V. K

Ideas

The Narodnaya Volya party was organized at the Lipetsk Congress in June. In contrast to Land and Freedom, from which Narodnaya Volya emerged, the latter emphasized political struggle as a means of conquering the socialist system. The theoretical worldview of the revolutionary populists (participants in “going to the people”), expressed in the magazines “Forward”, “Nachalo”, “Land and Freedom”, was also adopted by the Narodnaya Volya party. Like Land and Freedom, the Narodnaya Volya party proceeded from the conviction that the Russian people “are in a state of complete slavery, economic and political... They are surrounded by layers of exploiters created and protected by the state... The state constitutes the largest capitalist force in the country; it also constitutes the only political oppressor of the people... This state-bourgeois growth is maintained exclusively by naked violence... There is absolutely no popular sanction for this arbitrary and violent power... The Russian people in their sympathies and ideals are completely socialist; its old, traditional principles are still alive in it - the right of the people to land, communal and local government, the beginnings of a federal structure, freedom of conscience and speech. These principles would be widely developed and would give a completely new direction, in the spirit of the people, to our entire history, if only the people were given the opportunity to live and arrange themselves as they want, in accordance with their own inclinations.” In view of this, the Narodnaya Volya party considered its task to be “a political revolution with the aim of transferring power to the people.” As an instrument of the coup, the party put forward a constituent assembly elected by free universal vote. Pledging to completely submit to the will of the people, the party nevertheless put forward its program, which it had to defend during the election campaign and in the Constituent Assembly:

1. permanent popular representation having full power in all national issues;
2. broad regional self-government, ensured by the election of all positions, the independence of the world and the economic independence of the people;
3. independence of the world as an economic and administrative unit;
4. ownership of the land by the people;
5. a system of measures aimed at transferring all plants and factories into the hands of workers;
6. complete freedom of conscience, speech, press, meetings, associations and election campaigning;
7. universal suffrage, without class or any property restrictions;
8. replacing the standing army with a territorial one.

Story

All terrorist acts that followed Solovyov’s attempt on the life of Emperor Alexander II came from the Narodnaya Volya party. The party, which was insignificant in its composition, relied on the sympathy of only a small part of the intelligentsia and had no basis among the broad masses, showed such energy that it believed in its own strength and made people believe in it. Due to the policies of Count Loris-Melikov, a part of society that had previously sympathized with the People's Will was pushed away from it. When the party, not softened by concessions, killed Emperor Alexander II on March 1, this murder caused not only a government reaction, but also a much more public reaction. wide sizes than Narodnaya Volya expected. Nevertheless, in the following years the party continued its activities (murder of Strelnikov, murder of Sudeikin). In the city, the arrest of Lopatin and many people associated with him completely weakened the party.

Release of the leaflet “Land and Freedom!”

A new Narodnaya Volya group arose in the city (with Ulyanov and Shevyrev at the head), which on March 1 intended to make an attempt on the life of Emperor Alexander III. Then, several more Narodnaya Volya circles arose that had no genetic connection with the old “Narodnaya Volya”; they were not successful, and Narodnaya Volya finally left the stage. Subsequently, it was revived in the form of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, with a slightly modified program.

Causes of the crisis

Popular opinion sees the reason for the fall of Narodnaya Volya in the public reaction caused by the assassination of Alexander II. S. Kravchinsky, in the book “Underground Russia,” offers, however, another explanation for this fact. In his opinion, the People's Will was very strong after 1881, but it set itself unrealistic plans for a broad state conspiracy, through which it could immediately seize power and establish a provisional government; having set out these plans, she abandoned attempts that could increasingly undermine government power and feed the Narodnaya Volya party with new strength. Among the acts committed by Narodnaya Volya, it is necessary to note the theft in a Kherson bank in the city through undermining, which was not successful, since almost all the money taken from the bank (over a million rubles) was very soon found by the police. This fact, which took place back in the heyday of the party, undoubtedly made a negative impression on significant circles of society, having a detrimental effect on Narodnaya Volya. Even more destructive was the activity of the gendarme colonel Sudeikin, who already in the last period of the history of “Narodnaya Volya” introduced his agent Degaev into the party, who subsequently killed him.

Party publications

The “Narodnaya Volya” party published in secret printing houses in St. Petersburg and in the provinces a newspaper of the same name (11 issues were published, 1879-1885) and leaflets of “Narodnaya Volya” (a significant number of them were published from 1880 to 1886); then separate leaflets published by various Narodnaya Volya groups were issued in 1890-92, 1896 and other years. In addition, a magazine was published abroad: “Bulletin of Narodnoi Voli”, ed. P. L. Lavrov, the most prominent theorist of “Narodnaya Volya”; 5 of its volumes were published in 1883-86. In 1883, the “Narodnaya Volya Calendar” was published in Geneva. In these literary works The theory of "People's Will" was developed. Socialist ideals gradually moved into the background and the party acquired a purely political character. Believing in the nearness of revolution, the party was afraid that Russia would have its own Vendée, from which reactionary forces would launch a campaign against the triumphant revolution; therefore, she put forward centralist demands, not noticing their contradiction with the demand for self-government of communities and regions. Thus, the People's Will could finally be considered a Jacobin party; her magazines often resembled Tkachev’s “Alarm”.

The magazine “Narodnaya Volya”, leaflets and some proclamations of the party were reprinted in Bazilevsky’s collection (“Literature of the Party of Narodnaya Volya”, 2nd supplement to the collection “Crimes of the State in Russia”, Paris, 1905). A very severe criticism of “Narodnaya Volya” is given on the one hand by Plekhanov’s “Our Disagreements” (Geneva, 1884), on the other by Drahomanov’s “Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy” (Geneva, 1883; reprinted in the collected works of Drahomanov, vol. I, Paris, 1905). A vivid description (sympathetic) of Narodnaya Volya can be found in Stepnyak’s “Underground Russia” (St. Petersburg, 1905) and in his own novel “Andrei Kozhukhov,” reprinted in St. Petersburg under the title “From the Past” (1905). A lot of valuable material for the history of the Narodnaya Volya party lies in reports about its processes, published at one time in legal and illegal newspapers. Of these, “The Case of March 1, 1881” (official, abridged and distorted report) reprinted in St. Petersburg (1906), with notes by Lev Deitch.

Literature

• Tun A.“History of revolutionary movements in Russia” St. Petersburg, 1906.
• Troitsky N. A."People's Will" before the royal court (1880-1891). Saratov: Publishing house Saratov University, 1971; 2nd ed., rev. and additional Saratov: Saratov University Publishing House, 1983.
• Troitsky N. A. Tsarist courts against revolutionary Russia (Political trials of 1871-1880). Saratov: Saratov University Publishing House, 1976.
• Troitsky N. A.. M.: Mysl, 1978.
• Troitsky N. A. Tsarism on trial by the progressive public (1866-1895). M.: Mysl, 1979.
• Troitsky N. A. Political processes in Russia 1871-1887. A manual for the special course. Saratov: Saratov State University named after. N. G. Chernyshevsky, 2003.

Links

• People's Will. Article in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron.
• Insarov M. People's will
• Troitsky N. A.“People's Will” // Russia in the 19th century: Course of lectures
• Troitsky N. A."People's Will" and its "Red Terror"
• Troitsky N. A."The feat of Nikolai Kletochnikov"
• Troitsky N. A.“The madness of the brave. Russian revolutionaries and the punitive policy of tsarism 1866-1882.” (monograph)
• Yochelson V.“The first days of Narodnaya Volya”
• The Tsar's prison in the memoirs of Narodnaya Volya member M. P. Orlov: “About Akatui from the time of Melshin”
• People's Will (organization) on Khronos

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

And so, “Land and Freedom” split. The "villagers" led by G.V. Plekhanov, P.B. Akselrodom, L.G. Deychem, V.I. Zasulich and others, who formed a minority, gave the name of their organization “Black Redistribution”, reflecting in this name the eternal craving of the peasants for the “black”, i.e. general redistribution of land. In the central, St. Petersburg group of the “Black Redistribution” there were 22 people, and total number The organization, including its provincial circles in about 10 cities, did not even reach 100 people.

The Black Peredelites established the publication of their central organ under the same name “Black Redistribution” and a separate newspaper for workers (“Grain”), but they were unable to develop practical activities as they wanted: the old ways and means of struggle had already lost credit among the Russian revolutionaries. Soon, the Black Peredelites either emigrated (like all of those listed), or joined the “People's Will,” or completely moved away from the revolutionary movement. By the end of 1881, the “Black Redistribution” virtually ceased to exist.

Most of the landowners joined the “People's Will”, the number and power of which continuously grew; it became the largest, strongest and most authoritative of all Russian revolutionary organizations of the 19th century, the first in Russia political party. The leading center of “Narodnaya Volya” was its Executive Committee (“Great EC”, as contemporaries and then historians called it), numbering 36 people throughout its existence. Among them, three stood out in particular: the son of a serf peasant, a magnificent agitator, tribune and organizer with the intellect and outlook of a first-class statesman, a born leader Andrei Ivanovich Zhelyabov; the chief administrator of "Narodnaya Volya" and the unique, inimitable conspirator, former "Cato the Censor" of the Land Volunteer underground, Alexander Dmitrievich Mikhailov; the highest moral authority, the “moral dictator” of the party (in the words of S.M. Kravchinsky) Sofya Lvovna Perovskaya - the daughter of the St. Petersburg governor and the great-great-granddaughter of the morganatic husband of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna - in no way inferior to the most feminine of women and the most courageous of men . Next to them were outstanding organizers - N.A. Morozov, A.A. Kvyatkovsky, V.N. Figner, brilliant practices - M.F. Frolenko, N.N. Kolodkevich, M.F. Grachevsky, as well as the selfless and noble head of the People's Will Military /261/ organization Nikolai Evgenievich Sukhanov, about whom Vera Figner said: “Happy is the party to which the Sukhanovs pester!”

Of the IR agents, he stood out chief technician party, the head of its dynamite laboratory, the brilliant inventor Nikolai Ivanovich Kibalchich - the herald of the space age, the first in the world (15 years before K.E. Tsiolkovsky) to develop the project aircraft with a jet engine. An agent of the IK was also the one-of-a-kind counterintelligence agent of the Russian revolution N.V. Kletochnikov, who served for two years in the III Department on instructions from Land and Freedom (the first 7 months), and then from Narodnaya Volya, almost daily neutralizing police intrigues against revolutionaries.

The EC published as the central organ of the party the newspaper Narodnaya Volya, which was published from 1879 to 1885 and turned out to be the most durable of the revolutionary publications of the 19th century. in Russia. In addition, four more publications were published: Leaflet "Narodnaya Volya" (appendix to central authority), "Workers' Newspaper", Bulletin of "Narodnaya Volya", Calendar of "Narodnaya Volya". Total - five periodicals! Previously, only “Land and Freedom” 1876-1879. had its own literary organ, but all other revolutionary organizations in Russia never went beyond issuing individual proclamations. As the ideological headquarters of the party, the IC developed its program documents. The "Program of the Executive Committee" was considered a general party program. It was a step forward in the Russian liberation movement, as it freed itself from the anarchism and apolitism of the 70s. "People's Will" aimed to overthrow the autocracy and implement a series of democratic reforms. Here are the main ones:

1. Permanent people's representation with legislative functions, i.e. parliamentary democratic republic (“autocracy of the people,” as the Narodnaya Volya members put it).
2. Complete freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, conscience, and election campaigning.
3. Universal suffrage without class and property restrictions and the election of all positions from top to bottom.
4. The land is for the peasants, the factories are for the workers.
5. National equality and the right of nations to self-determination.

Like all populists, Narodnaya Volya proceeded from the fact that “the main creative force revolution - among the people", i.e. in the peasantry, and therefore considered the peasant uprising the most important means of achieving their goal, but with the support of the workers and military, under the leadership of the party. Moreover, having experienced the experience of "going to the people", the Narodnaya Volya members lost faith into the revolutionary initiative peasantry and came to the conclusion that “the party must take upon itself the initiative of the coup.” The IK program prescribed the preparation of a coup, on the one hand, through /262/ propaganda, agitation and organizational work in all segments of the population, and on the other hand, through “red” terror.

The widespread opinion in world literature about "People's Will" as a terrorist party is incorrect. Such a lie was put into use by the tsarist punitive forces to make the accusations against the Narodnaya Volya more serious; it was picked up by philistine rumor, after which it migrated into literature - scientific, educational and artistic. In reality, terror never occupied the main place either in the program or in the activities of Narodnaya Volya, it was simply in plain sight as a prelude and accelerator of the people's revolution. Through terror, the Narodnaya Volya members sought to solve a dual problem: on the one hand, to arouse a revolutionary mood among the masses and, on the other hand, to disorganize the government, in order to then raise the excited masses against the disorganized government.

Here it is important to emphasize that the “red” terror of “Narodnaya Volya” was historically conditioned, imposed on the revolutionaries as a response to the “white” terror of tsarism against “going to the people.” “When a person who wants to speak is clamped over his mouth, this frees his hands” - this is how A.D. explained the transition from propaganda to terror. Mikhailov. The Narodnaya Volya could not then foresee that terror would not lead to its goal. In the phase that the revolutionary movement reached by the end of the 70s, terror could not simply be discarded, it could only be overcome. It turned out to be the only possible not yet tested party-wide way of struggle.

The Narodnaya Volya themselves strongly stipulated the transitory conditionality of their terror. The IC protested against the assassination attempt by anarchist Charles Guiteau on US President D. Garfield. “In a country where personal freedom makes it possible to have an honest ideological struggle, where the free people’s will determines not only the law, but also the personality of the rulers,” explained the Executive Committee on September 10 (22), 1881, “in such a country, political murder as a means of struggle is a manifestation the same spirit of despotism, the destruction of which in Russia we set as our task." Aware of the moral and political reprehensibility of terror, the Narodnaya Volya allowed it only as a forced, last resort. “Terror is a terrible thing,” said S.M. Kravchinsky, “there is only one thing worse than terror: it is to endure violence without complaint.”

A tiny minority of “Narodnaya Volya” was engaged in terrorism, although it had immeasurably more forces than all the revolutionary organizations that existed in Russia before combined. Based on the totality of data for 1879-1883. "People's Will" united at least 80-90 local, 100-120 workers, 50 officers, 30-40 student and 20-25 gymnasium circles throughout the country from Helsingfors (Helsinki) to Tiflis (Tbilisi) and Revel (Tallinn) to Irkutsk. It had 10 printing houses in Russia and one more abroad, and even a permanent foreign representative office in Paris (P.L. Lavrov, L.A. Tikhomirov, M.N. Oshanina) and London (L.N. Hartman). The number of active, legally registered members of Narodnaya Volya was 500 people, but 10-20 times more participated in its activities, helping it in one way or another. According to the Police Department, in just a year and a half, from July 1881 to 1882, almost 6 thousand people were subjected to repression for participating in Narodnaya Volya.

All Narodnaya Volya circles acted energetically and boldly. Their activities among the intelligentsia, especially among students, were unprecedented in scope at that time. The connections between Narodnaya Volya and students throughout the country were excellently established and organized: in St. Petersburg there was a Central University Group that united and directed the efforts of Narodnaya Volya groups in all universities of the capital; the same system is in Moscow, Kyiv, Kazan, Odessa; separate student circles operated under local organizations of “Narodnaya Volya” in all cities where there were higher education institutions educational institutions, and in contact with them - circles of high school students and seminarians in the same and many other (where there were no universities) cities. This entire widely branched network of circles trained revolutionary cadres for the party, distributed proclamations, organized meetings, obstructions to the authorities, and demonstrations. The entire thinking Russia was forced to talk about itself by the anti-government demonstration organized by the People's Will at the University Act in St. Petersburg on February 8, 1881 in the presence of 4 thousand students, teachers and honored guests. The People's Will, led by Zhelyabov, Perovskaya and Vera Figner, scattered revolutionary leaflets around the hall, Lev Kogan-Bernstein managed to give a brief accusatory speech to the chorus, and Papius Podbelsky, stepping into the presidium, branded the Minister of Education A.A., who was sitting there. Saburov with a slap.

For the first time in Russia, Narodnaya Volya created a special Work organization of all-Russian significance with a center in St. Petersburg and branches in almost all manufacturing regions of the country. The Moscow working group alone included 100-120 people, the Odessa one - up to 300, the St. Petersburg one - /264/ hundreds of workers from almost all the factories of the capital, etc. A special “Program of workers, members of the Narodnaya Volya party” was developed. It testifies that the Narodnaya Volya members, unlike their predecessors, no longer saw the workers as intermediaries between the intelligentsia and the peasantry, but as an independent (not the main, but independent) striking force at the first stage of the revolution. The uprising “may be crowned with success,” says Preparatory work party" - if the party provides itself with the opportunity to move to the aid of the first skirmishers (i.e. students and military personnel. - N.T.) any significant masses of workers,” even before the multimillion-dollar mass of the peasantry rises.

The Workers' Newspaper was published as a means of propaganda among workers. According to the tsarist investigation, it spread everywhere where the workers lived. However, "People's Will" was not content with propaganda and agitation among workers; it also participated in organizing strikes - not in many factories in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kyiv, Perm. According to the memoirs of G.V. Plekhanov, Andrei Zhelyabov understood well that in Russia “a strike is a political fact.”

Believing that in the coming revolution "success first attack entirely depends on the workers and the army,” the Narodnaya Volya members created, along with the Worker and Student organizations, their own Military organization, more powerful than the entire set of Decembrist organizations by 1825. The Military organization of the “Narodnaya Volya” has not yet been properly studied. But we know that it united at least 50 circles in at least 41 cities with the participation of 400 officers, each of whom was interesting and worth a lot. For example, Lieutenant Colonel M. Yu. Aschenbrenner had an outstanding military reputation and extensive connections in army circles, and Major N.A. Tikhotsky was known as a high-society juir, danced at court balls and was among the very top of the military aristocracy.

The scale of the Military Organization of the People's Will is evidenced by the fact that in the spring of 1882 it counted only in Kronstadt on “two naval crews (about 8 thousand people) and two small battleships, as well as the garrisons of nine fortresses.” Probably, the peripheral circles also relied on local garrisons. According to the testimony of a member of the Narodnaya Volya Military Center N.M. Rogachev, at the end of 1881 the center was preparing to extend its actions “to all units of troops located in European Russia"According to indirect data, the IK "Narodnaya Volya" tried, not without success, to attract to itself some "persons of the highest military hierarchy", including the most popular of the /265/ Russian commanders of the second half of the 19th century, M.D. Skobelev and the most educated of them, the head of the Academy of the General Staff M.I. Dragomirov.

Narodnaya Volya paid less attention to the peasants than its predecessors, but still sent out propagandists and distributed proclamations among peasants in dozens of provinces in the European part of the country. These proclamations found a sympathetic response among the peasants, causing (or intensifying the fermentation that had begun earlier). Thus, under the influence and, perhaps, not without the participation of the Narodnaya Volya, an uprising of peasants in two districts of the Tver province broke out in March 1881, pacified only by the force of the troops.

So, the overwhelming majority of the forces of “Narodnaya Volya” were engaged in propaganda, agitation and organizational work in all segments of the population. As for the terror, it was the work of only the members and closest agents of the IK (who, by the way, were involved in all other aspects of the party’s activities), as well as several successive technicians, throwers, and observers. Only 12 ordinary party members, known by name, participated in the preparation and implementation of all eight Narodnaya Volya attempts on the life of the Tsar.

Terror, as the shock warhead of the revolutionary charge of Narodnaya Volya, was striking, overshadowing other actions of the party, especially since its tip was aimed at the Tsar. On August 26, 1879, the IK sentenced Alexander II to death. From that day on, an 18-month hunt by the Narodnaya Volya members for the Tsar, unprecedented in history, began.

The enemies and critics of Narodnaya Volya say a lot about the fact that it villainously persecuted and killed Tsar Liberator. At the same time, an indisputable fact is hushed up: by the end of the 70s, the tsar, who at one time freed the peasants from serfdom, had already earned himself a new “title”: Hangman. After all, in 1863, with the hands of Muravyov-Hangman, he drowned the Polish national liberation uprising in blood, and after Muravyov’s death, he hanged Karakozov, sent the peaceful propagandists of 1874 to hard labor and into exile, and in 1879 alone authorized the hanging of 16 populists. Among others, D.A. was hanged. Lizogub - only because he ordered it in his own way own money, donating it to the revolutionary treasury. It is characteristic of Alexander II that he demanded the gallows even in those cases when a military court sentenced the populists (V.A. Osinsky and others) to death. The IK recorded all this in the death sentence to the king. /266/

In organizing the assassination attempts on Alexander II, the Narodnaya Volya showed incredible ingenuity. Aware of the tsar's travel routes (with the help of Kletochnikov), they almost blew it up three times only in November 1879 - each time the tsar was saved by a miracle. On November 19, near Moscow, Sofya Perovskaya and Stepan Shiryaev, having missed the first train, which usually housed the tsar’s retinue, set off an explosion in the fourth carriage in the second train, where the tsar was traveling for greater safety. Alexander II was saved by the oversight of the railway authorities: they accidentally launched the royal train first - it slipped through; the luggage car (with Crimean fruits) of the Svitsky train was blown up. On February 5, 1880, Stepan Khalturin blew up the dining room in the Winter Palace exactly in time for the royal dinner, but Alexander II was 2-3 minutes late and again survived.

This entire chain of assassination attempts inflamed the situation in the country and, as the Narodnaya Volya members counted on it, brought disorganization to the camp of the “tops.” On the lips of many at that time was the New Year's speech to Alexander II in the newspaper "Narodnaya Volya" dated January 1, 1880: "The death of Alexander II is a decided matter, and the question here can only be in time, in methods, in general in details." However, it was not just the terrorist struggle, but the entire revolutionary struggle of “Narodnaya Volya” that represented the most important factor in the new revolutionary situation that emerged in Russia at the turn of the 70s and 80s.

Historiographical information. The first historians of populism were its punishers, who laid down the protective concept in the historiography of the populist movement. Count S.S. Tatishchev, Prince N.N. Golitsyn, General N.I. Shebeko, agent of the III department A.P. Malyinsky portrayed the populist “sedition,” contrary to the wise principle: “sine ira et studio,” as a string of atrocities, but they tried to arm the punishers with facts so that they would persecute the populists knowledgeably.

Following the protective one and in opposition to it, the liberal concept of populism emerged. Its meaning: the populists are noble dreamers who sought to educate the Russian people peacefully and differed from the liberals only psychologically: the liberals were supposedly sensible but weak-willed Hamlets, and the populists were strong-willed but reckless Don Quixotes. Tsarism subjected populism to cruel repression and thereby turned good-natured populists into malicious revolutionaries. Thus, based on the experience of the history of populism, liberals advised tsarism to be tolerant of them, proving that punitive excesses embitter even dreamers and turn them into revolutionaries, dangerous primarily for /267/ tsarism itself. Classics of the liberal concept - A.A. Kornilov, L.E. Barrivée, B.B. Glinsky and especially V.Ya. Bogucharsky.

Soviet historiography of populism is based on the assessments of V.I. Lenin, opportunistically choosing some of them and hushing up (or even falsifying) others. Historians of the USSR exalted A.I. Herzen and, even more, N.G. Chernyshevsky, exaggerated liberation movement the early 60s, but belittled the populists of a later time, starting with the Ishutins because of their connection with terrorism. In February 1935, Stalin said: “If we educate our people with the Narodnaya Volya, we will educate terrorists.” After this, not only Narodnaya Volya, but also all Narodnik issues were banned for more than a quarter of a century. Herzen, Chernyshevsky and the entire circle of their associates were torn out of the history of populism. For all their admiration for Lenin, Soviet historians deliberately ignored his judgment that Herzen and Chernyshevsky were “the founders of populism,” and tried to prove the unprovable: supposedly neither Herzen nor Chernyshevsky were populists. Traces of such violence against the historiography of populism remained in the USSR until recently.

“Narodnaya Volya” suffered especially in this case, which was either hushed up or scourged, its theory was distorted, its practice was belittled, and its merits were belittled. The fate of “Narodnaya Volya” is doubly tragic: first, as a subject of history, it went through a barrage of repressions from tsarism (you can’t count its heroes and martyrs who were hanged, shot, killed in tsarist prisons and convict holes), and then as a historical object - through the thorns of prejudiced assessments from historians, right up to today. Even the authors of the creative book “Revolutionary Tradition in Russia” (Moscow, 1986) I.K., which claims to overcome anti-populist stereotypes. Pantin, E.G. Plimak and V.G. Khoros saw in the ideology of "Narodnaya Volya" mainly "vagueness", "confusion", "primitivism", and its activities were considered a "dead end".

Recently, punitive and protective assessments of populism have become “fashionable” again.

Nevertheless, our scientists were able to prepare a series of genuine /268/ scientific works and about the populist movement of the mid-60s - early 80s.

The foreign (especially Anglo-American) historiography of Russian populism is very large. It is dominated by negative assessments of the populists, similar to the views of the tsarist guards, although B. Peirs, E. Crankshaw, R. Pipes, R. Hingley, A. Ulam and other critics of populism do not approve, unlike S.S. Tatishchev or A.P. Malshinsky, the punitive policy of tsarism. Many foreign historians judge populism from positions close to Russian liberal historiography: W. Walsh, A. Kelly, D. Hecht, D. Footman. The most comprehensive works are those of E. Lampert (England) and especially F. Venturi (Italy).

All of them, four years later, will mark the beginning of the spread of Marxism in Russia, and Vera Zasulich - the first Russian female terrorist - will become the first Russian female Marxist.

See the program instructions of "Narodnaya Volya" - "Preparatory work of the party" in the book: Revolutionary populism of the 70s. Sat. Doc. M., Leningrad, 1965 T. 2. P. 176.

Literature of the party "People's Will" M., 1930. P. 127.

For details see: Troitsky N.A."People's Will" before the royal court. 2nd ed. Saratov, 1983. pp. 355-357.

. Aschenbrenner M.Yu. Military organization of "People's Will" and other memories (1860-1904). M., 1924. P. 97.

Let me remind you that earlier, on April 4, 1866, an attempt was made on the life of Alexander II D V. Karakozov, June 6, 1867 - A.I. Berezovsky and April 2, 1879 - A.K. Soloviev. Thus, the revolutionaries were able to execute Alexander N only on the 11th attempt.

Kozmin B.P. Russian section of the First International. M, 1957; Vilenskaya E.S. Revolutionary underground in Russia (60s of the XIX century). M., 1965; Itenberg B.S. Movement of revolutionary populism. M., 1965; Tvardovskaya V. A. Socialist thought of Russia at the turn of the 1870-1880s. M., 1969.

See: Warn A. In the Name of the People. N.Y., 1977.

See: Lampert E. Sons against Fathers. L., 1965; Venturi F. Roots of Revolution. N.Y., 1960.

"People's Will" declared a merciless war on the autocracy.

In 1879, a revolutionary situation arose in the country. The government hesitated and began to look for new forms of concessions. For more details on this, see: P. A. Zayonchkovsky, The crisis of autocracy at the turn of 1870-1880, M., 1964.

The Narodnaya Volya followed the theory of Tkachev, a revolutionary who was convicted in the Nechaevite case and fled abroad, where he published the Nabat magazine. Tkachev was an ideologist of Russian Blanquism, a revolutionary movement that gives priority to conspiratorial activity and terror against the authorities, and argued that with the help of a conspiracy, a group of revolutionaries could seize power and, relying on it, begin socialist transformations. “Only by possessing power can a minority force the majority—that inert, routine majority that has not yet matured to understand the need for revolution and has not understood its goals and objectives—to force this majority to reorganize its life in accordance with its true needs, in accordance with the ideal of the best and most just community." Quote by: Milov L.V., Tsimbaev N.I. History of Russia XVIII - XIX centuries. - M.: EKSMO, 2006. - 784 p. - P.677.

Tkachev taught that autocracy “has nothing to do with the existing social system,” it “hangs in the air,” which makes it possible for Russian revolutionaries to deliver several decisive blows to the “abandoned government.” For the coup to be successful, a strong, united and disciplined organization of revolutionaries is needed: “Only with such an organization will the revolutionaries, having seized power, be able to protect it from the claims of hostile parties, intriguers, political ambitions, only it will give them the opportunity to suppress the conservative and reactionary elements of society, only it alone fully meets the needs of the struggle, it fully corresponds to the type of combat organization.”

Believing that the Russian peasant is “a communist by instinct, by tradition,” he believed that the implementation of the ideals of socialism is not difficult, although he emphasized that new forms are rapidly developing in the depths of the communal system - “forms of bourgeois life, kulaks and world-eating are developing; the principle of individualism, economic anarchy, heartless, greedy egoism reigns.”

Tkachev wrote: “The immediate goal of the revolution should be nothing other than to seize government power and transform a given conservative state into a revolutionary state.” Quote by: Milov L.V., Tsimbaev N.I. History of Russia XVIII - XIX centuries. - M.: EKSMO, 2006. - 784 p. - P.678. Relying on the independent creativity of the masses meant, according to Tkachev, an actual rejection of the revolution: “The people are not able to build on the ruins of the old world a new world that would be able to progress, develop in the direction of the communist ideal; therefore, in building this new world, he cannot and should not play any outstanding, leading role.” Right there.

The Narodnaya Volya party was headed by the Executive Committee, which included A.I. Zhelyabov, A.D. Mikhailov, S.L. Perovskaya, V.N. Figner, N.A. Morozov and others. Around the Executive Committee there was a system of local revolutionary groups, workers' circles and officer organizations.

The Narodnaya Volya, who came under the influence of the logic of the revolutionary struggle to the ideas of Russian Blanquism, set as their goal:

· overthrow of the monarchy and revolutionary seizure of power;

· convocation of the Constituent Assembly and transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people;

· approval of political freedoms;

· building, in the long term, communal socialism.

They were skeptical about the peasantry, which, despite “all efforts on the part of the party to support and organize it, is not able to cope with a centralized and well-armed enemy.” See the text of the program: Populist economic literature. - M., 1958. - P. 384--388.

The main means of achieving the goal was recognized as a political revolution with the help of the army and with the support of the people.

To disorganize the government, the Narodnaya Volya decided to use individual terror, which they perceived as a means of revolutionary propaganda, as a factor capable of pushing the masses to revolt. The revolutionary terrorism of “Narodnaya Volya” was sympathetically perceived by the Western European public, which was carried away by the pathos of the heroic struggle against autocratic despotism. The Russian liberal public was inclined to justify the terrorist activities of the Narodnaya Volya by the fact that in Russia there are no conditions for legal political struggle.

However, gradually terror attracted all the forces of the party and became the main means of political struggle. The Narodnaya Volya launched a real “hunt for the Tsar.” Having made several attempts (the explosion of the royal train near Moscow in November 1879, the explosion in the Winter Palace in February 1880, prepared by S.N. Khalturin), they achieved their goal. On March 1, 1881, a group of terrorists led by Perovskaya killed Alexander II. Despite the warnings, the emperor, after a long break, left the Winter Palace to take part in the dismantling of the guards. A bomb was thrown into his carriage on the Catherine Canal; the explosion did not hit the Tsar, but poor security arrangements led to the fact that a second bomb was thrown at Alexander II, who had exited the carriage, and the explosion of which mortally wounded him.

The Executive Committee addressed the new Tsar with a letter, demanding the convening of “representatives from the entire Russian people to review the existing forms of state and public life.” The Narodnaya Volya listed the conditions under which they agreed to end the terror: a general amnesty for “political crimes,” universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press, and gatherings. The letter was left unanswered, the main forces of Narodnaya Volya were defeated, and the participants in the assassination attempt were executed. Antonov V.F. Revolutionary populism. - M.: Publishing house "Enlightenment", 1965. - P.260-261.

Attempts by Figner and Lopatin to preserve Narodnaya Volya were unsuccessful. In 1882, the provocateur S.P. Degaev betrayed the military organization of the party. After Lopatin's arrest in October 1884, Narodnaya Volya practically ceased to exist. With it, the history of revolutionary populism ended, which over time turned into a social revolutionary direction of the liberation movement.

"Black Reach" (1879-1882)

By the end of the 70s. The working class in Russia was far from being an established social stratum, but it already had some experience of struggle and organization. The workers' spontaneous desire for political struggle led them to Kazan Square in December 1876. Since then, workers have resorted to demonstrations more and more often, and at the end of the decade their strikes became a common occurrence. The “Black Redistribution” group included G. Plekhanov, M. Popov, Yu. Preobrazhensky, O. Nikolaev, N. Korotkevich, M. Krylova, V. Ignatov, L. Hartman, Y. Stefanovich, O. Aptekman, L. Deitch , P. Axelrod, V. Zasulich and others, 21 people in total. "Black redistribution". - M., 1922. - P. 91. Its composition was not constant and homogeneous in beliefs. Leaders of the “Black Reach” - G.V. Plekhanov, P.B. Axerold, L.G. Deitch, V.I. Zasulich - continued to defend the populist goals of communal socialism. They considered the main task of their activities to be the preparation of a peasant revolution with the help of propaganda in the countryside. Those. “Black Redistribution,” as we see, tried to be the ideological heir and continuer of the work of “Land and Freedom,” but this attempt did not bring him success. The former landowners who became part of the “Black Redistribution” practically lost ties with the village, but still remained in the city. However, here too they were soon forced to abandon their positions, which was caused mainly by the cooling of the intelligentsia towards the program of the land organization, which was entirely accepted by the “Black Redistribution”. This was facilitated by the rapid defeat of the organization. O. V. Aptekman wrote that “the Black Peredelites, in the person of Plekhanov, Aptekman, Nikolaev, Preobrazhensky, Popov and Shchedrin, who, before the publication of the newspaper “Black Peredel”, conducted energetic propaganda among young people, soon became convinced that young people were leaving them all more and more. Only small groups of people supporting the only practical initiative of the Black Redistribution group arrived - the publication of the organ "Black Redistribution". These small cells were convinced populist socialists, who tried with all their might to fan the barely smoldering flames of life in the already dying revolutionary populism.” "Black redistribution". Organ of the Federalist Socialists 1880-1881. - M.-Pg., 1923. - P.94. In 1883, having become disillusioned with populism and finding themselves in exile, the Chernopredelites, led by Plekhanov, switched to the position of Marxism and created the “Emancipation of Labor” group in Geneva, the first Russian social democratic organization. This indicated the final collapse of the program and tactics of the Land Volyas.

Conclusion

With the defeat of Narodnaya Volya and the collapse of the Black Redistribution in the 80s, the period of “effective” populism ended, however, as an ideological direction of Russian social thought, populism did not leave the historical stage. In the 80-90s, the ideas of liberal (or, as it was called, “legal”) populism became widespread. Its representatives advocated social and political reforms, preached the theory of “small deeds” - painstaking daily work in the field of education and in the name of improving the financial situation of the masses. Some prominent figures of liberal populism, such as N.K. Mikhailovsky, V.P. Vorontsov, N.F. Danielson, made a significant contribution to the study of the socio-economic life of post-reform Russia.

At the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. Radical neo-populist circles and organizations also emerged that set as their goal to continue the work of the populists of the seventies.

However, populism in Russia in the 70-80s. XIX century, in contrast to the previous time, became important factor political life of the country. It tried to test the socialist ideas of Russian thinkers in practice, not stopping at either violence or human sacrifice for this purpose.

However, the ideas of revolutionary populism, although they were defeated, showed that in the second half of the 19th century a direction capable of carrying out the evolutionary modernization of the country had not yet emerged. In addition, the foundations were laid for the formation of political parties in the future.

The emergence and characteristics of Russian liberalism

In parallel with populism and the labor movement in the 2nd half. XIX century In Russia, the liberal movement is also beginning to gain special strength.

Liberalism (Latin: free) is a doctrine that calls for ensuring individual freedom, civil, political and economic rights and freedoms.

Liberalism is the brainchild of a capitalist society, when an individual freed from feudal dependence begins to fight for equal rights and freedoms with the ruling elite. Therefore, liberals took the position of Westernism, recognizing the pattern of development of capitalism in Russia, and considering the natural need to reform the socio-political system. The beginnings of liberal thought in Russia began to form in the 20-30s. XIX century. The Decembrists were among the first in Russia with liberal demands for endowing society with rights and freedoms and enshrining them in the Constitution. During the polemics between Westerners and Slavophiles in the middle. XIX century liberal views were expressed by major political and government figures Kavelin and Loris-Melikov.

In the 2nd half. XIX century capitalism in Russia had just begun to develop, so Russian liberalism was formed under the strong influence of Western European liberal thought, but with adjustments to the peculiarities of Russian reality.

European liberalism of the 19th century put forward demands for the free development of man, the supremacy of the individual and his interests over collectivism, state-guaranteed human rights and freedoms, the right to property and free competition, etc.

Russian liberals, having absorbed the ideas of Slavophilism, tried to develop a theory of reforming the state while simultaneously preserving purely Russian traditions - the monarchy, the peasant community, etc.

They demanded the elimination of class privileges, the creation of volost zemstvos, the reduction of redemption payments, the reform of the State Council, the involvement of zemstvos in legislative advisory activities, etc.

These demands did not affect the foundations of autocracy and were aimed only at its gradual reform into a constitutional monarchy, the creation of a civil society and a rule-of-law state in Russia.

The bourgeoisie, as the main bearer of liberal ideas in the West, in Russia was still so weak and dependent on power that it itself was afraid of radical reforms, and therefore occupied the right flank of the movement - the so-called liberal conservativism.

Therefore, the main carriers of liberal ideas in Russia were the progressive nobility and intelligentsia, which only strengthened the pro-monarchist shades of this socio-political movement.

After the defeat of the revolutionary Decembrist wing, the Russian nobility abandoned illegal activities, limiting itself to petitions “in the highest name.”

The reforms of the 60s and 70s gave a serious impetus to the development of the liberal movement.

The general emancipation of society led to the expansion of the liberal movement at the expense of the Russian intelligentsia, which made changes to the tactics of the movement.

While maintaining, for the most part, monarchist views, the liberal intelligentsia considered it necessary to increase pressure on the authorities.

They used semi-legal methods: letters addressed to the highest name, propaganda of new ideas in student audiences, support for peaceful political speeches (strikes, demonstrations, etc.).

2. Ideology of the liberal intelligentsia

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a) B.N. Chicherin; (Back to top)

One of the brightest representatives of Russian liberal thought of the 60s. XIX century there was a lawyer, historian, philosopher Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin.

The son of a noble landowner, he received an excellent education at home, studied at the Faculty of Law of Moscow University, where he was considered one of the best students of T.N. Granovsky, S.M. Solovyov and K.D. Kavelin, and where he was left to prepare for the professorship.

While in London, Chicherin met with Herzen, but their views sharply diverged.

Herzen took a revolutionary position, while Chicherin believed that in Russia only the autocratic government has sufficient power to bring about reforms, and therefore it is necessary to act through the government.

He wrote: “Insurrection can be the last resort of need; revolutions sometimes express historical turns in people’s life, but this is always violence, not law.”

According to him, an uprising inevitably leads to chaos, so personal freedom can only exist in the state, and within the framework of the law.

In the radical views of Herzen and Chernyshevsky, he saw evidence of the immaturity of Russian society, which convinced him of the prematureness of the Constitution for Russia.

Chicherin happily welcomed the reforms of Alexander II, considering the reform path to be the most optimal for Russia.

In 1861, he began teaching state law at Moscow University.

It was then that his program of “liberal conservativism” was finally formed, which was based on the principle of “liberal measures and strong power.”

Chicherin’s views on the transformation of Russia “from above” received the support of many liberal-minded government officials, among whom was Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakov, who had great influence on Emperor Alexander II.

However, they were not destined to be justified - in 1865, Tsarevich Nicholas died, and Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich (the future Alexander III), who was an opponent of liberal reforms, became the heir.

After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881, Chicherin was elected Moscow City Mayor, but his political career did not work out.

His liberal views collided with the conservative course of K.P. Pobedonostsev<, готовившего контрреформы.

Chicherin's speeches by the new government were interpreted as a requirement of the constitution, which led to his resignation.

b) P.K. Milyukov (Back to top)

In con. XIX century “fresh blood” poured into the Russian liberal movement.

The developing capitalism of post-reform Russia gave birth to a new intelligentsia, “purified” of outdated Slavophilism and absorbed all the new achievements of Western European science.

One of the most prominent figures of this time was Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov.

Born into the family of a professor-architect two years before the Manifesto for the Liberation of the Peasants, Miliukov made a brilliant scientific career.

In 1881, he was expelled from Moscow University and arrested for participating in student protests.

However, the very next year he not only completed his studies, but was also retained by Professor V.O. Klyuchevsky at the Department of Russian History.

In 1895, Miliukov was dismissed from the University and exiled to Ryazan for “being a bad influence on young people.”

In 1899, for participating in a meeting dedicated to the memory of P.L. Lavrov, he was sentenced to 6 months in prison.

Only a petition to Tsar Klyuchevsky made it possible to reduce this period to 3 months, after which Miliukov emigrated abroad, not for the first time.

In the period 1903-1905. he traveled and lectured in England, the Balkans and the USA.

In exile, he met with figures of the liberal and social democratic movement (P.A. Kropotkin, E.K. Breshko-Breshkovskaya, V.I. Lenin, etc.).

In 1905, when the First Russian Revolution began in Russia, Miliukov returned and began creating the Cadets Party (Constitutional Democrats), which became the largest liberal party in Russia.

Miliukov's political ideal was a parliamentary constitutional monarchy of the English type, which should replace the unlimited autocratic regime.

He advocated the convening of a Constituent Assembly, which would develop a constitution and transform Russia into a rule of law state with a parliamentary monarchy, giving citizens broad political rights.

The program of constitutional democrats provided for the introduction of universal suffrage and democratic freedoms, the implementation of the demand for cultural self-determination of the nations and nationalities of Russia, an 8-hour working day, and the solution of the agrarian question by transferring to the peasants the monastic, state and state-purchased part of the landowners' lands.

Like the liberal nobles, Miliukov advocated an evolutionary path of social development, but if the government is unable to carry out the necessary reforms in a timely manner, a political revolution (but not a social one) is permissible.

Miliukov avoided any extremes, for which his views were criticized by both radicals and moderates, calling his views “cowardly liberalism.”

3. Zemstvo liberalism

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The zemstvo reform on January 1, 1864 led to the creation of zemstvo self-government bodies, in which the majority of landowners and zemstvo intelligentsia (doctors, teachers, agronomists, etc.) were represented.

Zemstvo bodies received economic functions, which led to the revival of local economic life and, at the same time, to the development of the zemstvo social movement.

The goal of the zemstvos was to create a representative institution from local self-government bodies and admit them to public affairs.

In 1862, the Tver provincial nobility sent an appeal to the emperor, which said:

“The convening of electors from the entire land represents the only means for a satisfactory resolution of the issues raised, but not resolved by the provisions of February 19.”

Activation of populism and the development of terrorism con. 70s prompted Zemstvo residents to take action.

The liberal nobility was ready to assist the government in the fight against the rampant leftist forces if the government moved towards rapprochement with them.

Among the government representatives there were supporters of rapprochement with the liberal part of society, proposing the creation of a representative government body.

Among these we can single out the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Commission, Loris-Melikov, who developed a project for the creation of a Large Commission of representatives of zemstvo self-government bodies.

However, the regicide on March 1, 1881 buried this project, and Alexander III, who ascended the throne, refused any rapprochement with the liberals.

Any opposition was considered by him as a manifestation of revolutionism.

4. Liberal populism

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Liberal populism is a special trend in the liberal movement.

These views were formed under the influence of Slavophile ideology and liberalism.

The main theoretician of this trend was Nikolai Konstantinovich Mikhailovsky, a native of the nobility, a publicist and one of the editors of the journals Otechestvennye zapiski and Russkoe Slovo.

Mikhailovsky’s views largely echoed the ideas of the populist propagandists.

Like Lavrov, he considered the main value to be the individual, who must be protected from an unjust society, and placed his main hopes on the activities of a progressive-minded minority - the intelligentsia, which should express the interests of all workers. But, unlike Lavrov, Mikhailovsky did not believe in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and opposed any revolution.

In one of his letters, he wrote to Lavrov: “I am not a revolutionary, to each his own.”

Mikhailovsky did not deny the significance of revolutions in the history of mankind, but saw in them a danger both for the accumulated wealth of civilization and for the integrity of the individual.

He recognized the political struggle as acceptable methods, remaining on a legal reformist position.

Through magazines, he advocated the destruction of the remnants of serfdom and landownership, considering the way out of the deplorable situation of the peasants to be allotted land and the creation of a “working peasant economy,” which should follow a non-capitalist path of development.

In the 80s The main role in the study of post-reform Russia was played by liberal populist economists - Danielson and Vorontsov.

In their works, they revealed the predatory nature of the reform of 1861 for the peasants, proving that the village became a source of financial resources and labor for the development of capitalism in Russia.

Capitalism destroyed the basis of the community, splitting its population into two hostile groups - ruined peasants and rich, prosperous kulaks.

They considered capitalism itself to be “an illegitimate child of nature,” which is artificially grown by the government and is maintained only through government orders, supplies and tax farming operations, and not due to the needs of the domestic market.

In their opinion, capitalism, which has no natural basis, is easy to curtail, for which the government must take two important measures:

create state enterprises;

buy out landowners' lands;

after which all means of production should be transferred to the producers themselves, but not into ownership, but into the collective use of peasant communities and workers' artels.

At the same time, peasant communities must change radically, accepting and applying in practice all the latest achievements of science and technology.

According to Danielson, it is the intelligentsia that must take responsibility for educating the peasants, using economic arguments to induce the government to change the path of development.

5. The meaning of liberalism

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The liberal democratic movement developed in Russia both during the period of reforms of Alexander II and during the counter-reforms of Alexander III.

Despite the differences in the views of various liberal trends, they were all united by the idea of ​​the supremacy of individual interests, broad rights and freedoms, and a parliamentary and constitutional system.

The widespread dissemination of liberal ideas among the upper strata of the population testified to the political crisis of the ruling elite.

However, the fear of a repetition of European revolutions in Russia, bringing chaos and danger to the individual, society and state, turned Russian liberals away from revolutionary methods.

This fear gave rise to so-called liberal conservativism.

The weakness of the Russian liberal movement was that it remained disunited and therefore weak.

They were unable not only to unite with the populists, but even to create a united liberal front.

The main significance of Russian liberalism is that against the backdrop of the activation of radical socialists and the strengthening of conservative reaction, it offered Russian society an evolutionary reformist path of development.

At that moment, how Russia would develop depended on society and government.

Revolutionary party that existed in the Russian Empire in 1879-1884.

The “People's Will” party arose in August - October 1879 as a result of the split in “Land and Freedom” and united supporters of intensifying the terrorist struggle against the autocracy. It had a strictly centralized structure, headed by the Executive Committee (EC), all members of which had equal rights and were subject to the will of the majority. The IC included A. Mikhailov, A. Zhelyabov, L. Tikhomirov, A. Zundelevich, N. Morozov, S. Perovskaya, M. Oshanina, V. Figner and others.

In total, during its existence - 45 people. There was a narrower Administrative Commission. The Narodnaya Volya believed that the interests of the people and the autocracy were opposed. The EC program included demands for the creation of a permanent representative state body with broad powers, broad local self-government, freedom of conscience, speech, press, meetings, associations and agitation, the transfer of land to communities and the use of peasants, the liquidation of property on it, the transfer of plants and factories to the hands of workers, etc. The Narodnaya Volya sought to organize the armed overthrow of the autocracy and the transfer of power to the Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage. To disorganize and intimidate the authorities, it was planned to carry out a series of terrorist attacks to eliminate major figures in the tsarist administration. On August 26, 1879, the Narodnaya Volya members sentenced Emperor Alexander II to death.

By 1881, about 500 people had joined Narodnaya Volya, and even more opponents of the autocratic regime collaborated with it. It included organizations that formed circles in different cities: Student, which organized mass gatherings, Military, which included dozens of officers, Workers, which included the Central Workers' Circle in St. Petersburg (several hundred workers), and other circles. Contacts were established with the revolutionary populist emigration. "Narodnaya Volya" published several newspapers: "Narod-naya Vol-lya" (1879-85), "Ra-bo-chaya ga-ze-ta" (1880-81), "Lis-tok "Na-rod" "-noy vo-li" (1880-86), "Bulletin "Na-rod-noy vo-li"" (1883-86). In exile, the Narodnaya Volya Red Cross Society was created to provide assistance to victims of repression.

“Narodnaya Volya” prepared a number of terrorist acts, including 5 attempts on the life of Alexander II, and eventually managed to carry out the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. It operated quite successfully in 1879-1880. The organization is also obliged to its police agent N. Kletochnikov. At the beginning of 1881, the police, taking advantage of the betrayal of I. Okladsky, who was sentenced to eternal hard labor and entered the path of cooperation with the secret police, arrested Zhelyabov, Kletochnikov and others, which hit the organization hard. The Executive Committee was destroyed. N. Rysakov, who was arrested during the murder of the Tsar, was betrayed by the Central Workers' Circle. From now on, the center of the party is in Moscow.

After the assassination of Alexander II, Narodnaya Volya turned to Alexander III with a proposal to convene a Constituent Assembly, promising to end the terror. But the government took the path of escalating repression. On March 18, 1882, revolutionaries carried out the murder of the Kyiv military prosecutor V. Strelnikov, known in the revolutionary environment for his cruelty. From June 1882, after Tikhomirov and the seriously ill Oshanina left abroad, Figner took charge of Narodnaya Volya, trying to restore the organization.

Based on a denunciation by S. Degaev, she was arrested in February 1883. The Narodnaya Volya managed to kill secret police inspector G. Sudeikin. After the blow dealt to the organization by the “Degaev case,” the organization’s activities faded away despite attempts to revive “Narodnaya Volya” made in 1884 by G. Lopatin and in 1885 by B. Odzhikh, as well as Tikhomirov’s attempt to continue publishing its periodicals abroad . There were five high-profile trials of Narodnaya Volya: the trial of 16 (1880), the trial of March 1, 1881, the trial of 20 (1882), the trial of 17 (1883) and the trial of 14 (1884). More than 15 thousand people were subjected to various punishments for their involvement in Narodnaya Volya. Subsequently, attempts were made to revive the revolutionary populist party (for example, the Terrorist Faction of the People's Will of 1886-1887), but only the organizers of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR) succeeded in 1902.

Historical sources:

Andrey Ivanovich Zhelyabov. Materials for biography. M., 1930;

Archive “Zem-li i vol-li” and “Na-rod-noi vol-li”. M., 1932;

Li-te-ra-tu-ra part-tii “Na-naya will-la.” M., 1930;

“The people’s will” in do-ku-men-tah and vo-po-mi-na-ni-yah. M., 1930;

Na-ro-do-vol-tsy after March 1, 1881 M., 1928;

Mo-ro-call of N.A. According to the weight of my life. M., 1947;

Re-vo-lu-tsi-on-no-ro-d-no-st-in the 70s. XIX century: Sat. do-ku-men-tov and ma-te-ria-lov. M., 1965;

“The people’s will” and “Black re-deal.” L., 1989;

Figner V.N. Printed work. Memories. M., 1964. T. 1-2.

Activities of the party "People's Will"

Tkachev’s ideas about the seizure of political power by revolutionaries and the use of the state to implement socialist transformations, which were not popular among the apolitical populists of the 1870s, actually found their embodiment in the activities of Narodnaya Volya, although the Narodnaya Volya members themselves denied the direct influence of Tkachev’s ideas on them.

The People's Will organizations, which existed in more than 60 cities, included about 500 people, and approximately 5 thousand more people actively assisted the People's Will. At the head of the organization was the Executive Committee, which consisted almost entirely of professional revolutionaries. The name “Executive Committee” exactly corresponded to the essence of this body - its members not only conceived, but also, with the help of several dozen agents of the Executive Committee, carried out the most important Narodnaya Volya enterprises.

The organization of the Narodnaya Volya party (the largest and most significant revolutionary populist organization that arose in St. Petersburg in August 1879) consists of a whole network of secret circles, grouped at the beginning of the centralization of groups of a lower order around a group of a higher order. Each group of the higher order is replenished with the best forces of the groups of the lower order. The entire organization is drawn to a single center - the Executive Committee. All groups are interconnected by the unity of the program and plan of practical actions, by the commonality of forces and means. Relations between groups are conducted through an agent of the higher group, who is part of the junior group as its co-member. The interests of the center for each member are higher than the interests of his group. Therefore, the center has the right to recall members of subgroups for needs known to it, without motivating the recall to the group. Each group is independent in managing its affairs and has its own budget... The center submits all program issues, as well as party policy issues, for discussion to the entire organization. Decisions on these issues are made by a congress of representatives of local central groups together with representatives from the Executive Committee - the Executive Committee monitors the exact implementation of the plans of the congress and directs all the forces of the organization in accordance with them. The mutual relations of local central groups with each other and with the Executive Committee, their terms of reference are determined by special agreements. This is the local organization. In large centers it is divided into subjects of competence; such is the workers' organization, military, youth, etc., at the same beginning of the autonomy of circles and centralization. There are many such groups: some of them are in the provinces, others are here in the capital. Some are of a fighting, general revolutionary nature, others are special fighting, like a workers’ squad, but adapted to a different environment.

The leaders of the organization were A.I. Zhelyabov, A.D. Mikhailov, A.A. Kvyatkovsky, S.L. Perovskaya, V.N. Figner, L.A. Tikhomirov, M.F. Frolenko, A.I. Barannikov etc.

The organization was strictly centralistic and conspiratorial in nature. Printed organs - the newspaper "Narodnaya Volya" and the revolutionary socio-political review "Bulletin of the People's Will".

From the notes of V.N. Figner: “While the Black Redistribution faction, having retained the main outlines of the Land and Freedom program, only emphasized in it direct activity among the people and the need to organize them for the economic struggle against the bourgeoisie, the Narodnaya Volya members On the basis of their program they laid a completely new beginning. This beginning was the meaning and influence of centralized state power on the entire structure of people's life. This element played, in their opinion, a huge role at all moments of our history. Thus, in the economic sphere, the modern state was represented by “Narodnaya Volya” as the largest owner and the main independent predator of people’s labor, supporting other, smaller exploiters.

It was this ruler of Russian life - state power, based on a countless army and an all-powerful administration - that the revolutionary faction of Narodnaya Volya declared war on, calling the government, in its modern organization, the main enemy of the people in all spheres of their life. This thesis and its consequences: political struggle, transferring the center of gravity of revolutionary activity from the village to the city, preparing not an uprising among the people, but a conspiracy against the supreme power, with the aim of seizing it into their own hands and transferring it to the people, the strictest centralization of revolutionary forces as a necessary condition success in the fight against the centralized enemy - all this brought a real revolution to the revolutionary world of that time. These provisions undermined previous revolutionary views, shook the socialist and federalist traditions of the organization and completely violated the revolutionary routine that had already been established over the past decade. Therefore, it is no wonder that in order to break the opposition and give new views final dominance in the revolutionary environment, it took 1 - 1 1/2 years of tireless propaganda and a whole series of dazzling facts... Considering the implementation of socialist ideals in life as a matter of a more or less distant future , the new party set its immediate economic goal to transfer the main instrument of production - land - into the hands of the peasant community; in the political sphere - the replacement of the autocracy of one by the autocracy of the entire people, i.e. the establishment of a state system in which the freely expressed popular will would be the highest and only regulator of all social life. The most suitable means for achieving these goals seemed to be the elimination of the modern organization of state power, by the force of which the entire present order of things, so contrary to the desired one, is maintained; this elimination was to be accomplished through a coup d’etat prepared by a conspiracy.”

The Narodnaya Volya launched propaganda among the workers, publishing a special “Program of Workers, Members of the Narodnaya Volya Party” (1880) and publishing three issues of the “Workers’ Newspaper” (1880-81), created a military organization, managing to attract several hundred officers to it and its accompanying circles , conducted active propaganda among students. However, terror turned out to be the most effective weapon of the Narodnaya Volya. The organization very quickly began to acquire a predominantly conspiratorial-terrorist character. This was clearly manifested in the secret instruction “Preparatory work of the party” (spring 1880): “The party must have the strength to create for itself a favorable moment of action, to begin a task and bring it to the end. A skillfully executed system of terrorist enterprises, simultaneously destroying 10-15 people - the pillars of the modern government, will throw the government into panic, deprive it of unity of action and at the same time excite the masses, i.e., create an opportune moment for an attack.”

Public opinion was most impressed by the Narodnaya Volya terror. Even the royal court became worried, appointing Count M.T. Loris-Melikov as de facto dictator. In January 1881, M.T. Loris-Melikov proposed to the Tsar a project for convening advisory commissions with the participation of elected deputies. It seemed that the liberals’ dreams of a Zemstvo Duma were coming true.

However, the Narodnaya Volya became carried away by terror. In August 1879, the executive committee of Narodnaya Volya announced that it was condemning the Tsar to death. A real hunt began for Alexander II, and several attempts were made to kill the king. The People's Will, who sentenced Alexander II to death, organized a total of seven attempts on the life of the emperor, including a train explosion near Moscow on November 19, 1879, and an explosion in the Winter Palace on February 5, 1880. The explosion at the royal residence caused panic at the top and essentially forced the authorities to make concessions: abolish the Third Section, suspend capital punishment, and begin searching for support in society. However, the execution in November 1880 of Narodnaya Volya members Kvyatkovsky and Presnyakov, convicted in the trial of “16” on October 25-30, 1880 in St. Petersburg, was the first major trial of members of the Narodnaya Volya. Accusation of preparing assassination attempts on Alexander II. Sentence: A.A. Kvyatkovsky and A.K. Presnyakov to death, 4 people to eternal hard labor, the rest to various terms of hard labor and exile, made regicide a “matter of honor” for the party. On March 1, 1881, on the embankment of the Catherine Canal, N.I. Rysakov threw a bomb at the royal carriage, but the emperor was not even wounded. Another terrorist, I.I. Grinevitsky, threw a bomb at the feet of the Tsar. Grinevitsky was killed, and Alexander II was seriously wounded and died an hour later in the Winter Palace. During the investigation, Rysakov betrayed everyone he knew. In April 1881, five Narodnaya Volya members were publicly hanged: Zhelyabov, Perovskaya, Rysakov, Mikhailov, Kibalchich. Soon the “military cells” of Narodnaya Volya were defeated. Almost all members of the Executive Committee took part in the preparation of the regicide; Perovskaya directly supervised the terrorist attack. All these events defused the political crisis, a peasant uprising did not follow, and the people felt sorry for the murdered tsar.

Preparations for the assassination attempt on the emperor, which ended in his murder, began in the fall of 1880, when an observation detachment was created to monitor the king's travels. The detachment consisted of student youth, it included six people - I.I. Grinevitsky, E.N. Olovennikova, E.M. Sidorenko, N.I. Rysakov, A.V. Tyrkov, P.E. Tychinin (leader -- S. L. Perovskaya). The group of technicians preparing explosive devices (mine and hand-held projectiles) included M.F. Grachevsky, G.P. Isaev, N.I. Kibalchich and N.E. Sukhanov.

To lay a mine on Malaya Sadovaya Street, along which the Tsar sometimes passed on Sundays, a shop for selling cheese was removed, the owners of which, the Kobozevs, were A.V. Yakimova-Dikovskaya and Yu.N. Bogdanovich. A.I. Barannikov, Bogdanovich, A.I. Zhelyabov, N.N. Kolodkevich, Isaev, M.R. Langans, N.A. Sablin, Sukhanov, M.N. Trigoni, took part in the construction of the underground gallery for laying the mine. M.F. Frolenko. The mine explosion in the event that the Tsar had passed along Malaya Sadovaya on March 1, 1881, should have been carried out by Frolenko. Zhelyabov also formed a group of metal workers, which included students Grinevitsky and Rysakov, worker T.M. Mikhailov and vocational school graduate I.P. Emelyanov.

Meetings to prepare the assassination attempt took place at the main safe house on Voznesensky Prospekt, which only members of the Executive Committee (the “owners” - Isaev and Figner) had the right to visit, as well as at the safe house maintained by Zhelyabov and Perovskaya. Dynamite was stored in the apartment of Grachevsky and P.S. Ivanovskaya. A.P. Korba-Pribyleva, T.I. Lebedeva, L.D. Terentyeva and some others were also involved in the preparation of the assassination attempt. The instructions for the metal workers took place at the safe house of Sablin and G.M. Gelfman on Telezhnaya Street.

The last meeting of the Executive Committee before the assassination attempt, on February 28, 1881, in an apartment on Voznesensky Prospekt, was attended by Figner, Perovskaya, Korba, Lebedeva, Isaev, Grachevsky, Sukhanov, Frolenko (Zhelyabov and Trigoni were arrested the day before). Thus, half of the people who decided the fate of Alexander II were women. The forces of the Narodnaya Volya on the eve of the assassination attempt were very limited, which forced the same people to perform different functions. There was practically no division into “managers” and “executors”. Members of the Executive Committee worked in the mines, personally prepared explosive shells, etc.

After the regicide, most of the participants in the assassination attempt were arrested. In the case of the “First Marchers” Members of the “Narodnaya Volya”, organizers and participants in the execution of Emperor Alexander II on March 1, 1881. In the trial of March 26-29, 1881 A.I. Zhelyabov, S.L. Perovskaya, N.I. Kibalchich, T.M Mikhailov, N.I. Rysakov were hanged, G.M. Gelfman was sentenced to eternal hard labor, the rest of the participants were convicted in other Narodnaya Volya trials. Zhelyabov, Perovskaya, Kibalchich, Mikhailov, Rysakov and Gelfman passed through. All of them, except Gelfman, were hanged on April 3, 1881. Gelfman, due to her pregnancy, the death penalty was postponed until the birth of the child, later replacing it with eternal hard labor, however, due to unbearable conditions in prison, she died on February 1, 1882. Grinevitsky was mortally wounded in a bomb explosion. Sablin shot himself during his arrest. The remaining participants in the assassination attempt, who later found themselves in the hands of the authorities, were convicted in other Narodnaya Volya trials or punished administratively. Tychinin committed suicide in the House of Pre-trial Detention before trial. Sukhanov, as a former officer, was shot. Those sentenced to death: Grachevsky, Bogdanovich, Isaev, Kolodkevich, Emelyanov, Frolenko and Yakimova, the punishment was replaced by eternal hard labor. Grachevsky burned himself in the Shlisselburg fortress as a protest against the prison regime. Bogdanovich, Isaev, Kolodkevich died in custody, as did the “vechniks” Barannikov and Langans. She died in Lebedeva's penal servitude (20 years of hard labor). Olovennikova and Tyrkov fell ill with mental illness. After recovery, Tyrkov was administratively exiled forever to Minusinsk.

Those who survived hard labor and exile were Trigoni, Frolenko, Korba, Ivanovskaya, Figner, Yakimova, Emelyanov, Tyrkov, and Figner, Korba and Yakimova, who fled the settlement, were involved in the activities of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Yakimova was a member of its Central Committee, and Ivanovskaya, who also fled from the settlement, joined the Socialist Revolutionary Fighting Organization and took part in preparing the murder of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve.

But the party did not have the strength to prepare any speech or carry out a new terrorist attack. On March 10, 1881, the demands of the Narodnaya Volya were formulated in the form of a letter from the Executive Committee to Alexander III. The demands boiled down to declaring an amnesty for political affairs and convening people's representatives. The new Emperor Alexander III abandoned the implementation of the Loris-Melikov project, fired all liberal ministers and moved on to counter-reforms. The chance for political modernization in Russia was missed. The decapitated “People's Will” failed to rouse the people to revolution. And the peasants interpreted the murder of the tsar simply: “The nobles killed the tsar because he gave the peasants freedom.”

The terror of “Narodnaya Volya” completely ceased to bring results and, headed by Minister Loris-Melikov, a commission was created to develop the Russian Constitution. (There is a legend that just on March 1, 1881, Alexander II went to sign the draft of this constitution and was killed by the populist Grishnivitsky).

The assassination of Alexander itself marked the beginning of a period of political repression and a crisis of populism. In 1887 a conspiracy was uncovered to assassinate Alexander III, headed by Alexander Ulyanov. 5 people were executed. Terrorism did not find support, but at the same time, in Russia, in parallel with populism, a new stage of the revolutionary movement began, working days and the spread of Marxism.

The regicide turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Narodnaya Volya. The liberals, whose support they had counted on, retreated from the party. Most of the party leaders were arrested in 1881-82. The last member of the “great” Executive Committee, Figner was imprisoned in 1883. The only major case that the party managed to carry out at this time was the murder in Odessa in 1882 of the Kyiv prosecutor V.S. Strelnikov (N.A. Zhelvakov and S.N. Khalturin).

According to the trials of the “First Marchers” (1881), “17” March 28-April 5, 1883 in St. Petersburg over members of the “Narodnaya Volya” (5 members, 2 agents of the Executive Committee) on charges of preparing assassination attempts on Alexander II. Sentence: 5 people (including Yu.N. Bogdanovich) to eternal hard labor, the rest to various terms of hard labor and exile. (1883), “14” September 24-28, 1884 in St. Petersburg over members of “Narodnaya Volya”. Accusation of preparing a coup d'etat and assassination attempts on Alexander II. Sentence: N.M. Rogachev and A.P. Shtromberg to death, 5 people (including V.N. Figner) to eternal hard labor, the rest to various terms of hard labor and exile. (1884), “21st” May 26-June 5, 1887 in St. Petersburg (G.A. Lopatin and others). Accusation of belonging to Narodnaya Volya and the murder of gendarme lieutenant colonel Sudeikin. About 300 people were involved in the investigation. Sentence: 5 people to eternal hard labor, the rest to various terms of hard labor and exile. (1887) some of the leaders of Narodnaya Volya were sentenced to death, others to long terms of hard labor. Some members of the Executive Committee (Tikhomirov, Oshanina, Sergeeva) went abroad. The provocation of S.P. Degaev finished off the party: despite the fact that he admitted his betrayal and helped organize the murder of his “seducer” gendarme lieutenant colonel G.P. Sudeikin, it was not possible to make up for the human and moral losses suffered by the organization.