Causes of the Tsushima disaster. Battle of Tsushima

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. “Tsushima” became a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was entrusted with the very vague task of independently gaining supremacy at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was located quite far from the theater of military operations and had an infrastructure too weak for a huge squadron. The voyage, as is known, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of Japan without losses in the ship's personnel or serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of combat status, and the ongoing exercises good results They didn’t give and couldn’t give. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

Often in the literature dedicated to the Battle of Tsushima, the terrible high-explosive effect of Japanese shells, which exploded even upon impact with water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. The Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima fired shells with a powerful high-explosive effect, causing great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

Thus, at Tsushima, the cruiser Nissin lost three of its four main caliber guns. Russian armor-piercing shells filled with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without exploding. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the day’s battle, Admiral Kammimura’s flagship, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoi the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overload of Russian ships with large amounts of coal, water and various cargoes, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Battle of Tsushima was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but proper use Japanese artillery, which concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth battleship of the Borodino class, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained its combat effectiveness.

It should be taken into account that out of 360 hits from large shells, about 265 fell on the above-mentioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentratedly, and although the main target was the battleship Mikasa, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor that determined the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much greater speed.

Thus, the four newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

By tying himself to slow-moving transports, which were still impossible to protect from attacks by light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the enemy’s hands. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The day's battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance of breaking through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the enemy overtaking the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhestvensky himself and the junior flagships. No specific instructions were issued before the battle. In case of failure of the flagship, the squadron had to be led by the next battleship in formation, keeping the given course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the flagship failed?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" perished with their entire crew and who actually led the ships, replacing the retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening Nebogatov took command of the squadron - more precisely the that I was able to gather around myself. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later did Rozhdestvensky take decisive action.

Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the end of the day's battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. Thus, almost the entire crew of the battleship Navarin perished, and the Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which were hit by torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in dark time days, but then, maintaining camouflage, she successfully exited the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of Japanese destroyers.

In the Battle of Tsushima, mine attacks, as during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with Akatsuki-2 (formerly Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chefu).

In the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, the Russian Pacific Flotilla and the Imperial Flotilla suffered a crushing defeat. As a result sea battle the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and sunk along with their crew members. Some ships announced their capitulation, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. Russo-Japanese War(1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat of the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was a different outcome possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a surprise attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military actions. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence in this area of Russian land.

Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. Russia's small allies, such as France, Germany and others, strongly supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, at decisive strategic moments they still tried to adhere to neutrality. Allied cooperation was provided only when it suited their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive action. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron under the leadership of Vice Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken and all the ships in the roadstead are sunk. The Pacific Flotilla has been destroyed. This is maritime history Far East of Russia. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To strengthen the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships from Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was sent.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units on the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

8 squadron heavy artillery against 4 Japanese;
3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;
1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Imperial Japanese Navy;
8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;
5 against Japan's 24 auxiliary military vessels;
9 Russian versus 63 Japanese

The clear combat advantage of Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat riflemen skillfully mastered the art of hitting enemy targets at long distances, and at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet did not have such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of naval equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic objective of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky’s sea campaign was to capture the Sea of Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any force, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would be strategic the right decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. The decision was made to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and Sea of Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that Japanese Admiral Heitachiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are blocked

The commander of the Japanese fleet strategically chose the right plan possible hostilities. A patrol chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the approaches to Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently placed minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were awaiting the approach of Russian ships. refused naval reconnaissance, fearing detection of his squadron by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed crazy to many. Both veterans with worn-out mechanisms, who had logged hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed ships that had not passed tests, were sent on this doomed voyage. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. The battleships with the names of famous commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death.

They got stuck on the descent during a slip, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, and ran aground, as if they were giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe omens?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship Emperor Alexander III burned down in the workshop. The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in the civil harbor, and later ran aground several times, catching up with the squadron in Gulf of Finland. The battleship “Slava” was never able to be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command was unaware of any premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II walked around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and join the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for joint mastery of the Sea of Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, and destroyers left their native shores forever. The 220-day, 18,000 nautical mile voyage to the Japanese shores has begun.

Unforeseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command was the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time, warships of a belligerent party could enter the ports of a neutral party only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the squadron's route, closed its ports to Russian warships.

Supplying the squadron with coal, provisions and fresh water, had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop “Kamchatka” was equipped, staffed by volunteer craftsmen. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. Overall implementation strategic operation this scale deserves the highest praise.

The most difficult loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, a severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron, like a ghost, loomed on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world watched her movements. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

Port Said (Egypt);
Djibouti (East Africa);
Aden (Yemen);
Dakar (Senegal);
Conakry (Guinea);
Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were to no avail. The first long-term stop was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkersam also joined there, taking a short route through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this did not surprise anyone. The crews were formed mostly of recruits and penal prisoners. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The endlessly tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore and the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island were Korean pearl divers. The Battle of Tsushima would begin very soon, and the date of the squadron's destruction was approaching.

First salvo against the enemy

At 13:40, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov”, under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Ignatius, set course north-east 23. Nine minutes later, its guns opened fire on the Japanese squadron, and two minutes later flashes of response flashed volleys The Tsushima naval battle has begun. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear back in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not give up.” The commander kept his word and died along with the entire crew of the battleship.

Battle of Tsushima, briefly about the main thing

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr, with a strong bow on the bow and a huge fire on the rostra, rolled out of formation and fell on the left side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under water, leaving only wooden fragments and people floundering in the water on the surface.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, one after another, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down.

By 16 o'clock the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was out of action, which was severely mutilated by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier we managed to remove Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky with his headquarters to the destroyer “Buiny”. A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. The captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, commanded a squadron battleship and died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two wonderful artists died, both of them graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, complete namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S. O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship “Prince Suvorov”, the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

“Sisoy the Great” under the command of captain 1st rank M.P. Ozerov;
the battleship "Navarin", led by captain 1st rank Baron B. A. Fitingof;
the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;
squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", whose commander was captain 1st rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last of the Russian squadron to die);
"Admiral Senyavin" led by Captain 1st Rank S.I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 increasingly carried Russian sailors and their ships into the abyss of the sea. Another mortally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the fireman - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this terrible battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the north-east 23 course. The main thing is to survive. Many people died with this thought. Russian sailors on the following battleships followed with their gaze the place where their comrades died. They whispered with lips black from burning: “Rest their souls, Lord.”

The battleship Emperor Alexander III and its entire crew perished, and a little later the Borodino. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the indestructibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were surrendered to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. Subsequently, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buiny", who saved Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was captain 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, and commander of the icebreaker Ermak. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he distinguished himself as one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. First world war became vice admiral. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N.N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, his name was assigned to a new hydrographic vessel. Only very recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought in the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship “Nikolai Kolomiytsev” was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

Historical background

From the lists of naval fleets of that time, two ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored deck "Aurora" at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including E.R. Egoriev, were killed, and another 83 people were injured. Unable to move forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives more reason for the cruiser Aurora to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversaries of Tsushima, meetings of veterans and participants of the Russian-Japanese War were held there. The Japanese treat this historical monument with great reverence.

Memory of the lost sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three arrived in Vladivostok. The messenger ship "Almaz", the destroyers "Grozny" and "Bravey". Most of the ships and 5 thousand sailors found eternal peace at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Dazhelet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on Water, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with people's money and widows' contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

The Battle of Tsushima took place on May 14-15, 1905 in the Tsushima Strait between the East China and Sea of Japan. In this grandiose naval battle, the Russian squadron was completely defeated by the Japanese squadron. The Russian ships were commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky (1848-1909). The Japanese naval forces were led by Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934). As a result of the battle, most of the ships of the Russian squadron were sunk, others capitulated, some broke through to neutral ports, and only 3 ships managed to complete the combat mission. They reached Vladivostok.

Campaign of the Russian squadron to Vladivostok

The battle was preceded by an unprecedented transition of the Russian squadron from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. This path was 33 thousand km. But why did such a feat need to be accomplished by a large number of a wide variety of ships? The idea of creating the 2nd Pacific Squadron arose in April 1904. They decided to form it to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron, based in Port Arthur.

On January 27, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, without declaring military action, attacked Port Arthur and opened fire on the warships stationed in the outer roadstead. Access to the open sea was blocked. Twice the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron tried to break out into operational space, but these attempts ended in failure. Thus, Japan gained complete naval superiority. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats were locked in Port Arthur. There are 44 warships in total.

At that time, there were 3 cruisers and 6 old-style destroyers in Vladivostok. 2 cruisers were blown up by mines, and the destroyers were only suitable for short-term naval operations. In addition, the Japanese blocked the Vladivostok port, which led to the complete neutralization of naval forces Russian Empire in the Far East.

That is why they began to form a new squadron in the Baltic. If Russia had seized primacy at sea, the course of the entire Russo-Japanese War could have changed dramatically. By October 1904, a new powerful naval formation was formed, and on October 2, 1904, the great sea voyage began.

The squadron, headed by Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, consisted of 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 battleship cruiser, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 6 transport ships and 2 hospital ships. The squadron was armed with 228 guns. Of these, 54 guns had a caliber of 305 mm. There were a total of 16,170 personnel, but this includes those ships that joined the squadron already during the voyage.

Campaign of the Russian squadron

The ships reached Cape Skagen (Denmark), and then divided into 6 detachments, which were supposed to unite in Madagascar. Some of the ships moved through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. And the other part was forced to go around Africa, since these ships had a deep landing and could not pass through the canal. It should be immediately noted that while swimming tactical exercises And live shooting were carried out very rarely. Neither the officers nor the sailors believed in the success of the event. Hence the low morale, which is crucial in any company.

December 20, 1904 Port Arthur fell, and those going to Far East naval forces were clearly not enough. Therefore, it was decided to create the 3rd Pacific Squadron. And before that, on November 3, a detachment of ships under the command of captain 1st rank Dobrotvorsky Leonid Fedorovich (1856-1915) was poisoned in pursuit of Rozhdestvensky’s squadron. Under his command were 4 cruisers and 5 destroyers. This detachment arrived in Madagascar on February 1st. But 4 destroyers were sent back due to systematic breakdowns.

In February, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov (1849-1922) left Libau. The detachment included 4 battleships, 1 battleship cruiser and several auxiliary ships. On February 26, Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was caught up by the Irtysh transport with large reserves of coal. At the beginning of the journey, the legendary Lieutenant Schmidt was his senior mate. But in the Mediterranean Sea he began to develop renal colic, and the future hero of the revolutionary uprising was sent to Sevastopol on the cruiser Ochakov.

In March, the squadron crossed the Indian Ocean. Warships were replenished with coal using longboats that transported it from transport ships. On March 31, the squadron arrived in Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam). Here she waited for Nebogatov’s detachment, which joined the main forces on April 26.

On May 1, the last tragic stage of the campaign began. Russian ships left the coast of Indochina and headed towards Vladivostok. It should be noted that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky accomplished a real feat. Under his command, the most difficult 220-day transition of a huge squadron was carried out. She crossed the waters of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. We must also pay tribute to the courage of the officers and sailors. They survived this transition, and yet there was not a single naval base on the ships’ route.

Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Heihachiro Togo

On the night of May 13-14, 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Tsushima Strait. The ships sailed darkened and could easily pass through a dangerous place unnoticed. But the Japanese patrol cruiser Izumi discovered the hospital ship Orel, which was sailing at the end of the squadron. All the lights were on on it in accordance with maritime regulations. The Japanese ship approached and spotted other ships. The commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo, was immediately notified of this.

The Japanese naval forces included 4 battleships, 8 battleship cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 42 destroyers and 21 destroyers. The squadron consisted of 910 guns, 60 of which had a caliber of 305 mm. The entire squadron was divided into 7 combat detachments.

Russian ships sailed through the Tsushima Strait, leaving the island of Tsushima on the left side. The Japanese cruisers began to follow a parallel course, hiding in the fog. At about 7 o'clock in the morning the enemy was discovered. Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the squadron to form into 2 wake columns. Transport ships, covered by cruisers, remained in the rearguard.

At 13:20, at the exit from the Tsushima Strait, Russian sailors saw the main forces of the Japanese. These were battleships and battleship cruisers. They walked perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron. The enemy cruisers began to fall behind in order to position themselves behind the Russian ships.

The defeat of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait

Rozhestvensky rebuilt the squadron into one wake column. After the rebuilding was completed, the distance between the opponents was 38 cables (just over 7 km). The Vice Admiral ordered to open fire. The Japanese returned fire a couple of minutes later. They concentrated it on the lead ships. Thus began the Battle of Tsushima.

Here you need to know that the squadron speed of the Japanese fleet was 16-18 knots. And for the Russian fleet this value was 13-15 knots. Therefore, it was not difficult for the Japanese to stay ahead of the Russian ships. At the same time, they gradually shortened the distance. At 14 o'clock it became equal to 28 cables. It is approximately 5.2 km.

The artillery on Japanese ships had a high rate of fire (360 rounds per minute). And Russian ships fired only 134 shots per minute. In terms of high-explosive capabilities, Japanese shells were 12 times superior to Russian ones. As for the armor, it covered 61% of the area of Japanese ships, while for the Russians this figure was 41%. All this already predetermined the outcome of the battle from the very beginning.

At 14:25 the flagship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled. Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, who was on it, was wounded. At 14:50, having received numerous holes in the bow, the battleship Oslyabya sank. The Russian squadron, having lost its overall leadership, continued to move in a northerly direction. She tried to maneuver to increase the distance between herself and the enemy ships.

At 6 p.m., Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command of the squadron, and the Emperor Nicholas I became the flagship ship. By this time, 4 battleships had been destroyed. All ships were damaged. The Japanese also suffered damage, but none of their ships were sunk. Russian cruisers walked in a separate column. They also repelled enemy attacks.

As darkness fell, the battle did not subside. Japanese destroyers systematically fired torpedoes at the ships of the Russian squadron. As a result of this shelling, the battleship Navarin sank and 3 battleship cruisers lost control. The teams were forced to scuttle these ships. During the same time, the Japanese lost 3 destroyers. The situation was aggravated by the fact that at night the Russian ships lost contact with each other, so they had to act independently. Under the leadership of Nebogatov, 4 battleships and 1 cruiser remained.

From the early morning of May 15, the main part of the Russian squadron tried to break through to the north to Vladivostok. 3 cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist turned south. Among them was the cruiser Aurora. They managed to break through the Japanese defenses and escape to Manila, but at the same time they abandoned the transport ships without protection.

The main detachment, led by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, was surrounded by the main Japanese forces. Nikolai Ivanovich was forced to give the order to stop resistance and surrender. It happened at 10:34 am. The destroyer Bedovy, on which the wounded Rozhdestvensky was located, also surrendered. Only the cruiser "Izumrud" managed to break through the encirclement and went towards Vladivostok. It ran aground near the shore and was blown up by the crew. Thus, it did not fall to the enemy.

Losses for May 15 were as follows: the Japanese sunk 2 battleships that fought independently, 3 cruisers and 1 destroyer. 3 destroyers were sunk by their crews, and one managed to break through and go to Shanghai. Only the cruiser Almaz and 2 destroyers managed to reach Vladivostok.

Russian and Japanese losses

The Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian fleet lost 5,045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were then interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.

Of the ships, 7 battleships, 1 battleship-cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 vehicles. The enemy got 4 battleships, 1 destroyer and 2 hospital ships. 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 2 transport ships were interned. Of the entire squadron of 38 ships, only the cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers - "Grozny" and "Brave" - remained. They managed to break through to Vladivostok. From this it is clear that the defeat was complete and final.

The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 were injured. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.

Reasons for the defeat of the Russian squadron

For the Russian squadron, it would be more correct to call the Battle of Tsushima the Tsushima disaster. Experts see the main reason for the total destruction in the movement of ships in a wake column at low speed. The Japanese simply shot the lead battleships one by one and thereby predetermined the death of the entire squadron.

Here, of course, the main blame falls on the shoulders of the Russian admirals. They didn't even make a battle plan. Maneuvers were carried out hesitantly, the battle formation was inflexible, and control of the ships was lost during the battle. And the combat training of the personnel was at a low level, since practically no tactical training was conducted with people during the campaign.

But for the Japanese it was not like that. They seized the initiative from the first minutes of the battle. Their actions were distinguished by decisiveness and courage, and the ship commanders showed initiative and independence. The personnel had extensive combat experience behind them. We should also not forget about the technical superiority of Japanese ships. All this together brought them victory.

One cannot help but mention the low morale of Russian sailors. He was influenced by fatigue after a long march, the capitulation of Port Arthur, and revolutionary unrest in Russia. People felt the complete meaninglessness of this entire grandiose expedition. As a result, the Russian squadron lost the battle even before it began.

The finale of the whole epic was the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on August 23, 1905. But the main thing was that Japan felt its strength and began to dream of great conquests. Her ambitious dreams continued until 1945, when Soviet troops put an end to them, completely defeating the Kwantung Army.

Alexander Arsentiev

Photos from open sources

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. "Tsushima" has become a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

1 Long hike

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of the combat situation, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

2 Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

The significant overload of Russian ships with large quantities of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Battle of Tsushima was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth battleship of the Borodino class, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained its combat effectiveness.

3 Low speed

4 Management crisis

Only in the evening did Nebogatov take command of the squadron - or rather, what he could gather around him. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later did Rozhdestvensky take decisive action.

5 Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in the dark, but then, maintaining camouflage, successfully withdrew from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

Valery Shilyaev. Triptych Tsushima. Left side. 2005
Illustration from the artist’s website http://www.shilaev.ru/

Tsushima naval battle (May 14-15, 1905). Fight at Fr. Tsushima warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons consisting of 30 warships with the Japanese fleet (120 ships). The main goal of the Russian fleet (squadron commanders were admirals Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov) was a breakthrough to Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet (commander - Admiral Togo) had the task of completely defeating the Russian fleet. The greater concentration of forces of the Japanese fleet, its better equipment and maneuverability led to military success. Despite the courage and heroism of the Russian officers and sailors, who had previously traveled 33 thousand kilometers from Kronstadt to Tsushima and entered the battle on the move, their losses were catastrophic: 19 ships were sunk, 3 cruisers broke through to neutral ports and were interned, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok. Of the 14 thousand personnel of the squadrons, more than 5 thousand died.

Chronicle of the battle

1905.05.27 (May 14, old style) Sea of Japan. The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky (11 battleships, 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 1 auxiliary cruiser) met with the Japanese fleet of Adm. H. Togo (4 battleships, 24 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 42 destroyers, 24 auxiliary cruisers) in the Tsushima Strait.

7 .14. A Japanese cruiser was spotted from the Russian squadron.

9 .40. A detachment of Japanese cruisers has been discovered.

13 .15. The Russian squadron met with the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

13 .49. Russian ships opened fire from a distance of 38 cables (over 7 km).

13 .52. The Japanese fleet responded with concentrated fire at the battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya.

14 .00. The Japanese cruiser Asama was damaged by the Russians and removed from the battle.

14 .25. Having received heavy damage and lost control, the battleship Oslyabya broke down.

14 .30. The battleship "Prince Suvorov" was disabled and lost control.

14 .40. The Russian battleship Oslyabya capsized and sank.

15 .40. The squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was seriously damaged.

16 .20. On the battleship Suvorov, only the 75-mm gun in the aft casemate survived from the artillery, which continues to fire at the enemy. The ship is a continuous fire from bow to stern.

17 .20. The Russian auxiliary cruiser "Ural" was sunk.

17 .30. The destroyer "Buiny" removed the surviving headquarters officers and the adm. wounded in the head from the battleship "Suvorov". Z. Rozhdestvensky.

18 .50. The battleship "Emperor Alexander III" was sunk.

2 .15 the battleship Navarin was sunk, the Russians sank 3 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12.

5 .00. South of Tsushima Island, the Russian destroyer "Brilliant" was scuttled by its crew.

5 .23. The Russian destroyer Bezuprechny was sunk by a Japanese cruiser.

8 .00. To the north of Tsushima Island the battleship Admiral Nakhimov was sunk.

10 .05. The battleship Sisoi the Great was sunk by a Japanese torpedo.

10 .38. A detachment of ships of Adm. Nebogatov (battleships "Emperor Nicholas I", "Eagle", "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin"), surrounded by a Japanese squadron, capitulated. Only the cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.

11 .00. After a battle with 2 Japanese auxiliary cruisers and 1 destroyer, the cruiser "Svetlana" was scuttled by its crew.

11 .30. The destroyer "Buiny" was sunk.

11 .50. The destroyer "Bystry" was sunk. 12 .43. Off the coast of Korea, encountered by 3 Japanese destroyers, the destroyer "Gromky" was sunk by its crew.

14 .00. The team scuttled the battleship "Vladimir Monomakh"

17 .05. On the destroyer "Bedovy" the commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Adm. Z. Rozhestvensky, surrendered to Japanese captivity.

18 .10. Japanese cruisers "Yakumo" and "Iwate" sunk the Russian battleship "Admiral Ushakov" (cap. 1st r. Miklouho-Maclay). In the Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, the Russians lost 10 thousand people, Japanese losses - 3 destroyers and 1 thousand people. Of the entire 2nd Pacific Squadron, only a few ships managed to escape. The cruisers "Aurora", "Oleg" and "Pearl" broke through to Manila (Philippines; USA), the destroyer "Bodriy", the transports "Svir" and "Korea" to Shanghai ( China) where they were interned, the Anadyr transport went to the island of Madagascar (Fr). Only the cruisers Almaz and Izumrud and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny broke through to Vladivostok.

Analysis of the progress of the battle

The final stage of the 2nd Pacific Squadron's campaign to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By this time, the Russian squadron included eight squadron battleships (of which three were old), three coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, eight cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers and nine destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, consisting of 12 armored ships, were divided into three detachments of four ships each. The cruisers were divided into two detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov. The Japanese fleet, commanded by Admiral Togo, consisted of four battleships, six coastal defense battleships, eight armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into eight combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The first detachment was commanded by Admiral Togo, the second by Admiral Kamimura.

The Russian squadron was not inferior to the Japanese in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers), but in terms of quality, the superiority was on the side of the enemy. The main forces of the Japanese fleet had significantly more large and medium caliber guns; Japanese artillery had almost three times the rate of fire of Russian artillery, and Japanese shells had five times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese fleet had higher tactical and technical data than the Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this we must add that the Japanese had many times superiority in cruisers and especially in destroyers.

Big advantage The Japanese fleet also had the fact that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, lacking it, after a long and difficult transition had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had extensive experience in conducting live firing at long distances, gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in conducting concentrated fire from multiple ships at a single target over long distances. Russian artillerymen did not have experience-tested rules for shooting at long distances and did not have the practice of conducting such shooting. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and was even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

By the time the Russian squadron arrived in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, consisting of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments, were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers were at the island. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto and Quelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, which was supposed to timely detect the Russian squadron as it approached the Korean Strait and ensure the deployment of its main forces along its route. Thus, the initial position of the Japanese fleet before the battle was so favorable that any possibility of the Russian squadron passing through the Korean Strait without a fight was excluded. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korean Strait. Believing that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to conduct it depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active actions, giving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing happened as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and formed a night march order. The cruisers were deployed ahead along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron, two hospital ships followed at a distance of one mile. While moving through the Strait, Rozhdestvensky, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese discover the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its path. The first, at 2 hours 25 minutes, noticed the Russian squadron by the lights and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser "Shinano-Maru", which was on patrol between the Goto-Quelpart islands. Soon, from the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempts to interfere with the negotiations of Japanese ships.

Having received a report of the discovery of the Russians, Admiral Togo left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet along the route of the Russian squadron. The tactical plan of the commander of the Japanese fleet was to envelop the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and, with concentrated fire on the flagships, disable them and thereby deprive the squadron of control, and then use night attacks by destroyers to develop the success of the day's battle and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

With the onset of the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron first into a wake formation, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following the formation of two wake columns through the Korean Strait, the Russian squadron at 13:30 on the right bow discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were heading to cross its course.

Admiral Togo, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cabs. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese were trying to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, came out to the left side and began a successive turn of 16 points to cover the head of the Russian squadron. This turn, made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships at an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn for the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation almost in one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. However, this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire turned out to be ineffective, since due to improper management it was not concentrated on those Japanese ships that were turning around on the spot. As they turned, the enemy ships opened fire, concentrating it on the flagship ships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired upon by four to six Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve positive results.

The superiority of the Japanese in artillery and the weakness of the armor of Russian ships had an immediate impact. At 14:23, the battleship Oslyabya, having received serious damage, broke down and soon sank. At about 14:30 the battleship Suvorov broke down. Having serious damage and completely engulfed in flames, she repelled continuous attacks from enemy cruisers and destroyers for another five hours, but at 19:30 she also sank.

After the failure of the battleships Oslyabya and Suvorov, the battle order of the Russian squadron was disrupted and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going to the head of the Russian squadron, intensified their fire. The Russian squadron was led by the battleship Alexander III, and after its death - by the Borodino.

Trying to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron followed a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated the fire of almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and steadfastness, repelled enemy attacks to the last.

At 15:05, fog began, and visibility decreased so much that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. At about 15:40, the Japanese again discovered Russian ships heading to the north-east and resumed battle with them. At about 16 o'clock the Russian squadron, evading encirclement, turned south. Soon the battle stopped again due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and was eventually forced to use his main forces to search for it.

Well organized reconnaissance before the battle. Togo neglected it during the battle, as a result of which he twice lost visibility of the Russian squadron. During the daytime phase of the Battle of Tsushima, Japanese destroyers, staying close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (four ships in a group) from different directions. Torpedoes were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cabs. Of the 30 torpedoes, only five hit the target, and three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 17 hours 51 minutes, the main forces of the Japanese fleet, having discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting with Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. This time the Japanese commander abandoned the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the day's battle, which lasted until 19 hours 12 minutes, the Japanese sank two more Russian battleships - "Alexander III" and "Borodino". With the onset of darkness, Admiral Togo stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces towards the island. Ollyndo (Dazhelet), and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

At about 20 o'clock, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45 from three directions simultaneously and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance from 1 to 3 cabins, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors destroyed two Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from Japanese destroyer attacks, Russian ships were dispersed throughout the Korean Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior Japanese forces on their way, they boldly entered into a decisive battle with them and fought it until the last shell. The crews of the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov, under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklouho-Maclay, and the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev, fought heroically with the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags to the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted completely differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian fleet lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. Four armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (he was unconscious due to injury) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the cruiser Almaz and two destroyers broke through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in strength and the unpreparedness of the Russian fleet for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies with Rozhdestvensky, who, as commander, allowed a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, refused reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active actions and did not organize the control of forces in battle.

The Japanese fleet, having sufficient time and operating in favorable conditions, was well prepared for the meeting with the Russian squadron. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they discovered the Russian squadron in a timely manner and concentrated their main forces on its route. However, Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he was unable to cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron. Togo exposed his ships to her attack, and only Rozhdestvensky’s inept actions saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this incorrect maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result of which he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used cruisers in the battle, resorting to searching for the Russian squadron with the main forces.

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Due to the increase in combat distance, medium-caliber artillery did not justify its worth. The need emerged to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to develop the success achieved in artillery combat. An increase in the penetrating ability of armor-piercing shells and the destructive effect of high-explosive shells required an increase in the armoring area of the ship's side and strengthening of the horizontal armor. The battle formation of the fleet - a single-wing column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces over distances of up to 100 miles.

Materials used from the book: “One Hundred Great Battles”, M. “Veche”, 2002

Literature

1. Bykov P.D - Battle of the island. Tsushima // Russian naval art. Sat. Art. / Rep. ed. R.N. Mordvinov. - M., 1951. P. 348-367.

2. History of naval art / Rep. ed. N.A. St. Petersburg. - M., 1953. - T.Z. - P. 66-67.

3. History of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. / Ed. I.I. Rostunova. - M., 1977. P. 324-348.

4. Kilichenkov A. Togo’s mistake and the last chance of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. [On the tactics of the naval battle of Tsushima, 1905]. // Marine collection. - 1990. -No. 3.-S. 80-84.

5. Marine atlas. Descriptions for cards. - M., 1959. - T.Z, part 1. - P. 698-704.

6. Marine Atlas / Rep. ed. G.I. Levchenko. - M., 1958. - T.Z, part 1. - L. 34.

7. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military historical commission to describe the Russo-Japanese War. -T.I-9. -SPb., 1910.

8. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 The work of the military historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. under Marine General Headquarters. - KN.1-4, 6, 7. - St. Petersburg-Pg., 1912-1917.

Read further:

War in the context of world politics.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905(chronological table).

Defense of Port Arthur(detailed chronicle of the battle and its analysis).