On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the plan for war against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a fleeting, lightning-fast war, as a result of which an exit was planned German troops on the line Rostov - Gorky - Arkhangelsk, and later - to the Urals. Decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is “the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to the end of Soviet resistance.”
This plan provided for two strikes - north and south of Polesie. The northern attack was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these attacks, a “private operation to capture the Baku region” was planned. The implementation of the plan took from 9 to 17 weeks.
Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command under the leadership of General Paulus. This check revealed a serious flaw in the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main group towards Moscow. The Supreme Command headquarters decided to reconsider the plan.
In connection with Keitel's report about the bad engineering training On August 9, 1940, Hitler’s command issued an order called “Aufbau Ost” as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. It outlined measures to prepare a theater of military operations against the USSR, repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order that stated: “I order an increase in the number of occupation troops in the east within next weeks. For security reasons, Russia should not create the impression that Germany is preparing for an offensive in the eastern direction.”
On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military meeting, Halder’s report was heard on the “Otto” plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groupings of the Red Army by developing an offensive on Kyiv and Leningrad before the capture of Moscow. In this form the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler said: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the very first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the French army in 1940.”3. Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.
The meeting participants had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be ended quickly; CPOK~ weeks were also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler’s General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: “In the High Command of the Armed Forces and in the High Command of the Ground Forces, they so confidently expected to finish the campaign by the beginning of winter that in the ground forces Winter uniform was provided only for every fifth soldier." German generals subsequently tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the winter campaign troops to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame. He writes: “I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that Hitler alone is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the fall of 1941.”4.
Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and generals when, with his characteristic self-confidence, he said in the circle of his entourage: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.”
The day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive on the war against the USSR based on the decisions made at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont presented the text of Directive No. 21 to Yodel, who made several corrections to it, and on December 17 it was handed to Hitler for signature. The next day the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.
When meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, a war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell out of favor forever.
The fascist German generals developed and put into effect a plan for war against the USSR, which met the most predatory desires of the imperialists. Germany's military leaders unanimously supported the implementation of this plan. Only after Germany’s defeat in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders, for self-rehabilitation, put forward a false version that they objected to the attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition shown to him, still started a war in the East. For example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted on his own. With a firm hand he took the helm and led Germany onto the rocks of complete defeat.” In reality, not only the “Führer”, but also the entire German generals believed in the “blitzkrieg”, in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.
Directive No. 21 stated: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia through a quick military operation even before the end of the war with England” - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: “The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia armies must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advances of tank units. It is necessary to prevent the retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off the common Arkhangelsk-Volga line from Asian Russia.”
On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the main command of the German ground forces issued the “Troop Concentration Directive,” which set out the general plan of the command, defined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the location of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the “first intention” of the German army, set it the task of “splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroying the separated ones. groupings of enemy troops."
Thus, two main directions for the advance of German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. North of Polesie the main blow was delivered by two army groups: “Center” and “North”. Their task was defined as follows: “North of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having brought powerful tank formations into battle, it makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys them together with the Finnish army and the German troops sent from Norway for this purpose, finally depriving the enemy of his last defensive capabilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured to carry out subsequent tasks in cooperation with German troops advancing in southern Russia.
In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north will no longer be necessary and the question of an immediate attack on Moscow may arise.”
It was planned to launch an offensive south of Polesie with Army Group South. Its mission was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group “South” under the command of Field Marshal Rutstedt, using a swift strike from powerful tank formations from the Lublin area, cuts off Soviet troops located in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the Kyiv area and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver to solve subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or to carry out new tasks in the south of Russia.”
The most important strategic goal of Plan Barbarossa was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction hoped to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donetsk basin. The plan attached great importance to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the German command, was supposed to bring decisive political, military and economic success to Germany. Hitler's command believed that his plan for war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.
In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task according to Directive No. 21 and an order to conduct a war game to test the expected course of battles and obtain material for detailed development operational plan.
In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of military operations against the USSR was postponed by 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order that stated: “The start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the German High Command made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941 The increased transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last, so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.
17 June 1941 high command armed forces Germany issued the final order, which stated that the implementation of Plan Barbarossa should begin on June 22. The headquarters of the High Command was moved to the Wolfsschanze command post, established in East Prussia near Rastenburg.
Long before the attack on the USSR, Gestapo chief Himmler, on behalf of the German government, began developing the Ost master plan - a plan for the conquest of the peoples of Eastern Europe, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, by fire and sword. The starting points of this plan were reported to Hitler as early as May 25, 1940. Himmler expressed confidence that as a result of the implementation of the planned measures, many peoples would be completely exterminated, in particular the Poles, Ukrainians, etc. To completely eliminate the national culture, it was planned to destroy all education except primary in special schools. The program of these schools, as Himmler proposed, should have included: “simple counting, up to 500 at the most; the ability to sign, the inculcation that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. “The ability to read,” Himmler added, “I consider unnecessary.” After reviewing these proposals, Hitler fully approved them and approved them as a directive.
Special teams and “equipment” were created in advance for the mass extermination of civilians. The German armed forces and authorities in the occupied territories had to be guided by the corresponding instructions of Hitler, who taught: “We are obliged to exterminate the population - this is part of our mission to protect the German population. We will have to develop the technique of exterminating the population... If I send the flower of the German nation into the heat of war, shedding precious German blood without the slightest pity, then, without a doubt, I have the right to destroy millions of people of the lower race who multiply like worms.”
References
To prepare this work, materials from the site http://referat.ru were used
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Until 1941, Hitler successfully carried out the conquest of Europe. However, he did not suffer any serious losses. Hitler planned to end the war with the USSR in 2-3 months. But unlike Europe, Soviet soldiers put up strong resistance to the Nazi army. And by the autumn of forty-one, the plan for the rapid capture of the USSR was thwarted. The war dragged on.
Hitler had a great goal. He wanted to completely change Eurasia and make Germany the strongest country in the world. The USSR had a special plan called OST. The plan was to destroy the Soviet order of government and completely dispose of the people at their own discretion.
Primary Goal
Germany's main goal was resources, of which there were a lot in the USSR. Vast areas of fertile land. Oil, coal, iron, other minerals, as well as free labor. The German people believed that after the war they would be given occupied lands and people who would work for them for free. Hitler planned to reach line AA (Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk), and then secure the border. Create four Reichskommissariats on the occupied territory. From here it was planned to export everything that was needed for Germany.
According to the plan, the population of the region should be reduced to 14 million. They wanted to deport the rest to Siberia, or destroy them, which is what they did from the beginning of the war. It was planned to destroy 3 - 4 million Russians every year until it reached the “required” number of the population. Cities in the occupied territory were not needed. They wanted to leave only healthy, strong workers living in small villages that were easy to manage. It was planned to replace the Slavs with about eight million Germans. But this plan failed. It was easy to evict people, but the Germans, having moved to new lands, were not very happy with the living conditions. They were given land that needed to be cultivated. The Germans themselves could not cope, and none of the remaining peasants wanted to help. There were not enough Aryans to populate the occupied territories. The German government allowed soldiers to have relationships with women of conquered peoples. And their children were raised as true Aryans. Thus, it was planned to create a new generation loyal to Nazism.
As Hitler said, Soviet people should not know much. Being able to read a little, write German and count to one hundred was enough. A smart person is an enemy. Medicine is not needed for the Slavs, and their fertility is undesirable. Let them work for us, or die, the Fuhrer believed.
Few people knew about the OST master plan. It consisted of mathematical calculations and graphs. And there was no mention of genocide. It was an economic management plan. And not a word about the destruction of millions of people.
Operation Barbarossa (Barbarossa plan 1941) - a plan for a military attack and rapid seizure of USSR territory by Hitler’s troops during.
The plan and essence of Operation Barbarossa was to quickly and unexpectedly attack Soviet troops on their own territory and, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, defeat the Red Army. Then, within two months, the German army was to advance deep into the country and conquer Moscow. Control over the USSR gave Germany the opportunity to fight with the United States for the right to dictate its terms in world politics.
Hitler, who had already managed to conquer almost all of Europe, was confident of his victory over the USSR. However, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be a failure; the protracted operation turned into a long war.
The Barbarossa plan received its name in honor of the medieval king of Germany, Frederick 1st, who bore the nickname Barbarossa and was famous for his military achievements.
Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans
Although Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack Russia, as this was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the Third Reich. Hitler instructed the German command to collect information about the composition Soviet army and on this basis draw up a plan of attack. This is how Plan Barbarossa came into being.
After checking, German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German: it was less organized, less prepared, and technical equipment Russian soldiers leave much to be desired. Focusing precisely on these principles, Hitler created a plan for a rapid attack that was supposed to ensure Germany's victory in record time.
The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR on the borders of the country and, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the army and then destroy it. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment, which belonged to Germany, and the effect of surprise.
The plan was to be carried out at the beginning of 1941. First, German troops were to attack the Russian army in Belarus, where the bulk of it was gathered. Having defeated Soviet soldiers in Belarus, Hitler planned to advance towards Ukraine, conquer Kyiv and the sea routes, cutting off Russia from the Dnieper. At the same time, a blow was to be delivered to Murmansk from Norway. Hitler planned to launch an attack on Moscow, surrounding the capital from all sides.
Despite careful preparation in an atmosphere of secrecy, from the first weeks it became clear that the Barbarossa plan was a failure.
Implementation of the Barbarossa plan and results
From the very first days, the operation began to not be as successful as planned. First of all, this happened due to the fact that Hitler and the German command underestimated the Soviet troops. According to historians, the Russian army was not only equal in strength to the German one, but in many ways superior to it.
The Soviet troops turned out to be well prepared, in addition, military operations took place on Russian territory, so the soldiers could use the natural conditions, which they knew better than the Germans, to their advantage. The Soviet army was also able to hold its own and not fall apart into separate units thanks to good command and the ability to mobilize and make lightning-fast decisions.
At the beginning of the attack, Hitler planned to quickly advance deep into the Soviet army and begin to split it into pieces, separating units from each other in order to avoid mass operations from the Russians. He managed to advance, but failed to break the front: Russian detachments quickly gathered together and brought up new forces. This led to the fact that Hitler’s army, although winning, moved deeper into the country catastrophically slowly, not by kilometers, as planned, but by meters.
Only a few months later, Hitler managed to approach Moscow, but the German army did not dare to launch an attack - the soldiers were exhausted from prolonged military operations, and the city was never bombed, although something else was planned. Hitler also failed to bomb Leningrad, which was besieged and blockaded, but did not surrender and was not destroyed from the air.
It began, which lasted from 1941 to 1945 and ended with the defeat of Hitler.
Reasons for the failure of Plan Barbarossa
Hitler's plan failed for several reasons:
- the Russian army turned out to be stronger and more prepared than the German command expected: the Russians compensated for the lack of modern military equipment with the ability to fight in difficult natural conditions, as well as competent command;
- the Soviet army had excellent counterintelligence: thanks to intelligence officers, the command almost always knew about the enemy’s next move, which made it possible to quickly and adequately respond to the actions of the attackers;
- inaccessibility of territories: the Germans did not know the territory of the USSR well, since it was extremely difficult to get maps. In addition, they did not know how to fight in impenetrable forests;
- loss of control over the course of the war: the Barbarossa plan quickly showed its inconsistency, and after a few months Hitler completely lost control over the course of hostilities.
They already had sketches of what theirs should look like new order. If everything had gone according to Hitler's plan, the world would be different today. And in many ways, the new Nazi world order would not be what you might imagine it to be.
10. Returning American land to the indigenous people
The Nazis were rabid white supremacists, but when it came to Indians, they were surprisingly tolerant. The Nazis promised that after conquering America they would return all their lands to the Indians.
They collaborated with a group called the Federation American Indians"and made fascist supporters out of them. Some members of the group went far beyond sympathy and became outright rabid Nazis, such as Chief Red Cloud, who affixed swastikas to his clothing and made speeches calling Jews “children of Satan” and claiming that they were “controlling the Indian movement.”
The Nazis liked it. They publicly declared that the Native Americans were Aryans and secretly sent propaganda officers to America to persuade the Indians to overthrow the US government. In return, the Nazis vowed to return all their lands to the indigenous tribes.
Whether the Nazis spoke the truth or not, many listened to them. Chief Red Cloud claimed that he had an army of 750,000 Native Americans willing to fight for Hitler. He promised that as soon as the Germans entered American soil, the Indians would help them deal with the United States.
9. Giant space mirror
Undoubtedly, one of the most unusual plans of the Nazis was the project to create a giant space mirror - in the literal sense of the word. The Nazis planned to place a giant mirror with a diameter of 1.6 kilometers in orbit at an altitude of 35,900 kilometers - and if they had a little more time, they might have done it.
The idea was that the giant mirror would be like a boy holding a magnifying glass and using it to burn ants. Whenever someone angered the Nazis, they would tilt their mirror so that what they reflected sun rays fell on the cities of the side that offended them. It was assumed that the rays of the Sun would be so hot that they would ignite everything they touched.
The Nazis even planned to equip it as a full-fledged space station. They had plans to constantly keep a crew on duty near the mirror, which would be provided with everything necessary for life.
Today there is some doubt as to whether it could have worked. But the author of the project, scientist and engineer Hermann Oberth, was so confident in his idea that after the end of the war he tried to convince the Americans to build a mirror. If he had just a little more time, the Nazis probably could have carried out this project, and the world would have lived under a terrifying giant mirror in the sky.
8. Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
Japan, of course, had its own plans. In their offices, the Germans and Japanese have already cut up and divided all parts of the world. Japan, by mutual agreement, was to receive under its control all territories east of the 70th meridian, including most of India and everything beyond it.
The Japanese Empire was supposed to come to the region under the optimistic name of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. It would be an empire full of friendship sounding words, the purpose of which was to hide everything that stood behind them. Among each of the conquered peoples, it was planned to “train” special leaders who would lead their country and become puppets of the Japanese government.
And they have already begun to put their plan into action. The Japanese presented it as independence from Western imperialism, fighting under the slogan “Asia for Asians.” But the peoples of Asia were forced to accept Japanese rule.
Japanese would become the official language of the entire eastern hemisphere, and there would be Japanese teachers in every school. They were to instill the “dominance of Japanese culture” into the young brains of the citizens of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Australia and New Zealand were also supposed to come under Japanese control. Hitler believed that if the Nazis won the war, it would mean the end for everyone white man who lived there.
7. Great Wall of the kids
The Nazi line of defense against the new Japanese Empire had to start right at the 70th meridian east. The Germans were confident that over time, war between the two new rulers of the world would become inevitable, and they must prepare for its arrival.
The plan was to create a "living wall" of German colonists who would live along the border, reproducing as quickly as possible. Any man worth his salt who served 12 years in the Nazi army would have been sent to the eastern border, where a farm, a gun, and orders to have as many children as possible awaited him.
Men from the baby-making team of Nazi veterans had to marry local women; they could not bring German wives with them. They were supposed to spread the German gene pool along the border and create a new generation of half-German children. To achieve this, former Nazi soldiers were required to spend as much time as possible in the bedroom. Hitler demanded that for the sake of his country, every man on the eastern border had at least seven children.
6. Hopes for a war between America and England
Despite what Hitler told Chief Red Cloud in private, he publicly stated that he had no intention of invading the United States. The idea, he once told a Life magazine reporter, was “as fantastic as an invasion of the moon.” He blamed paranoia on "warmongers" who believe fear is "good for business."
But when the Americans didn't believe him, he started singing a different song. “My feeling for Americanism is one of hatred and deep disgust,” he once told his comrades. “Everything about the behavior of American society shows that half of it is Judaized and the other half is disillusioned.”
However, he did not think that he would have to invade America. Before America entered the war, he was sure that Britain would help him get rid of America. And even when America supported Britain, he insisted that it was just part of a long-term plan to crush the British.
Hitler believed that no matter how the war ended, the Americans would attack Britain. He believed that he would not need to invade the United States because the British would do everything for him. “England and America will someday wage war against each other, and it will be waged with the greatest hatred,” Hitler insisted. “One of the two countries will have to disappear.”
And only if England had not attacked America would he have done it himself. If the United States still existed after Europe was conquered by the Nazis, then, as Hitler promised, it would have to face a full-scale onslaught from the Third Reich.
5. Enslavement of Eastern Europe
The Nazis tried their best to eradicate all the Jews on the planet, but their plans for genocide did not end there. The Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe were declared the next "racially inferior" group to be exterminated. By the time the war ended, Hitler had already begun to put some of his plans into action.
There was a Master Plan "Ost", and it included a systematic effort to destroy the Slavs and erase their culture from the face of the planet. The leaders had to come first. Even before the war was over, the Nazis had already begun to “liquidate” the Soviet elite and those who had cultural influence. With the same speed, they rushed to destroy anyone who could encourage the inhabitants of Eastern Europe to be proud of their own culture.
But if the Nazis had conquered Russia, they would have started by deporting 31 million Slavs to Siberia, where they would be forced into slave labor in concentration camps. The rest were to be sold into slavery, modeled after the American Negroes. In their place, 10 million ethnic Germans were to arrive and create new, racially pure households.
Within 30 years, 50 million people were to be deported to concentration camps or killed. Almost all Eastern European countries were to be destroyed.
4. Gandhi's execution
In 1938, even before the start of the war, Hitler gave the British Foreign Secretary little advice. “Shoot Gandhi,” he told him. “And if that’s not enough to force them into submission, shoot ten more leading members of Congress.”
According to Hitler, the British reacted too softly to the peaceful protests of Mahatma Gandhi. He considered Indians to be an "inferior race" who should submit to Aryan rule, and if he were to take over the world, he would take his own advice.
As the war spread, Hitler's contempt for India cost him more and more lost opportunities. At one point, a delegation from the resistance army led by Subhas Chandra Bose went to Berlin and offered to help the Germans in the Indian uprising against the British. Bose received thousands of signatures from men willing to fight alongside him, but Hitler's prejudices were so deep that he did not take up the Indians' offer.
As a result, Bose allied with the Japanese, and India was declared a territory included in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. But Hitler made it clear how Indian citizens would be treated if a third war began. world war and the Nazis will conquer Japan.
3. Enslavement of all British men
When the war began and the British refused to surrender, Hitler's feelings towards the British began to change. After a while, he just wanted to ruin their lives, and he already had a plan for how he would do it.
If Britain had surrendered to the Nazis, there would have been a new law. Every able-bodied male between the ages of 17 and 45 was to be transported to continental Europe, where they would be forced to work as slaves.
Women and children could remain in their homes until boys turned 17. Everything they owned was to be looted, and anyone who tried to oppose Nazi rule was to be shot on the spot.
It was a terrible plan, but it wasn't the worst. Heinrich Himmler wanted to go even further. He planned to destroy 80 percent of the population as soon as England fell.
2. Giving Muslims power in the Middle East
Hitler was surprisingly pro-Muslim. Both he and Heinrich Himmler complained that Germany was a Christian country. Hitler said: " Muslim religion would suit us much better than Christianity.”
At first he promised to give the Middle East to Italy, but as the war continued, he began to change his mind. He met his congenial Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who told him that they had the same enemies: “The British, the Jews and the Communists.”
Al-Husseini wanted to lead a fascist uprising against the British, but Hitler told him to wait until the war with the USSR was over. But they already had a pact, and they were already working together to send a death squad to Palestine that would kill every Jew living there.
When it became clear that the Nazis were losing the war, Hitler blamed the failure on his failure to work more closely with the Muslims, especially after Italy turned against him. “We could liberate Muslim countries,” Hitler said. “Think of how much we could do to help them!”
And if he had managed to change the course of the war and become the winner, he would have done exactly that. He would make the Middle East a land where fascism and Islam would reign.
1. Conversion of Eastern Europe to Jehovah's Witnesses
But not the entire Nazi empire was to become Muslim. If Heinrich Himmler had carried out his plan, Eastern Europe would have received a different religion: Jehovah's Witnesses.
The Nazis killed tens of thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses in concentration camps. But, despite the mass destruction of the Jehovah's Witnesses, Himmler had a strange respect for their religion. “If their fanaticism could be used for Germany,” he once said, “we would be much stronger than we are today!”
In Himmler's eyes, Jehovah's Witnesses had perfect combination fanatical work ethic and pacifism, which was supposed to promote hard work and the absence of violent resistance to the fascist regime. He even gave specific instructions to one of his officers, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, on how the religion should be introduced into Eastern Europe.
The reality under a global Nazi regime would be very strange. There would be slavery, genocide and weapons of mass destruction, but there would also be many Jehovah's Witnesses.
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Self-confidently stated: “I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he has already lost the war.” Ten days later, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Hiroshi Oshima, the Fuhrer predicted that it was not him, but Stalin, who would suffer the fate of Napoleon this time. At the same time, Hitler admiringly called his military leaders “personalities of historical proportions” and the officer corps “exceptional in its kind.” However, by the end of July, during further development events on the Eastern Front, not a trace remained of this confidence.
Despite successful fighting, the encirclement of the enemy in the area of Bialystok and Minsk and the subsequent attack on Smolensk, despite the first successes of Army Group North in the Leningrad direction and Army Group South in Ukraine, in the second half of July it became obvious that both army groups operating on the flanks, they will not be able to cope with the enemy forces opposing them on time and will therefore be forced to use part of the formations of Army Group Center to complete the assigned tasks. Hitler, deciding where to turn the formations of Army Group Center - north or south, called it the most difficult decision of this war. Hitler's confidence that the campaign would proceed as planned was reflected in a series of directives in late July and early August.
On July 19, in OKW Directive No. 33, Hitler demanded that infantry and tank units and formations be turned south to support Army Group South and at the same time also conduct an offensive with mobile units and formations in the northeast direction to support Army Group North, and forces infantry formations of Army Group Center to continue the attack on Moscow. On July 23, in addition to this directive, he even ordered the final transfer of the 2nd Panzer Group to the subordination of Army Group South and the temporary subordination of the 3rd Panzer Group to Army Group North. On July 30, Hitler was forced in the new OKW Directive No. 34 to temporarily cancel his decision, set out in addition to OKW Directive No. 33. The 3rd Panzer Group was not allowed to enter the battle, Army Group Center was ordered to suspend the offensive, the 2nd and the 3rd Panzer Group was supposed to receive reinforcements. This directive was also supplemented by a new instruction dated 12 August, which ordered Army Group Center to conduct offensive operations on the flanks, ensuring close cooperation with neighboring army groups in order to repel the threat of enemy counterattacks.
These directives indicated a difference of opinion in assessing the situation, Hitler’s disagreements with his military advisers, and also the fact that it remained unclear how to continue the campaign, since it was not possible, as planned, to defeat the enemy west of the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. In his training developments, General Marx back in the fall of 1940 proceeded from the fact that the campaign should end west of the Dnieper-Western Dvina line. During the war games, held under the leadership of Lieutenant General Friedrich Paulus, who was then the chief quartermaster of the ground forces, their participants also came to the conviction that the Red Army must be defeated west of this line, because otherwise the German armed forces would be too weak in order to win over the wide Russian expanses Soviet Union. But this was a task that Hitler could not solve when planning operations at the end of January 1941. All original plans campaigns against Russia were based on preventing the Red Army from retreating deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. In case this could not be done, plans were not prepared, since the high command of the ground forces, having overestimated their capabilities, did not take into account the likelihood of such a development of the situation.
At the end of July, Hitler realized that his dreams of occupying Moscow on August 15 and ending the war with Russia on October 1 turned out to be unrealistic: the enemy did not take his plans into account. These days, Hitler is increasingly thinking about the time factor, which became the defining moment in the deployment of all subsequent operations. A convincing picture was painted by the OKW Chief of Staff, Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel, in a conversation with Field Marshal von Bock during his visit to Army Group Center headquarters in Borisov on July 25.
“Hitler's hope that Japan would use the moment to settle scores with Russia appears to have been dashed. In any case, we can’t count on her performing anytime soon. But in the interests of the Germans, it is necessary to deal a crushing blow to Russia as quickly as possible, since otherwise it is impossible to conquer it.” Assessing the current situation, the Fuhrer anxiously asks himself the question: “How much time do I still have to finish off Russia, and how much more time will I need?”
Keitel arrived at the headquarters of Army Group Center to inform Bock about the political situation, and mainly about Hitler’s new instructions “to move from large-scale encirclement operations to tactical actions of a limited scale with the aim of completely destroying the encircled enemy.” These considerations of Hitler indicated that he, recognizing the shortcomings of previous plans, was looking for new ways to achieve his goals and that his confidence in completing the military campaign in short term hesitated.
Hitler was amazed by the data on the number, its equipment and weapons, so much so that this was another reason for his uncertainty and hesitation.
On July 14, Hitler, in a conversation with Oshima, spoke about the many surprises that Germany had to endure. On July 21, in a conversation with the Slovak Marshal Kvaternik, he said that the Russians had produced such a large number of aircraft and tanks that if he had been informed in advance, he, the Fuhrer, would not have believed it and decided that it was apparently disinformation. In a conversation with Guderian, who actually warned him about the well-established production of tanks by the Russians, Hitler said on August 4, 19411^- that if he knew that the figures named by Guderian were true, then he would decide to attack the USSR it would be much more difficult for him1.
Although Hitler considered the main goals of further offensive operations to be the capture of Leningrad as the “citadel of Bolshevism”, as well as the capture of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin for military-economic reasons, he still for a long time could not come to a decision on how to achieve these goals.
Only as a result of the difficult situation on the front of Army Groups North and South, as well as under the influence of strong Russian counterattacks east of Smolensk, did Hitler decide to give the order to suspend the offensive of Army Group Center and move it to the defensive, and also about the destruction of enemy forces on the flanks of the Eastern Front. Certainly, main reason, which determined the transition of German troops to defense east of Smolensk, was not the difficulties that arose in the logistics of supporting the troops of Army Group Center, but Russian counterattacks.
Bock wrote:
“I am now forced to bring into battle all my combat-ready divisions from the reserve of the army group... I need every person on the front line... Despite the huge losses... the enemy attacks every day in several sectors in such a way that until now it was impossible to regroup forces and bring up reserves. If the Russians are not dealt a crushing blow somewhere in the near future, then the task of completely defeating them will be difficult to accomplish before the onset of winter.”
Although at the end of August Hitler still believed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union before the end of October, by this time the Fuhrer was beginning to think about the possibility of a longer war on the Eastern Front, going beyond the winter of 1941/42. An OKW memorandum of 27 August 1941 on the strategic situation at the end of the summer of that year revealed these doubts even more clearly:
“The defeat of Russia is the immediate and decisive goal of the war, which must be achieved using all the forces that can be pulled from other fronts. Since this cannot be fully accomplished in 1941, in 1942 the continuation of the eastern campaign should become task number one... Only after Russia has been militarily defeated should military operations be launched in full force in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean against England, if perhaps with the help of France and Spain. Even if Russia is dealt a crushing blow this year, it is unlikely that until the spring of 1942 it will be possible to free up ground forces and air forces for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Iberian Peninsula.”
From this analysis of the situation it is clear that the initial intention, back in the fall of 1941, to undertake operations against the British in the Middle East and to pull back troops from the Russian front turned out to be impracticable.
Directive No. 32 and the draft plans of July 4, 1941, provided for three covering operations against the Middle East for the post-Barbarossa period. Of all these plans, only the plan remains in force now offensive operation through the Caucasus towards Iran.
The reorganization and rearmament of the ground forces scheduled for the fall had to be postponed indefinitely, operations planned for the period after Barbarossa were also postponed, since after the expected end of the eastern campaign the army would need time to be replenished with people and equipment. Thus, Hitler signed that his plan for a “lightning war” had failed. In search of the culprits, he sharply criticized the OKH regarding the further conduct of operations and behaved defiantly and even insultingly towards him. How offensive Hitler's reproaches were is evidenced by Halder's offer to Brauchitsch to submit his resignation letter. Brauchitsch, however, rejected this offer. Hitler and the military leadership were forced to admit at the end of August that they had miscalculated their plans for Russia. And among the population, sad voices began to be heard that the war had dragged on for too long and that the army had suffered huge losses.
Casualties on the Eastern Front totaled 585,122 by the end of August—about three times the casualties of the entire French campaign.
During the same time, German troops lost 1,478 tanks and assault guns, that is, approximately 43% of the available tanks and assault guns at the beginning of the war with Russia.
A security report dated August 4, 1941 stated:
“Opinions are often expressed that the campaign is not developing as might have been expected based on the reports published at the beginning of the operation... Now it seems that the Russians have an enormous amount of weapons and equipment and that their resistance is intensifying.”
A report dated September 4, 1941 noted that “many Reich citizens express dissatisfaction with the fact that military operations on the Eastern Front have dragged on for too long. More and more often one can hear statements that the offensive in the East is developing very slowly.”
In order to eliminate these sentiments and restore the population’s faith in the regime, it was necessary to quickly end the war in Russia and end it with victory.
Military-economic issues. In August it was necessary to conclude that the plans for the production of weapons and military equipment planned on July 14, 1941 were also not fully implemented. The planned production output for the newly formed tank and motorized divisions was already reduced by 16% on August 8. Of the originally planned 36 tank divisions of three regiments, only 30 divisions of two regiments were now to be formed, and of 18 motorized divisions - only 15 divisions of two regiments.
At extended meetings in the OKW military economics and armaments department, which lasted from August 14 to 16, 1941, it was decided, due to a lack of labor and raw materials, to reduce the tank production program from 900 to 650 units per month. In addition, a decision was made, along with a partial reduction in production for the needs of the ground forces, to limit the production of anti-aircraft guns, to completely stop production associated with preparations for the landing operation “Seelowe” (“Sea Lion”)®1-, and to agree on an extensive production program for the Air Force with the available possibilities.
The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Fritz Todt, who took part in the meeting, stated that the plan for the production of tanks and the expanded program for the production of weapons for the Air Force arose at a time when they hoped, with the end of the war on the Eastern Front, to release 1 million people from the army for the needs of the economy . Now the situation has changed. Even if the figure of 1 million people was 100% overestimated, it still became obvious that the main obstacle to the implementation of weapons production plans was primarily the lack of labor. The OKH Chief of Staff, in his memorandum on the possibilities of reorganizing the ground forces in the fall of 1941, referring to the need to provide effective assistance to the economy with people after the end of operations in the fall of 1941, came to the conclusion that after the end of operations on the Eastern Front, the armed forces could be allocated for the needs of industry are a maximum of 500 thousand people, of which 200 thousand will be World War II veterans discharged from the army and 300 thousand will be specialists who are urgently needed in industry. All plans for the military industry were based on the fact that after the end of the Eastern campaign, during the reorganization of the ground forces, most of the specialist workers would be sent to enterprises.
At the same time, it was planned to disband 49 infantry divisions, as a result of which about 500 thousand people would be freed up for the military industry. Initially, it was planned to disband even 60 infantry divisions, but by August this figure had decreased to 49. In July, the manpower requirements amounted to 1.5 million people, and thus could only be satisfied by one third, and in specialists - even only by one fifth. The tense situation at the front made it clear to the leadership of the relevant departments that using the released soldiers in the military industry in the near future was out of the question. Therefore, the existing contradiction between growing demand and available labor reserves for the military industry continued to deepen. Of the 9.9 million unconscripted military personnel belonging to the contingents of 1897-1923, after being called up for active service, the selection of persons subject to armor, as well as those unsuitable for military service, by the beginning of August only 72 thousand people remained. This meant that it was impossible to make up for losses in personnel, nor to satisfy the need to increase the number of troops at the front, since the annual natural increase in the contingent of military personnel (350 thousand people) turned out to be exceeded. This problem could be solved only by exposing other areas of the economy or by calling younger people into active service. But the possibilities for this were limited, and mainly because the need for workers for the war industry increased. Although civilian industries could, through various types of internal movements, free up about 30 thousand people every month for military production, this was still not enough.
The way out of this situation, found by the German leadership, was very simple: to use in the military industry about 500 thousand French prisoners of war, previously employed in German agriculture. Russian prisoners of war could take their place in agriculture. The first attempts by the Wehrmacht High Command and the Reich Ministry of Labor to put this plan into practice date back to mid-July, although by then it had already become clear that the use of Russian prisoners of war for work on German territory in accordance with the directives previously issued by the highest authorities was impossible.
In August, the situation cleared up a little after the Wehrmacht High Command, and mainly Goering, as the general commissioner for the implementation of the four-year plan, demanded the replacement of French prisoners of war with Russian ones. On August 2, the Wehrmacht High Command requested the use of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. This measure was seen as a “forced evil.” However, Goering managed to obtain for the military industry, and primarily for the implementation of the aircraft production program, 100 thousand French and only 120 thousand Russian prisoners of war, since Hitler categorically prohibited the use of more Russians on the territory of the empire. Thus, assistance to the military industry was provided, but not to the extent required. Due to the fact that most French prisoners of war needed training for work in the war industry, their efficiency ratio was still low. Moreover, this number of prisoners of war was completely insufficient. Only to fulfill the most urgent and most important military orders was required: the navy - 30 thousand people, ground forces- 51 thousand people, the air force until the end of 1941 - 316 thousand people, for the implementation of the Krauch program (fuel, aluminum, artificial rubber) - 133,700 people, that is, a total of 530,700 people. The only way to solve the manpower problem - and this became quite obvious in August - was to use Russian manpower in the future.
Participants in a meeting in the Department of War Economy and Armaments on August 16, 1941 came to the conclusion that even the most important production programs should be reduced due to a lack of raw materials. The commander of the reserve army, Colonel General Fromm, demanded that the Wehrmacht leadership “finally descend from the sky-high heights to the sinful earth.” Real conditions dictated either a sharp reduction in production programs or the seizure of new raw material bases. The missing reserves of raw materials needed to be replenished from the rich depths of the European part of the Soviet Union, and this was one of the main reasons that prompted Hitler to attack the USSR. In his notes on the military-economic significance of the operation in the East, the head of the department of military economics and armaments indicated that Germany would receive relief from raw materials if it was possible to take decisive action to prevent the enemy from liquidating reserves of raw materials, to capture the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and solve the transport problem.
It was planned to create a special organization for the exploitation of Russian industry and natural resources, and the issue of this was previously discussed in November 1940. Initially, this organization was transferred to the subordination of Lieutenant General Schubert and was called the “working headquarters of Russia.” On March 19, 1941, it was renamed “economic headquarters special purpose Oldenburg" and is subordinated directly to Goering. The organization was supposed to deal with issues not only of the military, but also of the entire economy as a whole, that is, to put the industry and raw materials of the USSR at the service of the interests of Germany.
The leadership of the Department of War Economy and Armaments was of the opinion that Germany should not only use Russia’s raw materials to continue the war, but also further restore Russian industry and agriculture. Goering, on the contrary, was a supporter of the unbridled plunder of the Soviet Union and did everything possible to achieve this. In June 1941, the organization was renamed "military-economic headquarters Ost". It had under its command “economic inspections” in the rear areas of army groups, one in each army group, one or more “economic commands” in security divisions, and one “economic group” in each army. All of these “economic” organizations were at the disposal of the relevant Wehrmacht command authorities and carried out the tasks of supplying troops.
But their main purpose was to do everything necessary for the fastest and most effective use of the occupied areas in the interests of Germany, that is, in the plunder of the wealth of the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1941, Hitler, in a conversation with Mussolini, noted that the economic occupation and exploitation of the Soviet Union had begun successfully. He even claimed that the captured booty was significantly more than what the German army was counting on. However, Hitler concealed the fact that the captured sources of raw materials, due to severe destruction and damage to mining enterprises, could be used for the German military industry only to a limited extent and that, due to a lack of transport, the transfer of agricultural products from the Soviet Union could not be fully ensured. Nevertheless, in this area, as well as in the area of raw materials, there remained hope that in the future it would be possible to overcome all the growing difficulties that were now becoming obvious if things were better organized and if German troops successfully advanced forward to the East.
The question of raw materials played a decisive role in why Hitler, having disagreed with the OKH regarding the further plan of operations, decided at the end of August to launch the main blow in the south, and not on the front of Army Group Center. The Fuhrer believed that the destruction or capture of vital raw material bases was much more important than the capture or destruction industrial enterprises for processing raw materials.
The need to capture the Donetsk basin and provide cover for the Romanian oil-bearing areas prompted Hitler to, using an operationally advantageous starting position on the inner flanks of Army Groups South and Center, launch an offensive with the goal of destroying the Russian armies in the Kyiv area and opening the way to the Soviet raw material bases. By this time, coal production in Germany was about 18 million tons per month (June 1941), iron ore - 5.5 million tons per year, oil - 4.8 million tons per year®1.
After successful implementation During the first stage of the operation to encircle Kyiv, Hitler decided that both main objectives of the campaign had almost been completed - to capture the Crimea and the industrial coal region of Donetsk and cut off Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus, as well as cut off Leningrad in the north and connect with the Finns. However, by the beginning of September, the German military command understood that the “Russian colossus” was not only not crushed, but also concentrated most of the forces near Moscow, which must be destroyed if you want to achieve a final victory over Russia. By the beginning of September, the Red Army concentrated about 40% of ground forces and artillery personnel, 35% of tanks, 35% of VVO-Sh- in well-equipped positions near Moscow. Since the Russian command believed that decisive direction It will be Western, it also attracted a large number of human reserves and equipment there.
Political situation. Germany's foreign policy situation was such that it needed an early victory over the Soviet Union like air. In their plans for the period after Barbarossa, the German command counted on the support, and perhaps even the entry into the war of Turkey, Spain and Vichy France on the side of the Great German Empire" Already in March 1941, the German ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen reported that Turkey would side with the Axis countries only if things worked out for them favorable conditions. Spain also took a similar position. Hopes of reaching an agreement with Vichy France, mainly on the issue of its North African possessions, were dashed in early September, as France realized that as a result of the weakening of Germany in the war with Russia, it could in the near future again rise to the ranks of great powers . But these were hopes that could only be realized when victory over Russia became obvious, and the countries mentioned above would risk going to war due to this. In addition, after the US occupation of Iceland, Hitler feared, and not without reason, that the United States would enter the war and then he would be able to wage war only if the economic potential of Russia was in his hands. Fear of the United States entering the war while the campaign in Russia was not yet over forced Hitler to do everything possible to prevent America from having any reason to declare war on Germany. He hoped that after the victory over Russia, the United States would not dare to oppose Germany and would remain neutral, especially since American forces would be tied up in Pacific Ocean axis partner - Japan.
In a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Hitler again emphasized his decision to do everything possible to not give the United States an excuse to enter the war in the near future. Request for permission for German submarines to attack American ships was categorically rejected by Hitler.
Hitler, in contrast to Joachim von Ribbentrop, approved of Japan's performance in Southeast Asia and its restrained position towards the Soviet Union, since it drew part of the British forces from Europe and North Africa and kept the United States from entering the war.
Ribbentrop, who differed with Hitler on foreign policy issues, sought from the very beginning of the Russian campaign to persuade Japan to begin military operations against the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. All his attempts, however, failed, running up against the notorious “selfish considerations” and the realistic assessment of the situation by the Japanese.
Hitler considered a Japanese attack on Russia impossible. However, he made the answer to the question whether such an attack would be beneficial for Germany depend on the developing military situation. In any case, at the beginning of September he believed that he could alone, without the help of Japan, bring Russia to its knees. The Axis partners, however, by this time were no longer so confident in the victorious outcome of the German campaign against the Soviet Union. The Italian General Staff and Mussolini, starting from the second half of July, believed that Germany had overestimated its strength and that Russia would be able to hold out until the winter. The Japanese, impressed by the strength of the Russian resistance near Smolensk and remembering the lessons of the battles with the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol11, decided to seek a political settlement of relations with the Soviet Union. Back in 1941, they did not hide their doubts about the victorious outcome of the Eastern campaign for Germany.
Hitler, who had reached a dead end in early September, saw the only way out of the current situation was to concentrate all his efforts on the Eastern Front in order to secure a strategic advantage for himself back in 1941 and create favorable conditions for the development of operations in the period after Barbarossa in 1942. But for this, Hitler needed to completely defeat the Red Army and achieve freedom of action operationally on the European territory of Russia, which was possible only if the Russian troops were defeated near Moscow. Therefore, from Hitler’s point of view, it was logical to listen to the arguments of the OKH, which he had hitherto rejected as untenable, and to bet everything on the trump card, whose name is “Moscow,” in order to thus end the war in the East. The victorious outcome of the offensive in the fall of 1941 was supposed to help resolve the ever-increasing difficulties in the military, economic and political fields.
K. Reinhardt. Turning near Moscow.
