4. Ruzavin G.I. Scientific theory. Logical and methodological analysis. M., 1978, ch. 8;

5. Wright G.F. background. Explanation in history and social science. – In the book: Logical-philosophical studies. M., 1986;

6. Biryukov B.V., Novoselov M.M. Properties of explanation and order in a knowledge system. – In the book: Unity of scientific knowledge. M., 1988;

7. Hempel K.G. The function of general laws in history. – In the book: Logic of explanation. M., 1998;

8. Hempel C.I. Deductive – Homological vs. Statistical Explanation. – Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of science, v. III. Minneapolis, 1962.

Language and man [On the problem of motivation of the language system] Shelyakin Mikhail Alekseevich

4. Basic types of scientific explanation

The structure of any scientific explanation consists of a) initial knowledge about the object as an explicandum, b) knowledge used as a means of explanation (the basis of explanation) - an explicate, and c) cognitive actions associated with the use of the basis of explanation, i.e. with the establishment of its functions in relation to the explicandum.

Depending on the chosen explicate and cognitive actions with it, several types of scientific explanation differ.

4.1. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS pointing to the cause and its effect as sequential phenomena, states of affairs in some specific conditions. There are different understandings of the cause, but it is usually determined from the following characteristics:

a) a cause is an actual action that causes an unambiguous factual consequence and exists independently of the effect, b) cause and effect are often united by a law that defines indispensable, necessary connections, c) an effect cannot exist without a cause and one way or another reflects the cause, but not is identified with the cause, d) each cause has only its own consequences (responsible for the effect, “takes the blame for the effect”), e) the cause is aimed at explaining the past or present. Causal explanations are widely used in the study of natural and biological facts, and there has been a tendency to extend causal explanations to phenomena of a behavioral nature, but it has not taken into account the specifics of these phenomena, which has led to the search for other types of explanations.

4.2. RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS indicating a human motive, his rational considerations that determine his actions. Rationality in these conditions does not make a fact necessary, but only possible.

4.3. INTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS (teleological, intentional and goal-oriented, usually associated with rational explanations). They consist of a desired, anticipated result, a goal (goal setting) and the means that they consider necessary to use to achieve it (“the end justifies the means”). A goal differs from a cause in the following characteristics: a) a goal is always intentional, a reason is always factual, b) a goal is aimed at the future, a reason is directed at the past or present, c) reasons are implemented to achieve a goal, i.e. the goal is based on causal determination; d) the goal and the means do not have the necessary internal connection.

4.4. FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS. The term “function” (Latin functio – execution, correspondence, display) is widely used in modern sciences, but is interpreted differently in them. In mathematics, a function is a dependent variable, in physiology it is a manifestation of the vital activity of organs, tissues, cells, etc., in sociology it is a duty social institutions, positions, etc. Usually the mathematical understanding of a function is distinguished from an objective function. If we generalize the use of the term “function” in non-mathematical sciences, we can highlight the following conceptual features:

1) function is a special property of an integral object as a system or its subsystem and element (function carriers); the concepts of a system, its subsystem and element are interconnected: there is no system, subsystem, element of a system without a function, just as there is no function without a system, subsystem or element of a system (cf. a spring in a clock mechanism and a spring lying on the floor);

2) a function is a derived property of the entire system, subsystem or element of the system;

3) a function always provides something needed, intended, serves for something, i.e. has an exit beyond the boundaries of the system, subsystem or element of the system (cf. the function of an airplane - movement in the air, the function of a drinking glass, the functions of large and small hands on a watch);

4) the function has its own environment of implementation and is adaptive to the environment (for example, the environment for the function of a glass is the process of drinking liquids, the environment for a watch is the passage of time);

5) the function connects the system, subsystem or element of the system with its environment and is in relation to the latter;

6) each function manifests itself in systemic (interdependent) relationships with other functions, and functional system in general, it is a system of elements, subsystems with their interconnected functions, subordinate to the functions of the whole system.

7) function as the purpose of a system object or its element is manifested in the very real or potential process of their adaptation to the environment according to the feedback principle.

8) function and system are in mutually determined relationships, and function can act as a leading system-forming factor. The system function should be distinguished from the replaced one

function allowed by the system function. For example, the systemic function of a glass is its use for drinking, which corresponds to its structure, adapted to the peculiarities of the process of drinking liquids, but the use of a glass for storing a butterfly is its use in a replaceable function allowed by the systemic function. The function can be primary and secondary (derived from the primary): such, for example, is the secondary function of buttons sewn on only to add beauty to a dress.

The concept of function is related to the concept of “functioning”. Functioning is the realized manifestation of a function in the environment. Based on the functioning of the object as directly given for observation, its function is determined.

In linguistics, the concept of function, as a rule, is used in accordance with its stated characteristics, namely in a generalized form as the ability of a language system, its subsystems and elements to fulfill one or another purpose in transmitting and receiving information.

All the noted features of a function distinguish it from cause and purpose: a function is not, like a cause, an action that causes consequences, and is not a “necessary future”, like a goal, being always given or potential.

The essence of functional explanations is that an object as a system or an element in a system is explained by its function or, conversely, the function of an object and its element are explained by its systemic character or systemic connections (cf., for example, objects such as a watch, an airplane, a chair and all other artifacts or their individual elements).

4.5. SYSTEM-STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS associated with the concept of a system as a single organized and ordered integrity, consisting of interdependent elements and certain relationships between them, called the structure of the system. The simplest and most universal type of structural relationships are binary relationships (dyads), which are one of the types of symmetry of nature and organisms (cf. the left and right hemispheres of the human brain with their functional differences, day and night, life and death, inhalation and exhalation, and etc.). As is known, Hegel generalized and examined in terms of development binary relations as opposites that are inherent in any certainty. Man's awareness of the binary nature of all things is already reflected in the creation of binary symbolism in the culture of many nations. However, when further development human thinking, other types of structural relationships were realized, reflecting the dialectics of being - binary relationships with intermediate links and n-member relations with a binary structure.

The essence of system-structural explanations is that this or that phenomenon and development is explained from the point of view of the laws of the system, its intrastructural features and intrasystem relations. For example, in psychology and linguistics, many phenomena are explained by associative connections, when one phenomenon causes another by contiguity, similarity, and contrast (associations are based on the mechanisms of neural connections in the brain).

4.6. GENETIC EXPLANATIONS. They suggest explanations this state object by establishing its initial conditions of development over time through the derivation of step-by-step connections and determination of the main lines of development. Genetic explanations are historical explanations, but somewhat specialized in that they explain an object from its original basis. Genetic explanations are widely used in all sciences and are often combined with systems-structural and other types of explanation.

It should be noted that the mentioned types of scientific explanation are not always used in science in isolation from each other, which is determined by its different tasks and aspects.

From the book In Search of Moral Absolutes: comparative analysis ethical systems by Latzer Irwin Wu

From the book Category of Politeness and Communication Style author Larina Tatyana Viktorovna

2.3. Politeness as a subject of scientific research 2.3.1. The main directions of studying the category of politeness Interest in the problems of intercultural communication and national-cultural specific behavior, characteristic of recent decades, is accompanied by all

From the book The Truth of Myth by Hübner Kurt

5. On the intersubjectivity of the a priori elements of scientific experience We must now ask ourselves whether the a priori elements constitutive of scientific experience can in any way be justified intersubjectively, or whether they represent something more or less arbitrary.

From the book Transport in Liveable Cities author Vucik Vukan R.

1. The first mythical model of explanation The logical form of sentences that is the same in science and myth corresponds to the same forms of models of explanation. Somewhat very simple examples mythical explanations in the realm of nature, soul, as well as history and society will help

From the book of Bourgeois author Sombart Werner

1. Displacement of myth by science. An attempt at a scientific explanation a) Ahistorical explanations If we limit ourselves to the natural, social, historical sciences, as well as psychology, which we have done and will continue to do further, based on the grounds given in Chapter XVI,

From the book Daily Life of Istanbul in the Age of Suleiman the Magnificent by Mantran Robert

2. On the method of mythical explanation of the process of displacement of myth by science. What is interpreted by science as an accident, myth explains by the influence of a numinous being. Since we are not talking about a regular event here, the second, mythical model of explanation comes into play,

From the book Culturology and global challenges of our time author Mosolova L.M.

Preface by the scientific editor §1. The initiator of the publication of the Russian translation of the monograph of Professor Vukan Vucik, one of the most famous American transport scientists, is the outstanding Russian urbanist, academician of the Russian

From the book Language and Man [On the problem of motivation of the language system] author Shelyakin Mikhail Alekseevich

From the book Collective Sensibility. Theories and practices of the left avant-garde author Chubarov Igor M.

From the scientific editor It gives me pleasure to present to the Russian reader the work of the outstanding French orientalist Robert Mantrand on the life of the capital Ottoman Empire during the reign of the most famous Turkish Sultan Suleiman (1520–1566), who

From the book of Race. Peoples. Intelligence [Who is smarter] by Lynn Richard

1. Problems of scientific analysis and forecasting of the sociocultural development of mankind in the 21st century. Culture of the XXI century: analytical forecast. Y. Flier (Moscow). In order to start forecasting the future development of culture, one should first of all decide on

From the book Science under Oppression Russian history author Romanovsky Sergey Ivanovich

3. On the essence of scientific explanation As is known, any science has its own subject of study and two levels of its knowledge - descriptive and theoretical. If the first level is mainly reduced to the identification, characterization and systematization of the corresponding empirical

From the book History of British Social Anthropology author Nikishenkov Alexey Alekseevich

IV. Philosophy of art and the formation of scientific art history in the 1920s

From the author's book

2.4. Methods of concrete scientific analysis in functionalism The problem of the relationship between general methodological and specific scientific levels of knowledge has long been quite acute in science and, in our opinion, is still far from a final solution. Still we'll take the risk

Explanation is the function of theory. Nature and types of explanation.

Sciences

Explanation and understanding are a consequence of communication

EXPLANATION, UNDERSTANDING, INTERPRETATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

CHAPTER 24

Literature

Topics of reports and abstracts

1. The problem of the boundaries of cognitive relativism in humanitarian knowledge.

2. Classical and post-non-classical concepts of truth in the context of humanitarian knowledge.

3. Justice and truth.

4. Good and truth as classical and non-classical regulators of knowledge. Their relationship in the qualification of a legal fact.

1. Gaidenko P. P. Scientific rationality and philosophical reason. M., 2003.

2. Ilyin V.V. Criteria for scientific knowledge. M., 1989.

3. Mikeshina L. A. Methodology of scientific knowledge in the context of culture. M., 1992.

4. Mikeshina L. A. Philosophy of knowledge: polemical chapters. M., 2002.

5. Moiseev N. N. Modern rationalism. M., 1995.

6. PutnamX. Reason, truth and history. M., 2002.

7. Ricoeur P. Fair. M., 2005.

8. Rawls D. Theory of justice. Novosibirsk, 1996.

Explanation is a cognitive procedure aimed at enriching and deepening knowledge about real world phenomena by including these phenomena in the structure of connections, relationships and dependencies that reveal the essential features of the phenomenon being explained. The structure of an explanation includes: a) initial knowledge about the phenomenon being explained; b) knowledge used as a condition and means of explanation; c) cognitive actions that allow you to apply these ideas to the phenomenon being explained. The need for explanation arises in the process of discovering new facts, processes in nature, and solving problems, the purpose of which is explanation. This is the scientist’s internal laboratory, constituting the content of a problem, “puzzle”, or serious scientific problem. But now the problem is solved, and then the need arises to present your discovery to the scientific community, to present it for the purpose of critical testing. In this sense, explanation appears as the content and prerequisite of scientific communication. In scientific communication, explanation and understanding are interdependent procedures. Understanding presupposes explication of meaning scientific text, containing the components of the explanation structure listed above.

Theory is “a complex of views, ideas, ideas aimed at interpreting and explaining a phenomenon” (New Philosophical Encyclopedia. M., 2001. Vol. IV. P. 42). As follows from the definition of a theory, an explanation is its most important function. The possibilities and types of explanation in the natural and social sciences are different. In natural science there is a distinction following types explanations:

1.Hypothetico-deductive method. In this model, theory and law act as a means of explanation, and as cognitive actions, the logical method of deduction (deduction of knowledge regarding the phenomenon being explained). The satisfaction of such an explanation is regarded as evidence of the truth of the theory or law.

2. Probabilistic-inductive (statistical) model of explanation, based on the establishment of common recurring features observed in a certain class of phenomena and the attribution of the explained phenomenon to this class. In social and humanitarian knowledge, the classical deductive-nomological model of explanation has limited opportunities, since the circle is also limited

ties characterizing social phenomena. For example, in economic theory an explanation of inflation and its causes can be given, based on objective processes of economic activity. Much more effective methods of explanation are: rational an explanation, the starting premise of which is the recognition of the rationality of the actions of people (ordinary people or those in power, generals, public figures, etc.). Actions that comply with the norms and rules adopted in a given community during a given period of its history are recognized as rational. A rational explanation reveals not the necessity, but the possibility of acting according to these rules. In social and humanitarian knowledge, the model is also used intentional explanations. This model is based on motivation, direction (intention) to some action. The logical form of intentional explanation is the “practical syllogism,” often used in crime investigation. It looks like this: “Nikolaev had a motive to kill Petrov. Petrov was killed. This means that the killer is Nikolaev.” The limitations of such an explanation are obvious, since there is no strict unambiguous connection between motive and action. And yet, as investigative practice shows, establishing a motive, as a rule, helps solve a crime. In social and humanitarian cognition, such methods of explanation as typology, contextual explanation, causal, genetic, functional, structural-systemic, etc. are used. In social cognition, the explanation of human actions is synthesized with understanding.