The left wing in the Socialist Revolutionary Party began to stand out before the First World War. During the February Revolution, part of the Social Revolutionaries of Petrograd, led by V. Aleksandrovich, opposed the compromise with the liberal leaders of the Duma, in favor of transferring power to the government of the socialists who dominated the councils. Subsequently, the left wing was headed by the Socialist Revolutionary terrorist M. A. Spiridonova, one of the oldest populists M. A. Nathanson, B. D. Kamkov, V. A. Karelin and others, supporting the strategic goals of the Social Revolutionaries and advocating deepening the revolution in the interests of the peasantry and other “working classes”, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries considered the freezing of social transformations by the Provisional Government, which included the Socialist Revolutionary Party, unacceptable. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries shared the populist ideas of peasant socialism. They believed that for the victory of the revolution it was necessary to act more decisively, and this brought them closer to the Bolsheviks, they sought to reconcile the Bolsheviks and moderate socialist parties, and achieve the creation of a multi-party socialist government “without the bourgeoisie.” But radicalism involved the Left Socialist Revolutionary party masses in the October Revolution.
The leaders of the radical wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, who advocated joint action with the Bolsheviks to establish the power of the soviets, were expelled from the party on October 27, 1917 for participating in the overthrow of the Provisional Government and created the PLSR. With the help of the Left Social Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks managed to gain the support of part of the peasant councils. At the Second Congress of Peasant Deputies in November 1917, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries V. M. Chernov convinced the peasant representatives that the Bolsheviks’ agreement to give in to the populist demand for the transfer of land to the peasants was temporary, and the Bolsheviks would seek nationalization. Despite this, about half of the peasant councils supported the Left Social Revolutionaries. On November 15, an agreement was reached between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, according to which the united All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK) was formed on a parity basis by workers and Left Socialist Revolutionary peasant deputies (a significant part of each group were soldiers), after which representatives from the army and trade unions were additionally elected. The additional deputies gave the Bolsheviks an advantage. The Left Social Revolutionaries became the Bolsheviks' junior partners in the coalition. In November 1917, they entered the government; in December, the Council of People's Commissars included seven left Socialist Revolutionaries, including A. L. Kolegaev - People's Commissar of Agriculture, Karelin - People's Commissar of State Property, P. P. Proshyan - People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs.
The alliance of the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries became an important stage in the formation of the Bolshevik regime, and the breaking of this alliance was an important step towards the creation of a one-party dictatorship.
On November 19, the Party of Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Internationalists) was founded. Nathanson and later Kamkov were elected chairman of the presidium of the party's Central Committee. The newspaper “Znamya Truda” became the organ of the party. At a joint congress of councils controlled by the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries, on December 10, a united workers' and peasants' All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) was created. The coalition of the Bolsheviks and one of the socialist parties took place, giving the dictatorship the form of a union of the proletariat and the peasantry.
The Left Socialist Revolutionaries took seriously the slogans of Soviet power, workers' control, and an equal union of workers and peasants. At the same time, they were characterized by a fascination with radical methods of struggle and forceful solutions. Violence was seen as a temporary remedy; it was believed that the dictatorship would die out on its own, becoming the rule of the majority. Until then, the Bolshevik dictator had to restrain their desire to subordinate everything to the government - the Council of People's Commissars, and not the supreme body of the councils - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Initially, the Left Social Revolutionaries tried to actually give the dictatorship a democratic character. On December 18, security officers arrested several leaders of socialist parties. However, the Minister of Justice, one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries, I. Sternberg, intervened in this matter and released those arrested, which marked the beginning of a long struggle between the two government parties over the issue of the competence of the Cheka. Since the Left Socialist Revolutionaries actively worked in the Cheka, it was difficult to unleash government terror at that time. However, work in the punitive agencies influenced the psychology of the Socialist-Revolutionary Chekists, who became increasingly tolerant of repression.
In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who passed on the lists of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (despite the fact that the Socialist Revolutionaries received a majority), received only about 40 mandates (about 5%). In the same districts where the Left Socialist Revolutionaries decided to go on their own, they were defeated in most cases - PLSR supporters could not compare with the AKP electorate. After consultations with the Left Social Revolutionaries, the Bolshevik leadership decided to disperse the Constituent Assembly.
Since the dispersal of the meeting actually disrupted the adoption of the law on land, which was contrary to the interests of the peasants, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries proposed their own project, which was adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on January 27 as a law on the socialization of the land. This law assigned land to the peasantry at the legislative level. However, it was adopted without lengthy discussion and contained many flaws, ambiguities and contradictions. This suited the Bolsheviks, as it fueled conflicts in the village. In particular, it was unclear how to divide the land - by food or by labor.
The contradictions between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries grew inexorably. The PLSR believed that it was defending the interests of the peasantry and advocated socialism based on self-government. The Bolsheviks were supporters of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an industrial economy with a single centralized management and planning. The PLSR opposed grain requisitions and arbitrary arrests. The contradictions between the allies became especially acute in connection with the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty in March 1918. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries came out categorically against capitulation to German imperialism.
At the IV Congress of Soviets, Kamkov, on behalf of the majority of the Left Social Revolutionaries, declared that peace does not provide a respite for the revolution, but a respite for imperialism. Lenin called the proposals of the left a trap.
From the point of view of the left Socialist Revolutionaries and their supporters, the Bolsheviks “betrayed” the idea of world revolution, the “brotherly people of Ukraine” were given over to the Germans for plunder, Ukrainian grain was used to save the German Empire. An additional burden fell on the grain-producing regions of Russia, primarily Siberia and the Don. The dictatorship became anti-peasant, which led to a further aggravation of relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left Social Revolutionaries.
Despite the fact that the Central Committee of the PLSR, immediately after ratification, by a majority of one vote, decided to remain in the government, on March 15, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries still announced their withdrawal from the government. This decision was made under strong pressure from local organizations.
Having left the government, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries remained a Soviet party, recognizing the legitimacy of Soviet power and, therefore, the power of the Bolsheviks. They had no other choice - the AKP was more popular among the peasant masses, and only the Sovietized peasantry could constitute the force of the left. Opposing the Soviet regime would mean the meaninglessness of the split of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in October 1917. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries continued to fight against the Bolsheviks, but not against the Soviet regime. The extremist attitude of the left Socialist Revolutionaries inclined them to armed methods of struggle, but the danger of the collapse of the Soviet system as such held back the PLSR within Russia.
The fundamental disagreement of the PLSR on the issue of the already concluded Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty led to the Left SR rebellion. Having suppressed it, the Bolsheviks shot without trial several participants in the uprising, showing the Germans that they had punished the murderers of the German ambassador Mirbach. But other more popular leaders of the PLSR, including Spiridonova, were released the following year. However, by this time the PLSR had ceased to be a serious force. The Bolsheviks consolidated their monopoly on power. After this the party split. Some of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries created pro-Bolshevik parties and later joined the RCP(b). A group of left Socialist Revolutionaries led by D. Cherepanov participated in the organization by anarchists of the explosion of the Moscow City Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in Leontyevsky Lane in 1919. The majority of left Socialist Revolutionaries, led by Spiridonova, continued to campaign against the communist regime. PLSR continued to operate in Russia and Ukraine, but its influence was declining. By 1923, the legal activities of the PLSR were banned, and the remaining party activists were repressed.
page 37. Test yourself
Explain the names of the parties: “Socialist Revolutionaries”, “Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists”, “Bolsheviks”, “Meneviks”, “Cadets”, “Octobrists”, “Black Hundreds”.
The Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks were revolutionary parties that advocated the overthrow of the autocracy in Russia.
The Mensheviks and Cadets are social democratic parties with a “softer” position on the revolution, but also advocated a change in the state regime.
The Octobrists were a liberal party that stood for personal freedom and the rights of citizens.
The Black Hundreds are anarchists who advocated the overthrow of any regime in the country.
Union of Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists (SSRM). The most characteristic feature of the maximalist theory was their belief in the possibility of Russia's immediate transition to socialism. Therefore, they refused to put forward immediate, or so-called “minimal” tasks, and recognized the need to implement a maximum socialist program already during the first revolution. Hence the name of their organization. A direct continuation of the theory of the maximalists was their tactics, marked by an adventuristic desire to cause the rise of a mass revolutionary movement through active terrorist activities.
Page 37 Questions and tasks
1. What is the difference between the Socialist Revolutionary “new populism” and the populism of the 19th century?
The populists of the 19th century had a negative attitude towards the political struggle and did not connect the struggle for the constitution and democratic freedoms with the interests of the people. They underestimated the power of autocracy, did not see the connections of the state with the interests of classes, and concluded that social revolution in Russia was an extremely easy matter. The populists resolved the main socio-political question about the nature of the post-reform development of Russia from the position of utopian socialism, seeing in the Russian peasant a socialist by nature, and in the rural community - the “embryo” of socialism. The populists denied the progressiveness of the capitalist development of the country, considering it a decline, regression, an accidental, superficial phenomenon imposed from above by the government, and contrasted it with “originality,” a feature of the Russian economy - popular production. The populists did not understand the role of the proletariat; they considered it part of the peasantry.
The Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the other hand, sought by revolutionary means to sharply turn the development of agricultural Russia onto the path of developing a labor rather than a bourgeois economy, public rather than private property.
2. Think about whether there is any significant difference between political and criminal terrorism. Can purity of thoughts and the greatness of the tasks being solved justify the use of terror in the political struggle?
I believe that terrorism (no matter what: political or criminal) is expressed in physical violence up to destruction and is intended to intimidate. Thus, a characteristic feature of terrorism is the reliance on force to achieve its goals - to intimidate the population and sow panic. The use of terror in political struggle cannot be justified under any circumstances.
3. How did the views of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks differ?
In 1903, the RSDLP split into 2 factions: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (Yu. Martov, G. Plekhanov). Differences between them existed in the following issues:
1) The agrarian question.
The Mensheviks developed a program for the municipalization of the land. Its essence was that confiscated landowners', appanage, monastic and church lands were placed at the disposal of local governments (municipalities), which then distributed it among the peasants. It was envisaged that peasants would retain their ownership of their allotment land. It was also allowed to transfer part of the land into the hands of the state to create a resettlement fund. The Menshevik program was aimed against the overbearing intervention of the state in agrarian relations.
The Bolsheviks proposed the confiscation of landowners' lands and their nationalization with subsequent rental to the peasants.
2) The second part of the RSDLP program (“maximum program”) provided for the socialist reconstruction of society after the victory of the proletarian revolution. However, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks imagined the implementation of this program differently.
The Bolsheviks focused on the immediate construction of socialism after the victory of the proletarian revolution, even envisaging the possibility of the immediate “development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one,” without any transition period.
The Mensheviks considered the imposition of socialism in an economically and culturally backward country a utopia. They believed that after the bourgeois-democratic revolution, a certain period of bourgeois development should pass, which would transform Russia from a backward to a developed capitalist country with bourgeois-democratic freedoms and institutions.
The Cadets and Octobrists represented two options (radical and moderate) of the reformist path to transforming the social and state system of Russia. At the same time, both of them recognized the main method of modernizing Russia only as reforming it “from above.”
5. What social forces spoke out in defense of the autocracy?
Par-gay of constitutional democrats, dispersed
Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary power even before the convening of the Constituent Assembly,
became the first party of the “left bloc” to be sacrificed to the world revolution.
But not the last. In the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks, initially together with the left
Socialist Revolutionaries, begin a broad campaign of struggle against the opposition socialist
in parties both locally and in the center. They accelerated mercilessly, starting from
April, local Soviets and workers opposed to the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries
Moscow anarchists, and their party ceased to exist as a political
The Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik factions were expelled from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The exception was
carried out contrary to the will of the left Socialist Revolutionaries, who occupied the middle position at the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
remained in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and in local Soviets practically alone with
Bolsheviks. And, it seems, it should have been clear what the threat was to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries
such loneliness. What did the Left Social Revolutionaries hope for?
As Sverdlov openly admitted, after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and
after the Third Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had practically no
there were no discrepancies.3 On the contrary, for the first time ever
Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary
the block bore rich fruits almost every day. He is most effective
showed himself in the struggle of the Bolsheviks and left Socialist Revolutionaries with the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks,
Moreover, according to the testimony of a Soviet historian, “in many cases the block on
places was much stronger than in the central authorities, and local
Left Socialist Revolutionary organizations sometimes behaved more consistently than their
The Central Committee, in a number of cases, making decisions that contradict the line of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries."
(Similar facts also occurred when the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries after the Fourth
Congress of Soviets left the government) 4 In general, how
Gusev points out, “the period January - March 1918 was the period of the most
full implementation of the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries."5 But
and the March differences between the left Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, caused primarily by
conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, they wore tactical, not
principled character.
With equal fanaticism and devotion to the ideas of socialism, the Bolsheviks and
The Left Social Revolutionaries fought for the victory of the world revolution. The question was about timing and
"We and the Bolsheviks, the parties of social revolution, can exclusively tactically
diverge, ... going along with the Bolsheviks on all issues of social
revolution, even if we submit to their majority when we are
a minority in a single detachment of revolutionary socialism*.6
Even the exit from the Soviet government by the majority of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist Revolutionary
the party considered it a mistake. However, uncertainty and hesitation were inherent
mainly to members of the Central Committee, and not to the activists of the PLSR in its middle management,
to the Left Socialist Revolutionary delegates of the Fourth Congress of Soviets, the majority of whom
predetermined the position of the Central Committee and the exit of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Council of People's Commissars. The Central Committee of the PLSR tried
convince the party, but failed.
The Third City Conference of the Left, which met after the Congress of Soviets
Social Revolutionaries of Petrograd again spoke out against the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and
stated that "Petrograd
the organization will do everything possible to counteract the carrying out of predatory
peace."7 This alarmed the leadership of the PLSR even more. All hopes
It was at this congress that the Central Committee tried to convince the delegates for the last time.
Spiridonova, Kolegaev and Trutovsky sharply opposed the break with
Bolsheviks and secession from the government. Kolegaev said:
"To leave the government means to confront the peasantry with
question: step away from power or step away from us, transferring ϲʙᴏvoices to those who...
cannot reveal the will of the peasantry. Of course, the working peasantry
prefers to leave us."
Therefore, Kolegaev proposed “entering the central Soviet government” and
stated that otherwise “the revolution will pass us by.”8
Kolegaeva supported Spiridonov:
"By leaving power, we betrayed the peasantry. Revealing our
revolutionary position on the question of war did not attract masses: they remained behind
Bolsheviks, who, I maintain, do not betray the social revolution, but
only temporarily crouched down along with the people, without any strength in their hands and
opportunities to fully defend all our conquests." Trutovsky continued: from
current situation
"there can only be one way out, integral and agreed upon: either a joint
work with the Bolsheviks in the central government - to implement social
revolution... or overthrow the Bolsheviks, i.e. at the head
counter-revolution".9
A similar polarization was produced by the members of the Central Committee who spoke, especially
Trutovsky, deliberately, in order to force deputies to support the resolution,
condemning the exit from the Soviet government. But despite the eloquent
speeches of the Left Socialist Revolutionary leadership and equating the break with
Bolsheviks to a counter-revolutionary act, the majority of the congress delegates
approved the exit of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries
from the government and called on local party organizations to "straighten
the general line of Soviet policy." The new PLSR program adopted by the congress
called for defending the “dictatorship of the working people”, an 8-hour working day,
social insurance and the creation of labor inspectorates. Overall program
proposed to move "through multifaceted forms of collectivism from socialization
land to the full realization of the ideals of socialism."10
To implement this program at the very beginning of May, Spiridonov and
Karelin, on behalf of the Central Committee of the PLSR, was offered to the Bolsheviks in order to avoid party
civil strife on land issues to be transferred to the disposal of the PLSR commissariat
collegium of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, Lenin considered the considerations of the left Socialist Revolutionaries "unfounded and
their proposal is unacceptable."11 On the same day at the
meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "the claims of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries to transfer the commissariat to them
agriculture" were rejected.12 This was precisely the reaction of the Bolsheviks to
proposal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who recently headed the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and
who left him voluntarily was not accidental. Lenin was preparing to create
Tsyurupa openly stated that the next step of the food commissariat
will be "an organization of the poorest part of the population for the purpose of taking away from the holders
grain reserves."13 With such intentions to give to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries
commissariat of agriculture was extremely risky, especially since Tsyurupa
hastened to propose the text of the current decree for approval by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 13
May, the project proposed by Tsyurupa was approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars as
Long live the civil war" with the peasantry, and Sverdlov, meanwhile,
called on the Bolsheviks to organize their own revolutionary
Soviet organizations "uniting truly revolutionary village
rural areas of “committees of the poor” parallel to the village councils,
working under the leadership of the Bolsheviks."16
The Bolsheviks' decision to create committees of the poor in the summer of 1918 was not
random. At the end of May 1918, a crisis engulfed the Bolshevik party itself,
party committees, in which it was indicated that the situation in the party
Bolsheviks very seriously, the number of its members is falling, the qualitative composition
worsens, cases of internal conflicts are incredibly frequent, and discipline
Compared to the Bolsheviks, the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party looked much
more monolithic. Its position actually strengthened, since the future of the Bolshevik
government at that moment depended largely on peasant grain, and
village councils, through which the government intended to receive grain,
the poor were precisely supposed to become a purely Bolshevik party
an organization opposing the Left Socialist Revolutionary Soviets. Such a rough move
The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, of course, could not understand the Bolsheviks, and therefore, having realized
for themselves, the danger of the situation, they opposed the decree. From participation in
responsibility" for this decree. When the decree was passed by a majority vote
adopted, the representative of the PLSR faction in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Karelin said that the Left Socialist Revolutionaries
"by all means through the Soviets, with all the influence... of the party, with all the party
adopted today by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee."18
Karelin's statement was not an empty phrase. PLSR still stood for
real power. In June, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries had 208 in 21 provincial executive committees.
people out of 786.19, and after the introduction of the decree on organization
committees of the poor, the PLSR began to enjoy great influence even in those
Soviets, where the Left Socialist Revolutionaries did not have a numerical majority. Bad
Resolutions of provincial congresses of Soviets were also a symptom for the Bolsheviks. So,
The resolution of the Olonets Provincial Congress of Soviets indicated that in
"issues of the internal policy of the Soviet government, pursued by the Council of People's
commissars, the congress condemns
food decrees and decrees on the organization of committees
rural poor, as well as about sending food commissars and
armed detachments into the village." At the district congress of Soviets of Kargopol
in the same province everything was simpler.
It is interesting to note that the resolution there ended with the words:
"Down with the committees of the poor! Down with punitive detachments!"20 But
The Bolsheviks decided not to retreat. To break with the Left Social Revolutionaries, on the one hand,
and with the peasantry, on the other hand, they walked quite consciously.
To discuss the current situation, the PLSR held in Moscow, in the Small Hall
Conservatory, ϲʙᴏth third party congress. He worked for only four days, with
At that time, there were about 80 thousand members in the ranks of the PLSR, which was not so
little, considering that two months earlier, in April, the PLSR totaled
a total of 62,561 people.21 The percentage growth of PLSR was therefore
very tall, and the Bolsheviks were doubly afraid, since the growth of the PLSR was in
It is important to know that the Bolsheviks, who were losing their popularity, were also alarmed by the fact that
At the upcoming Congress of Soviets, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries could turn out to be the majority party.
Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Left Socialist Revolutionaries know the results of the elections to the Congress of Soviets
haven't been yet. Both parties were in a state of uncertainty. However, the Central Committee
PLSR seriously counted on victory. Even at the PLSR congress, Spiridonova stated,
what about the left socialist revolutionaries
"we must take a leading place in all future struggles
peasants and workers with their class enemy... We are entering a new
stage of political advancement, when, probably, we will be a party
dominant".22
The congress resolution also indicated disagreement with the conclusion
of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and the organization of the Poor People's Commissars in the villages, but the peaceful
the nature of the struggle against these acts of the Bolshevik government: "Third
the congress recognizes it necessary that the party without delay, with all its strength,
influence and the party apparatus straightened the line of the Soviet
politics".23
Much, of course, now depended on the course of events on the Fifth
discussion of the congress, reports of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, food
question, the question of the organization of the Red Army, the election of a new All-Russian Central Executive Committee and
approval of the first Soviet constitution. This last point was another
the reason that pushed the Bolsheviks to a quick and radical solution
Left Socialist Revolutionary problem.
The decision to write a constitution was made at the Third Congress
drafting the text.24 The Commission has already approved the draft “Basic
Soviets, the commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) chaired by Lenin introduced into the project
just before the congress, Sverdlov, in secret from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, instructed Steklov and
Sheinkman should draft the constitution again. Note that they were held in a locked room
"Metropol", where Sverdlov sat them down, all day. Steklov recalls:
“Since I had already outlined the main provisions, and Comrade Lenin, with
On its part, we were also given fundamental instructions regarding
formulation of the question of "ϲʙᴏbodah", then on the same day the draft constitution was
worked out."26
Why was it necessary to change the draft constitution, and even in secret from the left?
Socialist Revolutionaries, and what changes were made to the draft, first read
at the congress after the defeat of the PLSR, Steklov does not tell. But it's possible that
it was during the discussion of the Soviet constitution that it should have been with some
fix the issue of a multi-party system of government with certainty
RSFSR. It is worth noting that it seemed to remain open. And as a result, the constitution tactfully
walked around him.
The share of the PLSR in the Soviet apparatus was large. Despite the crackdowns
non-Bolshevik Soviets, repression and terror of the Pobedy Committees, which often fell
and on left Socialist Revolutionary activists, the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party retained its influence in
Soviets. During the district congresses of Soviets, held during the period
between the Fourth and Fifth All-Russian Congresses, PLSR on average
The Social Revolutionaries owned almost a third of the parliamentary seats: out of 1,164 delegates, 773
were Communist Bolsheviks and 353 Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Meanwhile,
the ratio of congress delegates did not reflect the influence of party functionaries in the data
parties in local councils. As William Chamberlin points out, the Bolsheviks
received a majority at the congress partly due to the fact that they provided
the committees of the poor they created have a disproportionately large percentage of seats,
intended for peasant deputies.27 In addition,
Urban councils generally received a larger number of seats than rural ones. IN
In this sense, the Bolsheviks were guaranteed a majority of parliamentary seats
congress even when a minority of Soviet voters followed them. This
there was one more clause of the first Soviet constitution, which was probably
The Left Socialist Revolutionaries were going to challenge it at the congress.
Discussions between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries flared up even before the start
Spiridonova accused the Bolsheviks of the fact that at the time of famine they
In accordance with the ultimatum demand of Germany, 36 wagons with bread and
communist faction of the Fifth Congress of Soviets, Sverdlov answered the question “is it true
“Is it true that 36 wagons of bread were sent to Germany,” answered
affirmative.28 But despite Lenin, already at the congress itself,
called Spiridonova’s statement slanderous:
"That party which brings their most sincere representatives to
that they are falling into such a terrible swamp of deceit and lies, such a party
will be completely lost."29
The next day, the PLSR really died - at the hands of the Bolsheviks. AND
in light of the subsequent liquidation of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, such a sharp and
Lenin's frank rebuke of Spiridonova's statement does not seem accidental.
In his speech to more
whist faction of the Fifth Congress to the upcoming break between the PLSR and the RCP
(b) the Bolsheviks were also prepared by Sverdlov, who pointed out that “relations with
the Left Socialist Revolutionaries have deteriorated since we declared war on the kulaks in
village".30
The atmosphere on the first day of the Congress of Soviets was extremely tense.
Even before the approval of the order of the day of the congress, a word of greeting from the delegates
Ukraine was taken by the left Socialist Revolutionary Aleksandrov. It is worth noting that he sharply criticized the conclusion
The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and demanded a resumption of the war with Germany. His speech was
emotional and received applause from the entire audience. Sverdlov became worried:
"I believe that the political issue that was raised in the welcome
speech will undoubtedly find its reflection in the very definite will of the congress, and
not in this or that exclamation... I have no doubt that the prevailing
the number of those ovations and applause that the speaker deserved does not count
in his words, but entirely to those fighting [against the German occupation]
Ukrainian workers and peasants."31
At the same time, it was not so easy to cope with the opponents of the Brest-Litovsk Peace.
due to their large number and virtually invulnerable position to criticism.
The cooperation of the Leninist government with the Germans has gone too far, from the point of view
revolutionaries, very far away. "On the western border in the Pskov area there were
cases when, to pacify the rebellious red units, they were invited
German troops."32 And to avoid publicity that would be unfavorable for
Bolsheviks information, Sverdlov decided to go on the offensive and provide
word for "extraordinary statement" to Trotsky. The latter accused the opponents
of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, primarily the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, in provoking the border
clashes with the Germans. The fact that the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were no more to blame for this
than the Bolsheviks themselves, it was obvious to Lenin, Trotsky, and
Sverdlov, 33 but the propaganda effect desired by the Bolsheviks
was Trotsky's statement achieved. Skillfully maneuvering the issue of border issues
clashes, Trotsky read from the podium a pre-prepared secret
Bolshevik and Left Socialist Revolutionary factions of the congress
a resolution that was something like an order or non-negotiable
resolutions:
"The decision on issues of war and peace belongs only to the All-Russian
to the Congress of Soviets and the bodies of central Soviet power established by it:
The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. None
group of the population does not dare, in addition to the All-Russian Soviet power, to take on
itself the solution to the question of a truce or an offensive... The benefit of the Soviet
The republic is the supreme law. Whoever opposes this law must be
wiped off the face of the earth."34 Referring to opponents of compliance
Brest Peace, Trotsky proposed to “clear all Red Army units from
provocateurs and mercenaries of imperialism, without stopping in front of the most
decisive measures."35 In response to ϶ᴛᴏ member of the Central Committee of the PLSR Karelin
stated that until the report of the credentials commission, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries would not participate in
Trotsky’s proposal is an attempt to prejudge a number of political issues,
needing discussion.36 When, despite the statement
at the event with approving noise and applause.37 For
"The congress adopted a unanimous decision on all issues in the spirit
Bolsheviks".38
Since there was nothing behind the departure of the Left Social Revolutionaries except reluctance
Sverdlov made a report on the activities of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the fourth convocation. He
touched in more detail on disagreements with the left socialist revolutionaries.
Sverdlov, in particular, said that if immediately after finishing work
of the Fourth Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks rarely disagreed with the left
Socialist-Revolutionaries, then “over the last period, all the major issues that stood in
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks."39 Sverdlov, thus
Thus, he equated the Left Socialist Revolutionaries with the parties already expelled from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee:
"In all our work we have had to repel extremely brutal attacks
from different sides. Recently, these attacks have taken place not only from
parties and groups that are undoubtedly hostile to Soviet power, but also from
side of the Soviet Left Socialist Revolutionary Party. We had to endure a stubborn battle with them.
struggle on a whole range of issues."40
Sverdlov again emphasized that the food policy of the Bolsheviks,
in particular the decree on the food dictatorship and the organization of committees
poor, formed the basis of disagreements with the PLSR.
The fact that the Bolsheviks stopped seeing allies in the Left Social Revolutionaries and saw
now exclusively a hindrance, as confirmed by numerous memoir sources.
Sverdlova, for example, writes that
"relations with the left Socialist Revolutionaries after the Fourth Congress of Soviets... after
The exit of representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Council of People's Commissars was getting worse. Yakov
Mikhailovich constantly said that it had become impossible to work with them in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
work".41
An employee also spoke about the worsening relations between the two parties.
Secretariat of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Strizhevskaya.42
The Left Socialist Revolutionaries were especially sharply opposed to the Bolsheviks on the issue
peasant. Thus, Cherepanov, a member of the Central Committee of the PLSR, said that the Left Socialist Revolutionaries would dissolve
committees of the poor and will expel food detachments from villages and villages that arrived there for
confiscation of bread. Kamkov called the committees "committees of village slackers"
and also promised to throw them out of the village “by the collar” along with
food detachments.43
Lenin responded to the criticism of the left Socialist Revolutionaries. He pointed out that between
between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, what is happening is “not a quarrel”, but “a real and
irrevocable break."44 Lenin's speech caused numerous
replicas of the hall, especially the right side of the stalls, where the faction was located
PLSR. According to the transcript
speech, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries perceived it rather hostilely.45
It is important to know that the Bolsheviks, in turn, simply disrupted Spiridonova’s speech,
surprisingly stupid and incoherent,46 but critical
Bolsheviks. Lenin, however, did not remain in debt. He spoke about the Left Social Revolutionaries
condescendingly and sarcastically, and named their party several times
"bad".47
What the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, from the Bolshevik point of view, has already accomplished
This main task was to help the Bolsheviks seize power, retain it and
destroy all opposition parties, including the right half
Socialist Revolutionary Party; that is another historical task of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party
Help for the Bolsheviks to penetrate the rural Soviets was also
completed; that at the moment of Lenin's transition to open war with the peasantry
The PLSR became the most dangerous enemy - in all things the Bolsheviks had no
doubts. It is legal to have such an opponent in a peasant country. Lenin did not
could. It is worth saying that the spring and summer of 1918 were the most suitable for the destruction of the left Socialist Revolutionaries
moment. The village had not yet become enraged, and it was important to remove the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries before
the beginning of the first serious uprisings. Weakened by the crackdown on pro-Socialist Revolutionaries
rural Soviets, which compromised itself before other parties by alliance with
Bolsheviks, dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and opposition
socialist parties, deprived of allies, the party of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries was left with
Bolsheviks one on one. By the way, this is the only legal socialist
the party, which automatically became opposition, was seen by Lenin as serious
threat. Lenin understood that the Left Socialist Revolutionary resolutions on internal issues
politicians can slow down the pace of the fight against the peasantry, while the call
left Socialist Revolutionaries "to break apart in a revolutionary way, disastrous for the Russian and
world revolution, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk" attracts part of the Bolshevik
party and threatens to create a bloc of left Socialist Revolutionaries and left communists,
directed against Lenin. Which means it threatens Lenin with absolute loss
Lenin's fears were not groundless. From March 1918, i.e. since
ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Bolshevik Party experienced a sharp decline
numbers.48 Except for the above, in the spring
1918, in connection with the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Left Social Revolutionaries were
the question of creating an opposition opposition together with the left communists was raised
Lenin's party. This became known only a few years later in connection with
"Is it true". And a few years later the same question came up during the trial
Bukharin and has now already appeared on the pages of the “Bulletin of the Opposition”
Trotsky.49 How great was the threat to Lenin’s power in the spring
Zinoviev claimed that in December 1923 Bukharin told
following:
“...At that time, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries came to them, to the faction of “left” communists...
made an official proposal... to arrest the People's Council
Commissars with comrade Lenin at the head. And in the circles of left communists it is serious
The issue of the new composition of the Council of People's Commissars was discussed, while
they meant to appoint Comrade Pyatakov as chairman..."50 This
Stalin also said:
“It is known, for example, that the left communists, who then formed a separate
faction, reached such bitterness that they seriously talked about. replacement
the then existing Council of People's Commissars by a new Council of People's Commissars from new people who were included
into the faction of left communists...”51 But the leftists themselves
Communists reported the following about those days:
“On the issue of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, as is known, at one time the situation in the Central Committee
the party was such that opponents of the Brest Peace Treaty had a majority in the Central Committee...
passed a decision in the Central Committee - the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to sign... During the meeting of the Central Executive Committee,
what took place in the Tauride Palace, when Lenin made a report on Brest, to
Pyatakov and Bukharin were approached by the left Socialist Revolutionary Kamkov during Lenin’s speech.
Kamkov, by the way, half-jokingly said: “Well, what are you going to do?
do if you get a majority in the party. After all, Lenin will leave, and then
You and I will have to form a new Council of People's Commissars. I think the chairman
We will then elect Comrade Comrade. Pyatakov" ... Later, after imprisonment
Peace of Brest-Litovsk, ... comrade. Radek went to... the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Proshyan for
sending over the radio some resolution of the left communists. Proshyan laughing
said Comrade Radek: “You all write resolutions. Wouldn’t it be easier to arrest
for Lenin's day, declare war on the Germans and after that again unanimously
elect Comrade Lenin as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars." Proshyan then said that,
of course, Lenin, as a revolutionary, being forced into
defend against the advancing Germans, cursing us and you (you - the leftists) in every possible way
communists), nevertheless, better than anyone else will lead the defensive
war... It is interesting to note that... when, after the death of Proshyan, Comrade Lenin
the obituary narrated about the latter, comrade. Radek talked about this incident
Comrade Lenin, and the latter laughed at such a “plan.”52
Regardless of whether the proposal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was a joke or not,
regardless of the degree of devotion of the left communists to Lenin, in fact
existence of the left Socialist Revolutionaries and left communists, Lenin could not help but see the threat
ϲʙᴏher power. And if the left communists remained part of a single
Bolshevik Party, then the influence and activities of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries are no longer
were subject to Bolshevik control. Being already significant in those days,
the political weight of the left Socialist Revolutionaries could increase with the first signs of a total
famine and the collapse of the German Empire. And it is very likely that it will be in June
Lenin, who had an amazing master’s intuition that saved him more than once
revolution, felt how dangerous the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party would be for him in
in the nearest future.
Lenin's decision to deal with the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, securing for himself
Opposition-free one-party Bolshevik communist
government, for Lenin was no more risky than his first
(failed) attempt
seizure of power in July 1917; or a successful seizure of power in
October;53 or the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918.
The entire history of Lenin's rise to power was essentially continuous
provocations and adventures, unheard of audacity, suicidal risk.
But it was a forced risk in the sense that without risking it was impossible to capture
power, retain it and defend it. At the beginning of July 1918, the very course of the revolution
forced him to take a new risky step. It was at this moment that
The German ambassador Count Mirbach was assassinated in Moscow. During
over the next two days, the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, the only legal Soviet
party, enjoying enormous influence in the Soviet apparatus, was
The Social Revolutionary Party (AKP) is a political force that united all the previously disparate forces of the opposition who sought to overthrow the government. Today there is a widespread myth that the AKP are terrorists, radicals who have chosen blood and murder as their method of struggle. This misconception arose because many representatives of populism entered the new force and actually chose radical methods of political struggle. However, the AKP did not consist entirely of ardent nationalists and terrorists; its structure also included moderate members. Many of them even occupied prominent political positions and were famous and respected people. However, the “Combat Organization” still existed in the party. It was she who was engaged in terror and murder. Its goal is to sow fear and panic in society. They partially succeeded: there were cases when politicians refused the posts of governors because they were afraid of being killed. But not all Socialist Revolutionary leaders held such views. Many of them wanted to fight for power through legal constitutional means. It is the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries who will become the main characters of our article. But first, let's talk about when the party officially appeared and who was part of it.
The emergence of the AKP in the political arena
The name “social revolutionaries” was adopted by representatives of revolutionary populism. In this game they saw a continuation of their struggle. They formed the backbone of the first combat organization of the party.
Already in the mid-90s. In the 19th century, Socialist Revolutionary organizations began to form: in 1894, the first Saratov Union of Russian Social Revolutionaries appeared. By the end of the 19th century, similar organizations had arisen in almost all major cities. These are Odessa, Minsk, St. Petersburg, Tambov, Kharkov, Poltava, Moscow. The first leader of the party was A. Argunov.
"Combat Organization"
The “combat organization” of the Socialist Revolutionaries was a terrorist organization. It is by this that the entire party is judged as “bloody.” In fact, such a formation existed, but it was autonomous from the Central Committee and was often not subordinate to it. For the sake of fairness, let’s say that many party leaders also did not share these methods of warfare: there were the so-called left and right Socialist Revolutionaries.
The idea of terror was not new in Russian history: the 19th century was accompanied by mass murders of prominent political figures. Then this was done by the “populists”, who by the beginning of the 20th century joined the AKP. In 1902, the “Combat Organization” first showed itself as an independent organization - the Minister of Internal Affairs D.S. Sipyagin was killed. A series of murders of other prominent political figures, governors, etc. soon followed. The leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries could not influence their bloody brainchild, which put forward the slogan: “Terror as the path to a bright future.” It is noteworthy that one of the main leaders of the “Combat Organization” was the double agent Azef. He simultaneously organized terrorist attacks, chose the next victims, and on the other hand, was a secret agent of the secret police, “leaked” prominent performers to the special services, weaved intrigues in the party, and prevented the death of the emperor himself.
Leaders of the "Combat Organization"
The leaders of the “Combat Organization” (BO) were Azef, a double agent, as well as Boris Savinkov, who left memoirs about this organization. It was from his notes that historians studied all the intricacies of BO. It did not have a rigid party hierarchy, as, for example, in the Central Committee of the AKP. According to B. Savinkov, there was an atmosphere of a team, a family. There was harmony and respect for each other. Azef himself understood perfectly well that authoritarian methods alone could not keep the BO in submission; he allowed the activists to determine their internal life themselves. Its other active figures - Boris Savinkov, I. Schweitzer, E. Sozonov - did everything to ensure that the organization was a single family. In 1904, another finance minister, V.K. Plehve, was killed. After this, the BO Charter was adopted, but it was never implemented. According to B. Savinkov’s recollections, it was just a piece of paper that had no legal force, no one paid any attention to it. In January 1906, the “Combat Organization” was finally liquidated at the party congress due to the refusal of its leaders to continue the terror, and Azef himself became a supporter of the political legitimate struggle. In the future, of course, there were attempts to revive her with the aim of killing the emperor himself, but Azef always neutralized them until his exposure and escape.
Driving political force of the AKP
The Social Revolutionaries in the impending revolution placed emphasis on the peasantry. This is understandable: it was the agrarians who made up the majority of the inhabitants of Russia, and it was they who endured centuries of oppression. Viktor Chernov thought so too. By the way, until the first Russian revolution of 1905, serfdom actually remained in Russia in a modified format. Only the reforms of P. A. Stolypin freed the most hardworking forces from the hated community, thereby creating a powerful impetus for socio-economic development.
The Social Revolutionaries of 1905 were skeptical about the revolution. They did not consider the First Revolution of 1905 to be either socialist or bourgeois. The transition to socialism was supposed to be peaceful, gradual in our country, and a bourgeois revolution, in their opinion, was not necessary at all, because in Russia the majority of the inhabitants of the empire are peasants, not workers.
The Socialist Revolutionaries proclaimed the phrase “Land and Freedom” as their political slogan.
Official appearance
The process of forming an official political party was long. The reason was that the leaders of the Social Revolutionaries had different views both on the ultimate goal of the party and on the use of methods for achieving their goals. In addition, there were actually two independent forces in the country: the “Southern Socialist Revolutionary Party” and the “Union of Socialist Revolutionaries.” They merged into a single structure. The new leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party at the beginning of the 20th century managed to gather all the prominent figures together. The founding congress took place from December 29, 1905 to January 4, 1906 in Finland. At that time it was not an independent country, but an autonomy within the Russian Empire. Unlike the future Bolsheviks, who created their RSDLP party abroad, the Socialist Revolutionaries were formed within Russia. Viktor Chernov became the leader of the united party.
In Finland, the AKP approved its program, temporary charter, and summed up the results of its movement. The official formation of the party was facilitated by the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. He officially proclaimed the State Duma, which was formed through elections. The leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries did not want to remain on the sidelines - they also began an official legal struggle. Extensive propaganda work is carried out, official printed publications are published, and new members are actively recruited. By 1907, the “Combat Organization” was dissolved. After this, the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries do not control their former militants and terrorists, their activities become decentralized, and their numbers grow. But with the dissolution of the military wing, on the contrary, there is an increase in terrorist attacks - there are 223 of them in total. The loudest of them is considered to be the explosion of the carriage of the Moscow mayor Kalyaev.
Disagreements
Since 1905, disagreements began between political groups and forces in the AKP. The so-called left Socialist Revolutionaries and centrists appear. The term “Right Social Revolutionaries” was not used in the party itself. This label was later invented by the Bolsheviks. In the party itself there was a division not into “left” and “right”, but into maximalists and minimalists, by analogy with the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Left Social Revolutionaries are the maximalists. They broke away from the main forces in 1906. The maximalists insisted on the continuation of agrarian terror, that is, the overthrow of power by revolutionary methods. The minimalists insisted on fighting through legal, democratic means. Interestingly, the RSDLP party was divided into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in almost the same way. Maria Spiridonova became the leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. It is noteworthy that they subsequently merged with the Bolsheviks, while the minimalists merged with other forces, and the leader V. Chernov himself was a member of the Provisional Government.
Woman leader
The Social Revolutionaries inherited the traditions of the Narodniks, whose prominent figures for some time were women. At one time, after the arrest of the main leaders of the People's Will, only one member of the executive committee remained at large - Vera Figner, who led the organization for almost two years. The murder of Alexander II is also associated with the name of another woman Narodnaya Volya - Sofia Perovskaya. Therefore, no one was against it when Maria Spiridonova became the head of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Next - a little about Maria’s activities.
Spiridonova's popularity
Maria Spiridonova is a symbol of the First Russian Revolution; many prominent figures, poets, and writers worked on her sacred image. Maria did not do anything supernatural, compared to the activities of other terrorists who carried out the so-called agrarian terror. In January 1906, she made an attempt on the life of the adviser to the governor, Gabriel Luzhenovsky. He “offended” before Russian revolutionaries during 1905. Luzhenovsky brutally suppressed any revolutionary protests in his province, and was the leader of the Tambov Black Hundreds, a nationalist party that defended monarchical traditional values. The assassination attempt for Maria Spiridonova ended unsuccessfully: she was brutally beaten by Cossacks and police. Perhaps she was even raped, but this information is unofficial. Particularly zealous offenders of Maria - policeman Zhdanov and Cossack officer Avramov - were overtaken by reprisals in the future. Spiridonova herself became a “great martyr” who suffered for the ideals of the Russian revolution. The public outcry about her case spread throughout the pages of the foreign press, which even in those years loved to talk about human rights in countries not under their control.
Journalist Vladimir Popov made a name for himself on this story. He conducted an investigation for the liberal newspaper Rus. Maria’s case was a real PR campaign: her every gesture, every word she said at the trial was described in the newspapers, letters to her family and friends from prison were published. One of the most prominent lawyers of that time came to her defense: Nikolai Teslenko, a member of the Central Committee of Cadets, who headed the Union of Lawyers of Russia. Spiridonova's photograph was distributed throughout the empire - it was one of the most popular photographs of that time. There is evidence that Tambov peasants prayed for her in a special chapel erected in the name of Mary of Egypt. All articles about Maria were republished; every student considered it an honor to have her card in his pocket, along with his student ID. The system of power could not withstand the public outcry: Mary’s death penalty was abolished, changing the punishment to lifelong hard labor. In 1917, Spiridonova joined the Bolsheviks.
Other Left SR leaders
Speaking about the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries, it is necessary to mention several more prominent figures of this party. The first is Boris Kamkov (real name Katz).
One of the founders of the AK Party. Born in 1885 in Bessarabia. The son of a Jewish zemstvo doctor, he participated in the revolutionary movement in Chisinau and Odessa, for which he was arrested as a member of the BO. In 1907 he fled abroad, where he carried out all his active work. During the First World War, he adhered to defeatist views, that is, he actively wanted the defeat of Russian troops in the imperialist war. He was a member of the editorial board of the anti-war newspaper “Life”, as well as a committee for helping prisoners of war. He returned to Russia only after the February Revolution, in 1917. Kamkov actively opposed the Provisional “bourgeois” government and the continuation of the war. Convinced that he would not be able to resist the policies of the AKP, Kamkov, together with Maria Spiridonova and Mark Nathanson, initiated the creation of a faction of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. In the Pre-Parliament (September 22 - October 25, 1917) Kamkov defended his positions on peace and the Decree on Land. However, they were rejected, which led him to a rapprochement with Lenin and Trotsky. The Bolsheviks decided to leave the Pre-Parliament, calling on the Left Socialist Revolutionaries to follow with them. Kamkov decided to stay, but declared solidarity with the Bolsheviks in the event of a revolutionary uprising. Thus, Kamkov already then either knew or guessed about the possible seizure of power by Lenin and Trotsky. In the fall of 1917, he became one of the leaders of the largest Petrograd cell of the AKP. After October 1917, he tried to establish relations with the Bolsheviks and declared that all parties should be included in the new Council of People's Commissars. He actively opposed the Brest Peace Treaty, although back in the summer he declared the inadmissibility of continuing the war. In July 1918, Left Socialist Revolutionary movements began against the Bolsheviks, in which Kamkov took part. From January 1920, a series of arrests and exiles began, but he never abandoned his allegiance to the AKP, despite the fact that he once actively supported the Bolsheviks. It was only with the beginning of the Trotskyist purges that Stalin was executed on August 29, 1938. Rehabilitated by the Russian Prosecutor's Office in 1992.
Another prominent theorist of the left Socialist Revolutionaries is Steinberg Isaac Zakharovich. At first, like others, he was a supporter of the rapprochement of the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. He was even the People's Commissar of Justice in the Council of People's Commissars. However, just like Kamkov, he was an ardent opponent of the conclusion of the Brest Peace. During the Socialist Revolutionary uprising, Isaac Zakharovich was abroad. After returning to the RSFSR, he led an underground struggle against the Bolsheviks, as a result of which he was arrested by the Cheka in 1919. After the final defeat of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, he emigrated abroad, where he carried out anti-Soviet activities. Author of the book “From February to October 1917,” which was published in Berlin.
Another prominent figure who maintained contact with the Bolsheviks was Natanson Mark Andreevich. After the October Revolution in November 1917, he initiated the creation of a new party - the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party. These were the new “leftists” who did not want to join the Bolsheviks, but also did not join the centrists from the Constituent Assembly. In 1918, the party openly opposed the Bolsheviks, but Nathanson remained faithful to the alliance with them, breaking away from the Left Social Revolutionaries. A new movement was organized - the Party of Revolutionary Communism, of which Nathanson was a member of the Central Executive Committee. In 1919, he realized that the Bolsheviks would not tolerate any other political force. Fearing arrest, he left for Switzerland, where he died of illness.
Social Revolutionaries: 1917
After the high-profile terrorist attacks of 1906-1909. The Social Revolutionaries are considered the main threat to the empire. Real police raids begin against them. The February Revolution revived the party, and the idea of “peasant socialism” found a response in the hearts of people, since many wanted the redistribution of landowners’ lands. By the end of the summer of 1917, the number of the party reached one million people. 436 party organizations are being formed in 62 provinces. Despite the large numbers and support, the political struggle was rather sluggish: for example, in the entire history of the party, only four congresses were held, and by 1917 a permanent Charter had not been adopted.
The rapid growth of the party, the lack of a clear structure, membership fees, and registration of its members lead to strong differences in political views. Some of its illiterate members did not even see the difference between the AKP and the RSDLP and considered the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks to be one party. There were frequent cases of transition from one political force to another. Also, entire villages, factories, plants joined the party. AKP leaders noted that many of the so-called March Socialist-Revolutionaries join the party solely for the purpose of career growth. This was confirmed by their massive departure after the Bolsheviks came to power on October 25, 1917. Almost all of the March Socialist-Revolutionaries went over to the Bolsheviks by the beginning of 1918.
By the fall of 1917, the Socialist Revolutionaries split into three parties: right (Breshko-Breshkovskaya E.K., Kerensky A.F., Savinkov B.V.), centrists (Chernov V.M., Maslov S.L.), left ( Spiridonova M. A., Kamkov B. D.).
Current page: 1 (book has 18 pages in total)
Felshtinsky Yu G
Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries (October 1917 – July 1918)
Yu.G.Felshtinsky
STUDIES IN MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ON THE WAY TO A ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP
Introduction
The emergence of the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary coalition
Formation of the Soviet government
Convening of the Constituent Assembly
Dispersal of the Constituent Assembly
Around the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
Peace of Brest-Litovsk in action
Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries in April–June
Mirbach Murder
The defeat of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party
Annex 1
Blumkin's letter
Appendix 2
Yakov Blyumkin
Documentation
INTRODUCTION
Only in the first months of the existence of the communist regime in Russia, the Bolshevik Party agreed for a very short time to share power with another socialist party - the party of left socialist revolutionaries. This union, which went against the very nature of Bolshevism, could not exist for long. Having originated at the turn of the October Revolution, the bloc of Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries collapsed in July 1918 under the most mysterious circumstances - immediately after the assassination of the German ambassador Count Mirbach in Moscow and the so-called “uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.” From this moment on, the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party of the USSR began its history.
Such an unnatural phenomenon for the communist system—the union of two parties—has attracted the attention of historians. Historical works on the bloc of Left Socialist Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks began to appear already in the 1920s, but their nature was far from scientific.1 * And later, until the mid-1950s, works on the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary alliance were published in the USSR, but, Unfortunately, these studies were biased and their authors only tried to emphasize the negative role of the Party of Left Socialist Revolutionaries (PLSR) in the October
* Footnotes and notes are provided chapter by chapter. The name of the source first indicated after each chapter is given in full, then in abbreviated form. (Editor's note)
coup and later.2 Post-Stalin historiography also did not take historians of the Soviet Union beyond the limits limited by the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology, although, starting in 1956, a large number of works on the history of the PLSR were published in the USSR.3 These studies differed from previous ones in that were often written based on archival materials and introduced previously unknown sources into scientific circulation.
In the West, works on the history of Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary relations are, unfortunately, few in number. There are no separate works in Russian about the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party at all, although the very fact of the “uprising” of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries has been repeatedly questioned by emigrant authors.4 English-language literature, including translated ones, has studied the issue of Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary relations only superficially, usually in connection with research into more general or, conversely, more specific topics. This work, therefore, sets itself the task of summarizing previous historiography, to show and analyze the main aspects of Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary relations from October 1917 to July 1918, from the day of the Bolshevik coup to the defeat of the PLSR. Particular attention will be paid to several key moments in the history of the first year of Soviet power: the formation of the government, the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and opposition socialist parties, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, relations with Germany, the Bolshevik thesis about world revolution and revolutionary war and the split caused by this issue in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, and , finally, to the July events themselves, which became fatal for the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party: the murder of the German ambassador Count Mirbach and the “uprising of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries.”
In Soviet historiography, the question of the “revolt of the left Socialist Revolutionaries” in Moscow in July 1918 is considered to have been studied for a long time. Numerous Soviet authors, while differing in the details of the events, always agree on the main thing: the PLSR committed the murder of Mirbach and raised an anti-Bolshevik rebellion with the aim of disrupting the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and overthrowing Soviet power.5 It is surprising that Western historical science, so incredulous in many other cases, in generally unquestioningly accepted
this Soviet point of view. Fundamental works of foreign historians and individual historical monographs rarely opposed the official Soviet theory.6 Only G.M. Katkov in 1962 first published an article that reasonably questioned the generally accepted version.7 Somewhat later, other Western historians expressed distrust of the Soviet official point of view . Here is what, for example, one of the leading Sovietologists in the United States, Adam Ulam, wrote:
“The drama that unfolded in July and August and led to the death of the left wing of a once proud party loyal to the Russian peasantry still retains an element of mysticism... Everything centered around Count Mirbach, whose murder was allegedly sanctioned by the Socialist Central Committee- revolutionaries at the meeting on June 24... It would not be surprising if any of the communist leaders decided to remove Mirbach... Of course, the circumstances surrounding the murder are extremely suspicious... One has to suspect that at least some of the communist dignitaries knew about the decision of the Socialist Revolutionaries, but did nothing... It is possible, at least, that someone in the highest Bolshevik circles was aware of the Socialist Revolutionary preparations, but believed that there was a good opportunity to get rid of them [the Socialist Revolutionaries] and from a German diplomat causing trouble. In general, the strongest suspicions fall on Dzerzhinsky..."8 Joel Carmichael also questions the official Soviet point of view. He's writing:
“The circumstances of this murder remain unusually mysterious... The Left Social Revolutionaries themselves vehemently denied any preparation for an uprising, although they did not dispute their participation in the murder and even boasted about it. However, the inconsistencies contained in this version completely refute it... Lenin used the murder Mirbach as a pretext for the extermination of the left Socialist Revolutionaries. Their notorious “uprising” was nothing more than a protest against.
Bolshevik "persecution", which consisted in the fact that the Bolsheviks presented them to the public, especially the German government, as the murderers of Mir Bah. The Socialist Revolutionary "revolt" was an extremely childish idea..."9
The proposed study makes another attempt to refute the opinion rooted in Soviet and partly Western historiography about the murder of the German ambassador Count Mirbach and the “uprising of the left Socialist Revolutionaries.” The constant closure of the most important Soviet archives does not allow either Western or Soviet scientists to familiarize themselves with all the documents necessary to study such a complex topic. That is why some of the conclusions made in the work remain hypothetical, and the monograph does not answer all the questions posed in it.
The most important sources for writing this book were documents and archival materials published in the USSR and the West, as well as monographs and studies by Soviet and Western historians. In addition to this, the work uses numerous articles, speeches, reports, reports, testimonies and memories of participants and contemporaries of the events of October 1917 - July 1918, as well as materials from periodicals.10
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION
See, for example: V. Vladimirova. Left Social Revolutionaries in 1917-1918. "About
letarian revolution", 1927, No. 4. - V.A. Shestakov. Bloc with the left
Social Revolutionaries. "Marxist Historian", 1927, No. 6. – E. Morokhovets. Agrarian
programs of Russian political parties in 1917. Lenin
See, for example: A. Ageev. The struggle of the Bolsheviks against the petty bourgeoisie
of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. “Propagandist”, 1939, No. 16. – Agrarian program
V.I. Lenin, in the collection: In memory of Lenin. "Collection of the Museum of the Revolution", 1934,
No6. -IN. Parfenov. The defeat of the left Socialist Revolutionaries. Moscow, 1940. -D.A.Chugaev.
The struggle of the Communist Party to strengthen Soviet power.
The defeat of the "left" Socialist Revolutionaries. "Scientific notes of the Moscow Regional
Pedagogical Institute", vol. XXVII, issue 2, Moscow, 1954. - E. Luts
cue The struggle around the decree “On Land” (November–December 1917).
"Questions of History", 1947, No. 10. - V. Zaitsev. Party politics more
Vikov in relation to the peasantry during the period of consolidation of the Soviet
authorities. Moscow, 1953.
See, for example: K. Gusev. The collapse of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party. "History of the USSR",
1959, No.2. – P.N. Khmylov. On the issue of the Bolshevik struggle against
the compromises of the "left" Socialist Revolutionaries in the days of October. "Scientific notes
Moscow Library Institute", issue 3, Moscow, 1957.
D. F. Zhidkov. The struggle of the Bolshevik Party with the right and left
Socialist Revolutionaries for the peasantry in the first months of Soviet power. "Proceedings
Department of Social Sciences of Moscow Civil Engineering
Institute named after Kuibyshev", collection 33, Moscow, 1959. - M.V. Spiri
dons The struggle of the Communist Party against the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in
1917-1918 "Scientific notes of the Karelian state pedagogue
Gogical Institute", vol. X, Petrozavodsk, 1960. - A. S Smirnov.
On the attitude of the Bolsheviks to the Left Socialist Revolutionaries during the preparation period
October revolution. "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1966, No. 2.
R. M. Ilyukhina. On the issue of the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the left
Social Revolutionaries. "Historical Notes", vol. 73, Moscow, 1963. - V.V. Kuchma.
Lenin on the theoretical foundations of the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the left
Social Revolutionaries. In the book: Lenin’s ideas are immortal. Volgograd, 1970. -
P. A. Golub. About the bloc of Bolsheviks with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries during the period under
preparations and victories of October. "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1971, No.9.
– L. A. Slepov. The Bolsheviks' use of left bloc tactics.
"Questions of History", 1973, No. 1.
Frankfurt am Main, 1973, pp. 506–509. On the other hand, recently
published two-volume book by M. Geller and A. Nekrich - “Utopia in Power” -
the traditional Soviet point of view on the July events of 1918 is presented (M. Geller, A. Nekrich. Utopia in power. History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present day. London, 1982, p. 63 ff).
The point of view of Soviet historiography on this issue boils down to
through terrorist acts against representatives of the German
imperialism to disrupt the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, provoke a war with Germa
niya and forcibly change the policies of the Soviet government.
Preparations for an armed uprising began. Conspirators
they hoped that the rebellion in Moscow would be supported by troops
Eastern Front, headed by the left Socialist Revolutionary Muravyov, and
Left Socialist Revolutionary organizations in other cities." (Revolutionary
Latvian riflemen, 1917-1920. Ed. A. Drizula and J. Krastynia.
Riga, 1980, p.103).
Thus, Leonard Shapiro in his book “The Communist Party Council
Soviet Union" (second, expanded edition, translated from English,
Florence, 1975) essentially repeats the Soviet point of view,
and even makes an attempt to justify the Bolshevik terror: “Rebellion
also strengthened the Bolshevik assertion that only one step
saves the opposition from an armed uprising, and this justifies their
eyes systematic red terror directed against everyone
political opponents." (Shapiro, op. cit., p. 269). Louis
Fischer in the book "The Life of Lenin" (London, 1970, translated from English)
also supports the version of the rebellion of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. (Fisher, op.
cit., pp. 359–361). A similar point of view is shared by
Isaac Deutscher. (Isaak Deutscher, The Prophet Armed. Trotsky: 1879
1921. Oxford University Press, 1979, pp.403-404). Standard point
views on the issue of the “uprising of the left Socialist Revolutionaries” and the murder of Mirbach
The German scientist von Rauch also adheres to this. (Georg von Rauch. A His
story of Soviet Russia. Sixth Edition, New York, 1976, pp.94-95).
George Katkov. The Assassination of Count Mirbach. "Soviet Affairs", No.3,
edited by David Footman, Carbondale, Illinois, 1962, pp.53-94.
Adam B. Ulam. The Bolsheviks. New York, 1968, pp.423, 424-425. Advice
Adam Ulam questions the official version in another way
his book: A History of Soviet Russia. USA, 1976, p. 33.
Joel Carmichael. Trotsky. (Abbr. translation from English). Jerusalem, 1980,
pp. 142,143.
10. All literature used is indicated in footnotes.
CHAPTER FIRST
THE ORIGIN OF THE BOLSHEVIK-LEFT SR COALITION
Both parties considered the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary alliance a brilliant tactical move. Formally, the “union” was concluded only after the Second Congress of Soviets, but the leaders of the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries came to the idea of the need to form a coalition even before the October coup. The tactics of the Left SRs were simple: hit “to the right”, cooperate “to the left”. “To the left” were the Bolsheviks. And the Left Socialist Revolutionaries could cooperate primarily with them. The Bolsheviks, according to the Soviet historian, entered into a bloc with the left Socialist Revolutionaries “not for the sake of the left Socialist Revolutionaries as such, but because of the influence that the Socialist Revolutionary agrarian program had on the peasants.”1 However, it was not a matter of “influence,” but in the program itself, and earlier, in the Left SR party workers who, unlike the Bolsheviks, had at least some access to the village. Sverdlov admitted in March 1918 that before the revolution the Bolsheviks “did not engage in work among the peasantry at all.”2 Soviet historiography indicated back in the 1920s that the Bolsheviks “failed by the time of the October Revolution to create their own peasant organization in the countryside, which could would take the place of the socialist revolutionaries.”3 And the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which defended “the principles of Soviet power and internationalism,”4 came in handy in this sense. This is what Lenin wrote on September 27, 1917 to the chairman of the regional committee of the army, navy and workers of Finland I. T. Smilga:
“Your position is exceptionally good, because you can immediately begin to implement that bloc with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, which alone can give us lasting power in Russia and a majority in the Constituent Assembly. While there is a trial and action, immediately conclude such a bloc at home, organize the publication of leaflets ( find out what you can do technically for this and for transporting them to Russia), and then it is necessary that in each propaganda group for the village there are at least two people: one from the Bolsheviks, one from the left Socialist Revolutionaries. In the village there is a “firm” of Socialist Revolutionaries. reigns, and we must take advantage of your happiness (you have left Socialist Revolutionaries) in order, in the name of this company, to establish a bloc of Bolsheviks with left Socialist Revolutionaries in the countryside..."5 The Bolsheviks, in addition, needed some kind of agrarian program. The paradox was that the RSDLP (b), a party that considered itself purely proletarian, did not have its own agrarian program at all. For the first time since 1906, the Bolsheviks put the agrarian issue on the agenda only at the All-Russian Party Conference in April 1917. The resolution adopted on the agrarian issue became the Bolshevik agrarian program. The resolution called for the immediate confiscation of all landowners' lands and the transfer of all lands to peasant councils and committees. The third point of the agrarian resolution of the conference demanded the “nationalization of all lands in the state.”6
On the peasant question, the Bolshevik Party did not want to take on any clear obligations. In this sense, Lenin in 1905 was no different from Lenin in 1917: “We stand for confiscation, we have already stated this,” Lenin wrote at the turn of 1905–1906. “But who will we advise to give the confiscated lands? Here we have not committed ourselves We will never tie our hands... we do not promise equalization, “socialization”, etc., but we say: there we will still fight..."7 In October 1917 Lenin was also categorically against introducing “excessive detail” into the agrarian program, which “may even cause harm by tying our hands in particulars.”8 But the Bolsheviks could not ignore the peasant question and the Russian village. For the victory of the “proletarian revolution” in the city and throughout the country
The Bolsheviks needed a civil war in the countryside. And Lenin was very afraid that “the peasants would take the land [from the landowners], and a struggle would not break out between the rural proletariat and the wealthy peasantry.” Lenin, thus, grasped not only the similarity of the situations of 1905 and 1917, but also their differences: “To repeat now what we said in 1905 and not talk about the class struggle in the countryside is a betrayal of the proletarian cause... We must combine the demand to take the land now with propaganda for the creation of Soviets of Farmers' Deputies."9
From April to October 1917, the Bolshevik tactics regarding the peasantry and the Socialist Revolutionary agrarian program changed several times. Thus, the agrarian resolution of the Bolshevik conference contained a proposal to strive for the formation “from each landowner’s estate of a sufficiently large farm.”10 A month later, speaking at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasant Deputies, Lenin, on behalf of the Bolshevik Party, recommended that
“so that from each large farm, from each, for example, the largest landowner’s economy, of which there are 30,000 in Russia, model farms were formed, as soon as possible, for their general cultivation together with agricultural workers and scientific agronomists, using the landowner’s livestock for this work, guns, etc."11
Meanwhile, the First Congress of Peasant Soviets was not so radical. Of the 1,115 delegates, there were 537 Socialist Revolutionaries, 103 Social Democrats, 4 People’s Socialists, and 6 Trudoviks. Not a single Bolshevik was elected to the congress, despite the fact that 136 delegates declared themselves non-party, and 329 belonged to non-socialist parties, i.e. e. “to the right” of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Popular Socialists.12 No matter how much Lenin wanted the opposite, the peasants stood for an equalizing division of landowners’ lands, but not for an equalizing division of lands in general. The order of the peasant congress of the First Army said so: “...The use of land should be equalizing labor, i.e. each owner receives as much land as he can cultivate personally with his family, but not below the consumer norm...”13 These peasant sentiments were
confirmed by the publication in August 1917 of a consolidated peasant mandate, compiled from 242 peasant mandates brought to the congress in May by Socialist Revolutionary peasant delegates. These orders were, of course, “to the left” of the orders of non-party peasants or delegates of non-socialist parties, but even according to the consolidated Socialist Revolutionary order, the peasants agreed to leave only a few highly cultured former landowner farms undivided, but nothing more.14 And Lenin, soon after the congress and publication of the order, retreated, immediately changed tactics. He decided to accept the Socialist Revolutionary program in its entirety, to lure the peasants to his side, at least to split them up, to deprive the AKP of its support in the countryside and then, having strengthened the bloc with the left Socialist Revolutionaries thanks to the adoption of the Socialist Revolutionary agrarian program, to deprive the Socialist Revolutionary Party of its leftist Socialist Revolutionary functionaries and practitioners in the village. The same goals were to be served by strengthening Bolshevik propaganda among the peasants. Lenin now demanded that “all agitation among the people... be restructured in such a way as to make clear the complete hopelessness of the peasants receiving land until the government is overthrown, until the Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties are exposed and deprived of the people’s trust.”15 At the end of August, Lenin assures the peasants that only the Bolshevik Party “can actually fulfill the program of the peasant poor, which is set out in 242 orders.”16
Here, however, a new moment emerged. Lenin imperceptibly replaced the “peasants” with the “peasant poor”, i.e. "rural proletariat". Lately reinforcing Lenin’s demagogic statement, the Soviet historian Gusev writes: “Thus, we can assume that about 80% of peasant households were proletarians or semi-proletarians.”17 But this statement by Gusev is completely unfounded, and the figure of 80% is openly falsified. The absolute majority of Russian peasant farms were classified as “kulak” and “middle peasant”, with the latter predominant.
Preparing bridges for the future retreat of the Bolshevik Party from previously assumed obligations, Lenin began to read into the Socialist Revolutionary peasant mandate what was there
It never happened. Thus, Lenin pointed to the supposed desire of the “peasant poor” in the order to abolish private ownership “of all types of land, including peasant land” without compensation. Lenin’s statement, of course, contradicted both the resolutions of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasant Deputies and the order itself.18 But this did not bother Lenin. By “equal land use” he also began to understand something different from what the peasants and even the Social Revolutionaries understood by this. In April 1917, at the All-Russian Party Conference of the Bolsheviks, Lenin said that peasants “understand “equalization of land use” as the taking of land from landowners, but not as the equalization of individual owners.”19 However, in August Lenin described the consolidated Socialist Revolutionary peasant mandate as “a program for peasant the poor” who want to “keep small farming, level it out, periodically equalize it again... Let,” Lenin continued, “not a single reasonable socialist break with the peasant poor because of this.”20 But break with the “peasant poor.” "Lenin, of course, was ready. He stubbornly and methodically prepared the basis for a future civil war in the countryside, or rather, a theoretical justification for the need for such a war. He had no intention of seriously deviating from the position he formulated back in 1905: “Together with the peasant owners against the landowners and the landowner state, together with the urban proletarian against the entire bourgeoisie, against all peasant owners. This is the slogan of the conscious rural proletariat.” .21 Unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries, who saw only two opposing camps in the countryside - landowners and peasants, the Bolsheviks identified another group from the peasants: the rural poor. But, as always, when tactical considerations required it, the Bolsheviks cooperated with the “left” wing to destroy the “right”. In this case, it was necessary to support the peasants in the fight against the landowners, so that after the landowners' property was destroyed, they could deal with the peasants by supporting the demands of the "village poor." To this end, the Bolsheviks temporarily abandoned the slogan of transforming every landowner's estate into a state farm. At the same time, Lenin tried no longer
mention equalization of land use. Thus, in the appeal “To Workers, Peasants and Soldiers,” written at the beginning of October but not published then, it was only said that “if the Soviets have power, then the landowners’ lands will immediately be declared the possession and property of the entire people.”22 The wording, of course. , was purely SR. In his work “Toward a Revision of the Party Program,” Lenin also did not touch upon the issue of equalizing division of land, as well as the issue of transforming landowners’ estates into public-state farms. However, the clause on the nationalization of land was included by Lenin in the work,23 although not a word was said about what to do with the nationalized land. This strange silence on an issue so important for the Bolsheviks attracted the attention of many. After the coup, V. Meshcheryakov, in his article “Marxism and the Socialization of the Land” published in several issues of Pravda, noted this significant feature of the Bolshevik agrarian program:
“What to do with nationalized, socialized state land? The nationalization program of the Bolsheviks did not give an answer to this question at all, postponing it until after the seizure of land, after the victory of the revolution, after the nationalization of the land... Neither in the nationalization project proposed by the Bolsheviks to the Stockholm Labor Congress party (1906), neither in the nationalization program adopted at the party conference in April 1917, nor in the extensive literature on this issue - not once did any of the supporters of nationalization among Marxists touch on this issue or propose any solutions ".24
The closer to the revolution, the more and more Lenin modified the original peasant demands. Thus, in the article “New Deception of the Peasants by the Socialist Revolutionary Party,” written five days before the October uprising and published on October 24, Lenin “retelled” the demands of the peasants as follows:
"The peasants demand the abolition of the right of private ownership of land; the conversion of all privately owned, etc. land into the public property free of charge; the transformation
land plots with highly cultivated farms (gardens, plantations, etc.) into “demonstration plots”; transferring them to the “exclusive use of the state and communities”; confiscation of “all household equipment, living and dead,” etc. This is how the peasants’ demands are expressed precisely and clearly, on the basis of 242 local orders given by the peasants themselves.”25 But, firstly, we were talking about the orders of the “SR” peasants, and not about peasants in general. Secondly, even in The Socialist Revolutionary orders did not contain the demands set out by Lenin. In essence, Lenin very subtly and veiledly started talking about nationalization. But among the soldiers and peasants, the “idea of “equalized land ownership” according to the consumer-labor norm of distribution, and not the predatory Leninist idea of “nationalization”, prevailed.
However, Lenin was too pragmatic to influence the peasants with newspaper articles alone. He was faced with the dual task of penetrating the village to gain positions there and weaken the Socialist Revolutionary Party as a political force that enjoyed significant influence in the village. But in order to penetrate the village, it was necessary to win over to one’s side some of the active figures in the peasant Soviets, and among them were the Socialist Revolutionaries. This is where the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party helped the Bolsheviks.
A bloc with the left wing of the AKP was at that moment a natural and only possible step for Lenin. There was also a real foundation for the union. Through months of permanent struggle with the majority of their party, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries proved their commitment to dogmatic radical socialism. The acceptance by the Bolsheviks of the Socialist Revolutionary agrarian program, without which the Bolshevik government would not have been able to function, and the consent of the left Socialist Revolutionaries, if the Bolsheviks accepted the Socialist Revolutionary agrarian program, to follow the Bolshevik program in all matters were, as it seemed to everyone then, the key to a successful union. Left Socialist Revolutionary party cadres in rural Soviets and Bolshevik party leaders in urban Soviets naturally complemented each other.
In May 1917, during the elections to the regional Dumas of Petrograd, the Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary alliance gave its first practical results: in the Nevsky district, the Bolsheviks entered into a bloc with the left Socialist Revolutionary internationalists. It was in May 1917 that the open withdrawal of the left wing from the main core of the AKP began. This month, shortly before the Third Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, one of the future leaders of the PLSR, V. Trutovsky, stated that among the members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, many, “calling themselves both socialists and revolutionaries,” are in fact neither one nor the other.27 This Trutovsky’s statement, published in the press, became a challenge to the entire AKP, which rightly considered itself a socialist and revolutionary party. An immediate party split began.
At the Third Congress of the AKP, held in late May - early June 1917, the left wing of the party, numbering 42 people, formed its own faction and came up with a resolution that was ultimately rejected by the congress. From about this moment, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, while formally remaining members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, began to take a position on a number of issues that was different from the directives and guidelines of their Central Committee, and to pursue their own political line. In response to this, the leadership of the Socialist Revolutionary Party forbade the left socialist revolutionaries to speak on behalf of the AKP and criticize the decisions of the Third Party Congress. But this decision had no real consequences. But the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided somewhat later, “without breaking the organizational connection with the party, to definitely and firmly distinguish themselves from the policies adopted by the leading majority.” The left accused the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party of deviating from the program and “traditional tactics” and of shifting “the party’s center of support to layers of the population that, due to their class character or level of consciousness, cannot truly support the policy of true revolutionary socialism.” The statement also stated that the left wing reserves the right to "full freedom of speech in the spirit of the above provisions." The statement was signed by the organizational bureau of the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries, elected by the faction of the left socialist revolutionaries at the Third Congress, as well as by the factions of the left Socialist Revolutionaries in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.28
In August, the Left Socialist Revolutionary faction in the AKP achieved the fact that it began to be considered legal. And already on September 10, at the Seventh Petrograd Provincial Conference of the AKP, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries sharply criticized the work of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and during the re-election of the provincial committee, due to the growing radicalism of the Petrograd Socialist Revolutionaries, they received a majority of votes. The left now began to dominate in a number of organizations: Petrograd, Voronezh and Helsingfors, and in the Petrograd organization of Socialist Revolutionaries, out of 45 thousand people, about 40 thousand followed the left.29 In Petrograd, therefore, there was real power behind the Left Socialist Revolutionaries.
There were almost no defeats for the left Socialist Revolutionaries in those days, except for the fact that they were forced to leave the editorial office of the Socialist Revolutionary newspaper "Land and Freedom." But even here they took revenge, achieving in September the re-election of the editorial board of the newspaper Znamya Truda, which has since become their organ.30 Intensifying their criticism of the AKP, at the All-Union Democratic Conference of Socialist Parties, Trade Union Councils, Zemstvos, commercial and industrial circles and military units, held in the citadel of the left Social Revolutionaries - Petrograd - from September 14 to 22, 1917, the left opposed the coalition with the Cadets, thereby causing a split in the ranks of the socialists. And in the Socialist Revolutionary faction of the Pre-Parliament - the Provisional Council of the Republic, created by the Democratic Conference - the left Socialist Revolutionaries declared the policy of the AKP treasonous and left the meeting. The criticism was carried out mainly on three issues: about the attitude towards the war, about agrarian policy and about power.
Even at the Third Congress of the AKP, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries demanded “to immediately break the civil peace with the entire bourgeoisie.”31 They also spoke out against the preparation of an offensive at the front and for the publication of secret treaties concluded by the tsarist government with the Entente countries. But despite this, the Central Committee of the AKP, being not interested in a party split, continued to consider the Left Socialist Revolutionaries as members of a single Socialist Revolutionary party.
