Details
One of the little-studied pages of the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activity of barrage detachments. During Soviet times, this issue was shrouded in secrecy. According to the “Rules for the preservation of military secrets in the press of the Red Army (on wartime)", approved by order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:
14. All information about barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies"
This order continued after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of the perestroika “revelations,” a certain ominous image of “executioners from the NKVD” who shot retreating Red Army soldiers with machine guns was formed in public opinion.
In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage detachments based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains insufficiently studied. Thus, there is a widespread misconception that barrage detachments appeared only after the issuance of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.
Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it in one publication. In this article we will limit ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of military operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of the study includes:
Northwestern Front, formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the control and troops of the Baltic Special Military District.
Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the control and troops of the Leningrad Military District. By Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.
The Baltic Fleet, which from June 28, 1941 was under the operational control of the Northern Front, and from August 30, 1941 - under the operational control of the Leningrad Front.
Volkhov Front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period under review is beyond the scope of this article.
At the beginning of February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD proper and the People's Commissariat state security(NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.
On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issued Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for “the organization of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command and including in their composition operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks:
a) detention of deserters;
b) detaining all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational employees of the Third Directorate of NPOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of material along with those detained according to jurisdiction.”
In pursuance of this directive, already on June 28, a control and barrier detachment of NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Active Army was created on the North-Western Front. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and in its place the 1st defensive detachment of the NKVD troops for protecting the rear of the Active Army was created.
In July 1941, the NKVD and NKGB merged. On July 17, 1941, by resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of NPOs were transformed into special departments and also became subordinate to the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of a closer connection between them and the territorial state security agencies. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.
The next day, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his Directive No. 169, explained the tasks of special departments as follows: “The meaning of transforming the bodies of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs , deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors.
Ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and discredit the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage.”
To ensure operational activities, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed at special departments of divisions and corps, at special army departments - separate rifle companies, at special front departments - separate rifle battalions staffed by NKVD troops. .
Carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, set up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced, for example, by the “Instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front for the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists”:
Special departments of a division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:
a) organize a barricade service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who have left combat positions without permission;
b) carefully check every detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;
c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and investigated for trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within 12 hours;
d) all servicemen lagging behind the unit are organized into platoons (teams) and, under the command of trusted commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;
e) in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot deserters on the spot. The head of a special department reports each such case to a special department of the army and front;
f) carry out the sentence of a military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the line;
g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;
h) daily report to a special department of the army and a special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and equipment transferred to the unit.”
The following document is directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. It says, in particular: “one of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all, without exception, military personnel unorganizedly making their way from the front to the front line, as well as military personnel, in groups or alone falling into other parts.
However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized; the check of detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.
In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in Red Army units, I propose:
1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose assign experienced operational workers to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interviews with all detainees without exception should be carried out only by detectives.
2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified through intelligence and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.
If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons will be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, with constant surveillance established over them both by the special department and by the unit’s commissar.”
The daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war is illustrated by the report of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Divisional Commissar Lebedev, No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941 to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The barrage detachment under the 3rd department of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a maneuverable company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd Department, two homemade armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.
Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were placed on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that moment was quite far away, there were few cases of desertion in the area of responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the barrier detachment and the group of operational workers assigned to it were aimed at fighting the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Kaitseliit organization, operated on highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.
As a result of the work of the barrier detachment in the first days of the war, six bandits were caught in the Loksa area, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence reports, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding bandits.
Practice has shown that in areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small settlements, since gangster groups from time to time were forced to purchase food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their own people to the villages for this purpose. representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the barrier detachment. Despite their numerical superiority, the latter tried to detain them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, but the fourth, although, as it turned out, was a former Estonian running champion, failed to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd department.
The raids, combing of the area, secrets and outposts carried out by the detachment significantly complicated the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in the areas that the detachment controlled decreased sharply.
When, as a result of a counterattack by the 8th Army, the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated in mid-July 1941, a platoon of a detachment and a group of operational workers went to this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons who were hostile to the Soviet regime and assisted the fascists. On the way to Virtsu, a platoon of a barrage detachment suddenly crashed into a German outpost in vehicles, located at the fork in the Virtsu-Pär-nu road, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by enemy machine-gun and mortar fire, dismounted and took up the fight. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving behind an anti-tank gun, a machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The detachment's losses were 6 killed and 2 wounded.
Having transferred the defense of the recaptured area to regular units, a platoon of the barrier detachment arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately launched its work, as a result of which the head of the local organization “Kaitseliit”, two former members of this organization who were members of the “self-defense” formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant used by the Germans as a translator, as well as a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities were detained two agents of our border guard. 6 informants were recruited from among the population of Virtsu.
During the same period, an operation was carried out to clear gangs from Varbla metro station and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnov district. Two platoons of a barrier detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with a fighter battalion captured the indicated settlements in battle, destroying the “self-defense” headquarters and capturing a heavy machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephone sets, several hunting shotguns and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded; 4 bandits captured were shot on the spot. Our losses are 1 killed.
In Tallinn, a counter-revolutionary organization that was engaged in recruiting the local population into gangs was discovered and liquidated by a detachment. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.
In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the barrier detachment began work to send our agents to the German rear. Of the three abandoned agents, two returned. Having penetrated the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military facilities. Using this information, Baltic Fleet aircraft successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the occupiers from among the Estonian nationalists.
During the battle for Tallinn, the barrier detachment not only stopped and returned the retreating forces to the front, but also held defensive lines. The situation became especially difficult on the day of August 27th. Individual units of the 8th Army, having lost leadership, leaving the last line of defense, fled. To restore order, not only the barrier detachment was sent, but also the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. The retreating men stopped at gunpoint and, as a result of a counterattack, threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.
The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind other people’s backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the barrier detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.
Having arrived in Kronstadt, the barrier detachment immediately began recruiting and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operators to serve on the southern bank Gulf of Finland, and by September 18 the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.
In 1941, the barrier detachment detained over 900 people, 77 of them were arrested and convicted. At the same time, 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the line.
Their “land” colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought with Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Military Council of the front about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups on the territory of Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, a barrier detachment in the area of the location of 320 joint ventures caught two a spy from the local population who informed the enemy about the location of our units. The spies were shot on the spot."
By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, satisfied the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “Headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of escape, to stop them, using weapons if necessary.”
A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. “Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commanders of front troops, armies, division commanders, and the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions” read:
The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and downright hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, throw down their weapons and begin shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters along with them. As a result of such actions by these elements, the division takes flight, abandons its material unit, and then begins to emerge from the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were up to the task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we don’t have many strong and stable commanders and commissars.
In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. In each rifle division, have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.
2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the common escape.
3. Oblige employees of special departments and political personnel of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline of the division.
4. The creation of barrage detachments should be completed within five days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Report receipt and execution to the commanders of fronts and armies.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
B. Shaposhnikov ".
In contrast to the barrage detachments that continued to exist under special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on detaining deserters and suspicious elements, army barrage detachments were created with the goal of preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (a battalion per division instead of a platoon), and their personnel were not composed of NKVD servicemen, but of ordinary Red Army soldiers. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (commanding personnel - 24, junior commanding personnel - 26, rank and file - 292). However, the actual number of barrage battalions, as a rule, was significantly lower.
As can be seen from table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the strength of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one.
Table 1
The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons
|
№ divisions |
Report date |
Number of personnel |
Heavy machine guns |
Manual machine guns |
Automata |
|
No information |
|||||
A very indicative example is the 43rd Division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (as of January 1, 1942, its personnel numbered only 1,165 people). It is obvious that the division’s barrage battalion, whose strength had dropped to 64 people, did not avoid serious combat losses.
Simultaneously with the creation of the barrage battalions of the divisions, a decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 was issued “On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad.” In this document, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front, 1st secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee of the CPSU (b) A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd Secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, was prescribed:
"5. To the Head of the OVT (Troop Rear Security. - I.P.) Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanova to organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents.
To the Chief of Logistics of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Mordvinov to organize feeding points with these barrage detachments.” And indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.
Nowadays it is often asserted that the only thing the barrier detachments did was shoot at their own people. In this case, it is completely unclear why they should organize nutritional points? To feed those being shot before execution?
In October 1941, the Northwestern Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, thwarted the enemy command's plan to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special message from the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, state security commissioner of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941 addressed to the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank V.S. Abakumov, during the battles near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, the barrier detachment detained 27 people. At another site near the village of Lobanovo, the barrier detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. The malicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the line.
According to the certificate prepared by the deputy. Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank S.R. Milstein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10th of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops to protect the rear.
Of those detained, Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the rest
632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 were shot in front of the line.
This data is distributed along the fronts:
Leningradsky: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot before the line - 430 Karelsky: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot before the line - 132 Severny: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot before the line - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 160 0 shot in front of the line - 730...” As we see, the overwhelming majority of military personnel detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repression, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% who were shot.
Thus, under the name “barrage detachment” in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination operated. Barrier detachments detained deserters and suspicious elements in the rear, and stopped retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses.
References:
Kokurin A., Petrov N. NKVD: structure, functions, personnel. Article two (1938-1941) // Free Thought. - 1997. - No. 7.
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the USSR state security bodies from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia / Comp. A.T. Zhadobin and others - M.: Publishing house "Zvonnitsa", 2002. - 480 p.
RGANI. F.89. Op.18. D.8. L.1-3. Quote from: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin Archive. Documents higher authorities party and state power. - M.: International Foundation "Democracy", 2006. - P. 317-318. (636 pp.)
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 717 p.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 699 p.
Appendix No. 1 to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0205-1956. List No. 1 of directorates, formations, units, divisions and institutions of the NKVD troops that were part of the Active Army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - B.M., 1956. - 100 p.
Pykhalov I.V. The great slandered war. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 480 p.
Russian archive: The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (1943-1945). - T. 13(2-3). - M.: TERRA, 1997. - 456 p.
Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 2 / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko. - M.: Voenizdat, 1976. -639 p.
Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 7 / Ch. ed. commission N.V. Ogarkov. - M.: Voenizdat, 1979. -687 p.
Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (CAMO). F.217. Op.1221. D.5.
TsAMO. F.217. Op.1221. D.94.
The balance of forces of the parties in the North-West direction.
The Wehrmacht had a fairly significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. In mid-June, the advance of Soviet troops to the border began, but by June 22 this process could not be completed.
Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb) consisting of two armies and one tank group—a total of twenty-three infantry, three motorized and three tank divisions, was the weakest of the three army groups. It was assumed that it would destroy enemy forces in the Baltic states and, by capturing the Baltic ports, and then Leningrad and Kronstadt, would deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases. They also meant timely support for the mobile formations of Army Group Center, which were first advancing on Smolensk. Army Group North sought first of all to move forward with mobile formations of a strong right wing in order to reach the Opochka area as soon as possible, prevent the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states and create the preconditions for a subsequent rapid attack on Leningrad.
The outline of the border forced the army group's troops to concentrate tightly on the border of East Prussia and on both banks of the Neman in its lower reaches and did not provide any opportunities for the planned coverage directly from the deployment area.
Only seven Soviet divisions stood on the border with East Prussia. Others were located in separate groups around Vilnius, Kaunas, Siauliai and further to the rear to the Opochka and Pskov areas. To this it should be added that the Baltic countries were considered by the Russians only as a politically unreliable frontier in which they did not intend to conduct a decisive defense.
In such a situation, enveloping the enemy from the south and destroying him before he could retreat could only be accomplished under exceptionally favorable circumstances. To this end, the 16th Army of Colonel General Bush received the task of launching an offensive on both sides of the Ebenrode-Kaunas road in the direction of Daugavpils and to the north, and the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Goeppner was to advance in the same direction north of the lower reaches the Neman River, the 18th Army of Colonel General von Küchler delivered the main blow along the Tilsit-Riga road to Riga.
Aviation of the North-Western Front |
||||||||||
Tallinn (management hell) | ||||||||||
Haapsalu | ||||||||||
Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-153 | |||||||||
Riga (management hell) | ||||||||||
Total in the air division | SB, I-16, I-153 | |||||||||
Mitava (control hell) | ||||||||||
Panevezys | ||||||||||
241 bap | ||||||||||
Total in the air division | SB, Ar-2, I-16, I-153, MiG-3 | |||||||||
Kovno (administration hell) | ||||||||||
I-153, I-15bis | ||||||||||
MiG-3, MiG-1 | ||||||||||
I-153, I-15bis | ||||||||||
Total in the air division | SB, I-16, I-153, MiG-3, MiG-1, I-15 | |||||||||
Vilno (administration hell) | ||||||||||
I-153, I-15bis | ||||||||||
I-16, I-153, I-15 | ||||||||||
Total in the air division | SB, Ar-2, I-16, I-15, I-153 | |||||||||
Total for the Air Force of the military district | ||||||||||
Including new types | MiG-3, MiG-1, Pe-2, Il-2 | |||||||||
1 - Aviation divisions and regiments that were part of them
2 - Name of deployment points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including faulty aircraft)
5 - Total number of crews (denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to carry out a combat mission, depending on the availability of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:
6 - during the day in normal weather conditions
7 - at night in normal weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in difficult weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from colleges
7. Features of accounting for personnel and their losses on the North-Western Front in the summer of 1941
But let’s return to the consideration of the features of the events on the Northwestern Front in the summer of 1941. We chose it to illustrate the failure of troop registration of personnel, characteristic of the entire Red Army of that time. With the same “success” it was possible to study both the Western and Southwestern fronts, and we would get the same picture. The features described below for the NWF were, in general, characteristic of all warring fronts.
In addition to the incoming assigned personnel and marching replenishment, the NWF formations were sometimes filled with soldiers from numerous construction battalions (each 1000 people), who were called up for 6-month military training in March-May 1941 and sent from all military districts of the USSR to the Soviet-German state border for the construction of fortifications. The peculiarity of their military fate is that these soldiers, who de facto served in the Red Army, were de jure not counted as mobilized, because they were called up temporarily for pre-war 6-month training camps (TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12951, d. 16, l. 37). They were not included in the conscription books for the mobilization of military registration and enlistment offices, although appropriate marks were made on their cards for registering those liable for military service and they were put aside in separate file cabinets (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 46, l. 78). Only a small part (no more than 30%) of these soldiers in August and September 1941 left the subordination of the Northwestern Front as part of construction units assigned to the near rear for the construction of defensive lines.
The author managed to find another archival document that sheds light on the number of construction parts of PribOVO. In total, 87 construction, 35 sapper and 8 motor vehicle battalions, arriving from internal military districts, began work in the district zone (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 8, pp. 76–81). Fully formed construction battalions had a strength of 1000 people, engineer battalions - 455 people each, motor battalions - 529 people each. (TsAMO RF, f. 131, op. 12951, d. 16, pp. 48, 51). Thus, we can estimate the number of people employed in the construction of parts of the PribOVO-SZF at no less than 107,000 people.
As we see, the front command had plenty of troops and personnel resources at its disposal. But they “disappeared somewhere” during the 40 days of the war, and where they disappeared was clear to few of the front leadership. That is why the first consolidated “updated” document on losses in the amount of 57,207 people. appeared only on August 1, 1941. Sooner or later, it was necessary to report in the prescribed manner for the loss of troops. And the front “reported.”
Oh yes Viktor Andreevich Kashirsky! It was necessary to be able to, with the “light” hand of Chief of Staff N. Vatutin, without blinking an eye, report for losses 6.6 times less than the front lost personnel by August 1 (377,469 people)!!!
After all, what did he do? The casket opens simply. As of August 1, 1941, he reported on the losses of troops subordinate only for this date, and even for them - far from completely, as happened with the 128th Rifle Division with its reported losses of 527 people. against real 15,600 (TsAMO RF, f. 221, op. 1364, d. 71, pp. 121–123, see table 7):
Table 7
Colonel V. Kashirsky completely left out of consideration the losses of some armies, formations and units that were part of the NWF for the period June 22 - July 31, 1941, for some reason calling his, to put it mildly, strange report “clarified.” “Forgotten” in the report a whole army(8th), half of the corps, 2/3 of the rifle, half of the tank and motorized divisions. Out of 216 accounting units from the construction battalion to the army, the report does not contain information about the losses of 176 units!!! There are no other, more reliable reports of losses in the archives of the front during the 40 days of the war. There is no reason to assume that the General Staff documents will contain other data, since these are “clarified”. But since this document is the only one, do you want to believe it too? Believe and forget about the “forgetfulness” of the front headquarters in relation to 176 accounting units?
Chief of Staff of the Northern Western Front, Lieutenant General N. Vatutin
Formations and units not included in the report also suffered losses as part of the NWF, which the chief of staff of the front and the head of its manning department were simply obliged to take into account in their document. The report on the losses of the NWF troops had to be signed by the chief of staff of the NWF, Lieutenant General N. Vatutin, appointed to this position on July 1, 1941. Until that moment, he was the first deputy chief of the GShKA, former boss Operational Directorate of the GShKA, one of the main developers of our strategic operational plan for the war, which we had to fight in a completely different way than planned. His contemporaries talk about him something like this: “bright head.” His strategic breadth of thinking is still amazing. Reading the documents signed by his hand in July-August 1941 as the chief of staff of the front, you involuntarily compare them with documents of the highest rank that once had the stamp “Sov. secret. Of particular importance. The only copy” and also signed by his hand just a couple of months before the events under study. He kept in his head numerous nuances of the enormous war machine The USSR was so clear and fresh that it could operate hundreds of formations by heart and draw up in its neat handwriting in May-June 1941 numerous certificates for leadership and Directives for troops, most of which are still unknown and inaccessible to researchers. Their presence can be reliably judged by the large omissions in the already identified line of numbers and contents of the GSKA and NPO Directives up to July 1, 1941. In fact, during the entire post-war period, an extremely meager number of documents of the highest military status from the period of May–June 1941 were declassified. The true background of what happened before June 22 and directly on this day of events still remains unknown to most researchers. This is not an exaggeration, this is a real fact.
The reasons for the removal of such a bright head from the General Staff and his appointment to the position of just the chief of staff of the front still remain unclear (as well as the removal from Moscow of the head of the Main Artillery Directorate G. Zhukov, the head of the Main Artillery Directorate G. Kulik, the head of the Main Political Directorate A. Zaporozhets and others ). As if he was being saved from something or removed as someone who had done something wrong. What were they saving from? What did you do wrong?
Chief of Staff of the Northern Western Front, Lieutenant General P. Klenov
It is also still unclear why his predecessor in the position of chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General P. Klenov, was removed from his post on 07/01/41, arrested on 07/09/41, and shot on 02/23/42, despite the fact that the rest of the front leaders were not physically eliminated (F. Kuznetsov, P. Dibrova, D. Gusev, G. Sofronov and others). If he was punished for the huge losses of subordinate troops with the wording “Confessed to displaying inactivity in the leadership of the district troops” (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 3, op. 24, d. 378, l. 196), then his superior, commander of the Northern Western Front, General Colonel F. Kuznetsov was relieved of his duties on 07/03/41 and was only demoted from 07/10/41 to commander of the 21st Army, and on 07/26/41 he was appointed to lead the Central Front. By definition, he had to bear greater responsibility than the chief of staff if it was a matter of troop losses. Didn't carry it. Member of the Military Council of the NWF, Corps Commissar P. Dibrova, was only relieved of his duties on 07/01/41 and demoted to military commissar of the 30th State Duma, and then again became a member of the Military Council of the 59th and 2nd Shock Armies. He was replaced in the NWF on 07/05/41 by none other than the USSR Prosecutor, Major General V. Bochkov (should we keep an eye on N. Vatutin?), who simultaneously took the position of head of the 3rd and then the Special Department of the front headquarters. P. Klenov’s deputy, Major General D. Gusev, took up the post of chief of staff of the Baltic Military District from 06/19–22/41, then on 08/04/41 he was sent to the post of chief of staff of the newly created 48th Army, from 10/09/41 he headed the headquarters of the Leningrad Front, and in 1944 - the 21st Army. The first deputy commander of the district, Lieutenant General G. Sofronov, took the post of commander of the Baltic Military District troops from 06/19–22/41, and then from 07/26/41 he began to command the Primorsky Army. Everyone retained their titles and lives. Except P. Klenov...
USSR Prosecutor Major General V. Bochkov
Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin avoided signing the “clarified” report, giving the right to sign to his direct subordinate - the head of the staffing department of the NWF headquarters, Colonel V. Kashirsky. He, by definition and position, did not have the right to sign a report sent on behalf of the front to the Organizational Directorate of the GShKA and in a copy to the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov. But he signed and, with the consent of N. Vatutin and the new front commander, Major General P. Sobennikov, legitimized with his report huge hole in the accounting of NWF personnel, extending to no less than 320 thousand people (377,469–57,207) losses of all categories in just 40 days of war.
Let's try to verify our data on the magnitude of losses through wartime information. Let us turn to the requests of the NWF to the GSKA for replenishment to compensate for the losses of troops and bring them to wartime levels as of August 1, 1941. In total, the front headquarters, taking into account the march replenishment promised to it by the Center (67,662 people), requested the GSKA with four applications from 2 , 7, 12 and 20 July 1941 312 070 people (TsAMO RF, f. 56, op. 12236, d. 80, pp. 1–15, 131). Headcount 2 and 5 TD died, 184 SD fled, 126 and 179 SD departed to the Western Front, which the front headquarters no longer planned to replenish and deploy, was about 65,000 people. This number must be subtracted from the total losses of 377,469 people, which we established above and which, if these divisions remained in the combat strength of the NWF, had to be compensated for by replenishment. Since they were lost to the front's combat strength, they did not need to be replenished. We get 377,469–65,000 = 312 469 people These numbers amazingly practically coincide with the request of the NWF headquarters for a replenishment of 312,070 people. and thus fully confirm the legitimacy and scrupulousness of our calculations to determine the losses of the NWF for 40 days of the war at 377,469 people. taking into account all formations and individual regiments!!! This fact also means that the NWF headquarters had a good idea of the true picture of the losses suffered by the troops, and therefore the request for replenishment was real, minus the dead and departing units. But on the same date he reported for losses of only 57,207 people. Well, what should we call all this? Not by guile?
The gaping gap in the digital and personal accounting of losses in the NWF was partially filled after the war by reports from military registration and enlistment offices about soldiers who did not return (in the vast majority without indicating the military unit number), partially by Orders of the State Administration of NGOs, and partially by hospital information. But not the primary troop accounting, and it was on its digital data that the calculations of the respected authors of the “Book of Losses” were later based.
In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a short-term campaign in the summer - autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready part of the German armed forces was deployed on the border with the USSR 1 .
Wehrmacht
For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 army group headquarters available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed (North, Center and South) (75%), out of 13 field army headquarters - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 army corps headquarters - 34 (73.9%), of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). In total, 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht was allocated for the Eastern campaign. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. Thus, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially staffed by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of flying units, 16.9% of air defense troops and over 48% of signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.
German satellites
Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, which allocated the following forces to wage the war (see Table 2). In addition, Croatia contributed 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, which arrived later. Consequently, the German Allied forces deployed there included 767,100 men, 37 crew divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks and 886 aircraft.
In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 crew divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and together with 8.5 thousand Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations). 
Red Army
The armed forces of the Soviet Union, in the context of the outbreak of war in Europe, continued to increase and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see table 3). 56.1% of the ground forces and 59.6% of the air force units were stationed in the five western border districts. In addition, from May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from internal military districts and with Far East. By June 22, 16 divisions (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), which numbered 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks, had arrived in the western districts.
The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy surpassed the Red Army only in the number of personnel, because its troops were mobilized.
Mandatory clarifications
Although the above data gives a general idea of the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed its strategic concentration and deployment in the theater of operations, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively A.V. described this situation. Shubin, “a dense body was moving from West to East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was increasing, but not at a fast enough pace” 2. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the balance of forces at two more levels. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on a district (front) - army group scale, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on an army - army scale. In the first case, only ground forces and the Air Force, and for the Soviet side also border troops, artillery and naval aviation, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops of the NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.
Northwest
In the North-Western direction, troops of the German Army Group North and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) confronted each other. The Wehrmacht had a fairly significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be taken into account that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, Army Group North troops managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).
Western direction
In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of the PribOVO opposed each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea were concentrated here (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest Luftwaffe air fleet (43.8% aircraft). In the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 15 Soviet divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions and the 21st Mechanized Corps from the Moscow Military District arrived at the site - total number 72,016 men, 1,241 guns and mortars, and 692 tanks. As a result, the ZAPOVO troops contained in peacetime states were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but superior to him in tanks, aircraft and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to defeat them piecemeal.
Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the Zapovovo troops located in the Bialystok ledge with a strike from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. The main blow was struck from the south (from Brest). The 3rd Wehrmacht tank group was deployed on the northern flank (Suwalki), which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of the PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Tank Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In these areas the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority (see Table 6).
Southwest
In the South-Western direction, Army Group "South", which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet group in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was it that was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete their concentration and deployment. Thus, in KOVO there were only 16 divisions in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border strip, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km strip. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived on the territory of the districts, from which by June 22, 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks were concentrated. Even without being staffed according to wartime levels, the Soviet troops were superior to the enemy group, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft and somewhat less in artillery. But in the direction of the main attack of Army Group South, where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by parts of the German 6th Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for themselves (see Table 7).
Situation in the North
The most favorable situation for the Red Army was on the front of the Leningrad Military District (LMD), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and units of the German Army “Norway”. In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by German units of the Norway Mountain Infantry Corps and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be taken into account that since military operations on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data provided do not reflect the number of troops of the parties at the beginning of hostilities.
Results
Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, parts of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly near the border. This arrangement of the Soviet troops made it possible to destroy them piece by piece. In the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create a superiority over the Red Army troops, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern Campaign was delivered. In other directions, even in the zones of the covering armies, Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The general balance of forces allowed the Soviet command to prevent enemy superiority even in the directions of its main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.
Since the Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations in May 1941, which was supposed to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and had no neither offensive nor defensive grouping. The Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army’s covering troops in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repel the enemy, of which only a few managed to occupy equipped positions on the border. The remaining troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If we take into account that the enemy immediately launched 103 divisions on the offensive, it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a continuous front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Having forestalled the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in selected directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions to seize strategic initiative and successful implementation first offensive operations.
Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. pp. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. P. 496.
Branch
In the Soviet and Russian armies, a squad is the smallest military formation with a full-time commander. The squad is commanded by a junior sergeant or sergeant. Usually there are 9-13 people in a motorized rifle squad. In departments of other branches of the military, the number of personnel in the department ranges from 3 to 15 people. In some branches of the military the branch is called differently. In artillery there is a crew, in tank forces there is a crew.
Platoon
Several squads make up a platoon. Usually there are from 2 to 4 squads in a platoon, but more are possible. The platoon is headed by a commander with the rank of officer. In the Soviet and Russian armies this is ml. lieutenant, lieutenant or senior. lieutenant. On average, the number of platoon personnel ranges from 9 to 45 people. Usually in all branches of the military the name is the same - platoon. Usually a platoon is part of a company, but can exist independently.
Company
Several platoons make up a company. In addition, a company may also include several independent squads not included in any of the platoons. For example, a motorized rifle company has three motorized rifle platoons, a machine gun squad, and an anti-tank squad. Usually a company consists of 2-4 platoons, sometimes more platoons. A company is the smallest formation of tactical importance, that is, a formation capable of independently performing small tactical tasks on the battlefield. Company commander captain. On average, the size of a company can be from 18 to 200 people. Motorized rifle companies usually have about 130-150 people, tank companies 30-35 people. Usually a company is part of a battalion, but often the existence of companies as independent formations. In artillery, a formation of this type is called a battery; in cavalry, a squadron.
Battalion
Consists of several companies (usually 2-4) and several platoons that are not part of any of the companies. The battalion is one of the main tactical formations. A battalion, like a company, platoon, or squad, is named after its branch of service (tank, motorized rifle, engineer, communications). But the battalion already includes formations of other types of weapons. For example, in a motorized rifle battalion, in addition to motorized rifle companies, there is a mortar battery, a logistics platoon, and a communications platoon. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel. The battalion already has its own headquarters. Usually, on average, a battalion, depending on the type of troops, can number from 250 to 950 people. However, there are battalions of about 100 people. In artillery, this type of formation is called a division.
Regiment
In the Soviet and Russian armies, this is the main tactical formation and a completely autonomous formation in the economic sense. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. Although regiments are named according to the branches of the military, in fact this is a formation consisting of units of many branches of the military, and the name is given according to the predominant branch of the military. The number of personnel in the regiment ranges from 900 to 2000 people.
Brigade
Just like a regiment, it is the main tactical formation. Actually, the brigade occupies an intermediate position between a regiment and a division. A brigade can also consist of two regiments, plus battalions and auxiliary companies. On average, the brigade has from 2 to 8 thousand people. The brigade commander, as well as the regiment, is a colonel.
Division
The main operational-tactical formation. Just like a regiment, it is named after the predominant branch of troops in it. However, the predominance of one or another type of troops is much less than in the regiment. On average, there are 12-24 thousand people in a division. Division commander, Major General.
Frame
Just as a brigade is an intermediate formation between a regiment and a division, so a corps is an intermediate formation between a division and an army. The corps is already a combined arms formation, that is, it is usually deprived of the characteristic of one type of military force. It is impossible to talk about the structure and strength of the corps, because as many corps exist or existed, so many of their structures existed. Corps commander, Lieutenant General.
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