This coming Sunday in the Primorsky Territory, the authorities intend to organize magnificent ceremonies dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the battles on Lake Khasan, between the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army and Japanese troops in the area where in 1938 the borders of the USSR, Japanese-occupied Korea and the Tokyo-controlled puppet state converged Manchukuo.
The Khasan battles began on July 29, 1938 and lasted until August 11. In Soviet times, it was customary to talk about the events on Lake Khasan as one of the classic examples of the valor of Soviet soldiers and the art of Red commanders. But there is a completely different point of view on the battle at Lake Khasan - both on who started it and why, and at what cost a very dubious victory was achieved in it.
This is what Vladimir Voronov, a historian and journalist, an expert in the field of military and foreign policy doctrines of the USSR of the 30s, thinks.
Victory at Lake Khasan, at Khalkhin Gol and in the Soviet-Finnish War is such a “holy trinity” that I remember from a young age when it came to the official Soviet military history before the start of the Great Patriotic War. When the Soviet Union began to collapse, very unsightly archival documents and facts came to light. It turned out that everything happened “somewhat differently.” The first two conflicts and supposedly militarily skillful victories, with little bloodshed, over militaristic Japan on the eve of 1941 became important element propaganda and ideas about the invincibility of the Red Army in any war. The song “Three Tankers” appeared and so on...
Khasan and Khalkhin Gol are fundamentally different events with different backgrounds. If the battles at Lake Khasan were not fully prepared and were provoked by the actions of the Soviet side, then the battle on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 was a Japanese initiative and Japanese aggression. Moreover, in both cases this initiative was non-strategic in nature. But the scale of Khalkhin Gol is, of course, much higher. I would say that if there had not been Khasan, there would have been no Khalkhin Gol. The battles of 1938 and how the Red Army behaved in a real battle gave the Japanese the idea of carrying out an already prepared operation on Khalkhin Gol. What the Soviet side planned at Lake Khasan was not something that was not implemented - but, by conceiving actions on Khasan and being the initiator of them, the USSR, to put it mildly, ended up in the bag.
- Why do you think that, militarily, it is difficult for the Soviet side to be proud of the course and results of the battles at Lake Khasan?
Because terrible losses were suffered. Until the 60s of the 20th century, no data on losses on Khasan were published at all. It is believed that 759 Red Army soldiers and border guards were killed on Khasan, and 3,279 were wounded. These are official data, which staff historians of the Ministry of Defense stubbornly cling to to this day. But already at the very beginning of our century, such losses of the Red Army were documented: at least 1,112 people were killed, at least 100 died from wounds, 95 were missing. Generally speaking, the remains of killed Red Army soldiers are still being found on Lake Khasan.
It is generally accepted that as a result of Stalin's repressions on the eve of the Second World War, the flower of military thought in the USSR was destroyed, and that if Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Yakir and others had remained alive, there would not have been the nightmarish defeats of 1941-1942. I don’t want to stray now and talk about the “Great Terror” of the late 30s. But is it possible that even under the repressed commanders whom I mentioned, if they had remained alive, the beginning of a war with Nazi Germany would it be the same? After all, the same Marshal Vasily Blucher received a terrible reprimand from Stalin towards the end of the events on Lake Khasan - for inability, for slowness and for terrible losses. Is it likely that these commanders remained commanders of the times until the end of their lives? Civil War? And their knowledge and skills are outdated?
I will neither dispute nor deny this. But the accusations against Blucher regarding his leadership at Lake Khasan are not founded for at least one reason. He didn't plan this operation. This operation was planned over his head. He had nothing to carry it out, from the point of view of command personnel at that time. On the Red Banner Far Eastern Front, into which the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army was renamed in June 1938, the shortfall in command personnel was 85 percent. This is 1937-1938 - there was an intensive destruction of command personnel, everywhere, and on Far East, which took on terrifying forms. Comrade Blucher also took part in this destruction - and it could not have been otherwise! For two years in a row, the valiant commanders of the Red Army were concerned about only one thing - their own survival. They spoke at party meetings, they wrote denunciations. No military training! No military training! During these two years, not a single military exercise was held! What maps did the red commanders use to fight in 1938? These were cards, formally, with the stamp of the General Staff and all the marks “top secret”, and so on. But in fact, these were maps compiled by the cartographic division of the NKVD, with deliberate changes made there, “maps for foreign tourists.” And suddenly in August 1938 it was discovered that the swamps were not indicated on these maps, that the roads were completely different. All Soviet artillery got stuck in the swamp and was shot by the Japanese with direct fire from the commanding heights. The artillerymen suffered particularly heavy losses. And Soviet tanks got stuck in swamps that were not on the maps.
Why did Japan need this conflict? It is known that in Tokyo at that time there existed, relatively speaking, an “army party,” which wanted, perhaps, to go north and west, against China and the USSR, and a “navy party,” which was preparing expansion to the south and east, against the United States and UK. Before the conflict at Lake Khasan, one of the top leaders of the NKVD, Genrikh Lyushkov, ran over to the Japanese and told him, perhaps, what potential the Red Army actually had in the Far East. Could it happen that a local conflict would result in a full-scale land war? Or was it a “shooting”, a test of strength on both sides?
Lyushkov, nevertheless, due to the nature of his activity, hardly had detailed information about the combat capability of the Red Army. He, of course, knew the Far East very well, he knew the capabilities of the Red Army very well, but he was not able to lay out what, for example, the chief of staff of the unit knew. He could give the Japanese approximate data. But yes, these data shocked the Japanese, because it turned out that the Red Army in the Far East had a threefold numerical superiority. And the Japanese did not plan any serious operations against the Soviet Union in 1938 and had absolutely no desire to get involved in a serious military conflict. This was a forced reaction of the Japanese to fighting. They could not leave without consequences, from their point of view, the brazen attempts to seize the dominant hills on the territory of Korea controlled by them, and Manchukuo - the area in question is the point of convergence of the then Korean, Manchurian and Soviet borders. Because the Soviet border guards captured hills not on Soviet territory - and carried out engineering support, which threatened serious consequences for the Japanese. A bridgehead could be created there, from which Japanese territory could be shot deep into, over a very long distance, and a large-scale offensive could be carried out. Therefore, their task, after the start of the conflict, was nothing more than establishing control over the Japanese hills. The Japanese did not enter even one meter or one millimeter into Soviet territory.
- How did the conflict formally begin?
The conflict arose after an unexpected inspection of a number of senior managers of the Main Directorate state security The NKVD, led by Mikhail Frinovsky, in July, after Lyushkov’s escape, when, together with the head of the local border detachment, a group of senior NKVD command personnel entered Japanese territory, where a group of Manchus worked under the protection of Japanese gendarmes. And when the Japanese gendarmes, without using force, asked them to leave, they were shot at point-blank range by NKVD soldiers with revolvers! Then, when, already during the battles on Khasan, Stalin, “accidentally” walking along the corridors of the People’s Commissariat of Defense on August 1, suddenly “accidentally” wandered into Voroshilov’s office and “accidentally” contacted Blucher in a direct line, he tried to report to him how the matter really stood . And in response he received from Stalin: “You, Comrade Blucher, don’t want to fight the Japanese? Say so.”
And many facts indicate that this operation was prepared in advance on the Soviet side. At the same time, she prepared, as always, extremely poorly, as evidenced by the results. By July 1, the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army was deployed to the Red Banner Far Eastern Front. What does it look like that during the first two days of fighting, the Red Army instantly concentrated an entire army corps at Lake Khasan? “By chance” a corps of 32 thousand people was walking in the border zone? Formally, one 19th Infantry Division fought on the Japanese side, but in reality it was an incomplete regiment. According to the Japanese captured documents that the Soviet troops received in 1938, it is clear that this “division” had a shortage of officers, a shortage of personnel, it was formed not from personnel, but from literally just hastily called up reservists.
The main forces of the Japanese ground army were deployed in China. Then China was their target! Tokyo did not need an open conflict with the Soviet Union at all, because the Japanese had already fought with the Soviet Union in China. A huge Soviet aviation group operated there; Soviet pilots flew Soviet fighters and bombers, albeit with Chinese markings. Soviet infantry commanders led Chinese units into battle. Several hundred Soviet military advisers were already in China. In 1938, the Japanese General Staff categorically prohibited the use of aviation against Soviet troops! At a meeting in Tokyo, after the first shots were fired at Lake Khasan, it was said - exclusively defensive actions! We’ll return what was ours, formally put the flag back on the hill, and that’s it, nothing more is needed! According to Soviet official data, the Red Army deployed over 600 guns and about 400 tanks for this operation. But the Japanese didn’t have a single tank there!
The USSR, in this case, already in 1938 was planning a large-scale invasion of northern Korea and Manchuria? And the attack at Lake Khasan was a preparatory operation?
It was, I would say, in fact, rather an internal political operation, for the sake of achieving, first of all, internal political goals - namely, a kind of special operation against Blucher. Stalin was in a wild rage after Lyushkov’s flight to the Japanese, and at the same time he had long been sharpening his grudge against Blucher, who for over 10 years had been an almost unlimited governor and master of a huge region. According to Stalin, “his time has come.” But Comrade Stalin always played multi-move games! That is, it was impossible to simply arrest Blucher! This would be banal, especially since the name of Blucher still shone in society. There were two tasks - to show a certain fig to the Japanese, and to blame Blucher. And the Japanese also had to respond adequately for Lyushkov, from Stalin’s point of view. Well, the great Stalin decided to play a “two-move” - to strengthen his positions both inside and outside. Because for the USSR and the Red Army, the Khasan hills were of greater importance in the future; they brought the army to the vast expanses of Manchuria, and then there was operational space. But they did not take the Japanese anywhere except the swamps, through which they would not be able to advance anywhere in the event of war.”
The Battles of Lake Khasan (July 29, 1938 – August 11, 1938) (known as the Zhanggufeng Heights Incident in China and Japan) arose from mutual claims USSR and Japanese dependent states Manchukuo to the same border area. The Japanese side believed that the USSR misinterpreted the conditions Beijing Treaty of 1860 between Tsarist Russia and China.
Causes of the collision
Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, there were strong tensions between Russia (then the USSR), China and Japan over the border issue in northeastern China. Here in Manchuria took place Sino-Eastern railway (CER), which connected China and the Russian Far East. The southern branch of the CER (sometimes called the South Manchurian Railway) became one of the reasons for Russian-Japanese war , subsequent incidents that caused Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945, as well as a series of clashes on the Soviet-Japanese border. The most notable among the latter were 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict And Mukden incident between Japan and China in 1931. Fighting on Lake Khasan broke out between two powers that had long distrusted each other.
This clash was caused by the fact that the Far Eastern Soviet troops and border units NKVD erected additional fortifications on the Manchurian border in the area of Lake Khasan. This was partly prompted by the flight of the Soviet general to the Japanese on June 13-14, 1938 Genrikh Lyushkova, who previously commanded all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Lyushkov conveyed to the Japanese the most important information about the poor state of Soviet defense in this region and about the mass executions of army officers during Great Terror Stalin.
Starting a conflict
July 6, 1938 Japanese Kwantung Army intercepted and deciphered a message sent by the commander of Soviet troops in the Posyet area to his headquarters in Khabarovsk. He asked that headquarters give the soldiers orders to occupy a previously unowned hill to the west of Lake Khasan (near Vladivostok). Owning it was beneficial, since it dominated the Korean port of Rajin and the strategic railways connecting Korea and Manchuria. Over the next two weeks, small groups of Soviet border troops arrived in the area and began to fortify the mentioned heights, setting up firing points, observation trenches, barriers and communications facilities.
At first, Japanese troops in Korea paid little attention to the Soviet advance. However, the Kwantung Army, whose area of responsibility included these heights (Zhanggufeng), became concerned about Soviet plans and ordered troops in Korea to take action. Korean troops contacted Tokyo with a recommendation to send an official protest to the USSR.
On July 15, the Japanese attaché in Moscow, Mamoru Shigemitsu, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet border guards from the Bezymyannaya (Shachaofeng) and Zaozernaya (Zhangufeng) hills west of Lake Khasan, insisting that these territories belonged to the neutral zone of the Soviet-Korean border. But his demands were rejected.
Progress of battles near Lake Khasan
The Japanese 19th Division, along with some Manchukuo units, prepared to attack the Soviet 39th Rifle Corps (which consisted of the 32nd, 39th, and 40th Rifle Divisions, as well as the 2nd Mechanized Brigade and two separate battalions ; commander - Grigory Stern). Colonel Kotoku Sato, commander of the Japanese 75th Infantry Regiment, received orders from Lieutenant General Suetaka Kamezo: “At the first news that the enemy moved forward at least a little, You should launch a firm and persistent counterattack.” The meaning of the order was that Sato was to expel the Soviet forces from the heights they occupied.
The Red Army soldiers go on the attack. Fighting on Lake Khasan, 1938
On July 31, 1938, Sato's regiment launched a night attack on the hills fortified by the Red Army. At Zaozernaya, 1,114 Japanese attacked a Soviet garrison of 300 soldiers, killing them and knocking out 10 tanks. Japanese losses amounted to 34 killed and 99 wounded. At the Bezymyannaya hill, 379 Japanese were taken by surprise and defeated another 300 Soviet soldiers, knocking out 7 tanks, and losing 11 people killed and 34 wounded. Several thousand more Japanese soldiers of the 19th Division arrived here. They dug in and asked for reinforcements. But the Japanese High Command rejected this request, fearing that General Suetaka would use reinforcements to attack other vulnerable Soviet positions and thereby cause an unwanted escalation of the conflict. Instead, Japanese troops were stopped in the captured area and ordered to defend it.
The Soviet command assembled 354 tanks and assault guns at Lake Khasan (257 T-26 tanks, 3 ST-26 tanks for laying bridges, 81 BT-7 light tanks, 13 SU-5-2 self-propelled guns). In 1933, the Japanese created the so-called “Special Armored Train” (Rinji Soko Ressha). It was deployed to the "2nd Railway Armored Unit" in Manchuria and served in the Sino-Japanese War and the battles of Hassan, transporting thousands of Japanese soldiers to and from the battlefield and demonstrating to the West "the ability of an Asian nation to absorb and implement Western doctrines of rapid deployment and transportation of infantry."
On July 31, People's Commissar of Defense Klim Voroshilov ordered the 1st Primorsky Army to be put on combat readiness. The Pacific Fleet was also mobilized. Commander of the Far Eastern Front created back in June, Vasily Blucher, arrived to Hassan on August 2, 1938. By his order, additional forces were transferred to the battle zone, and on August 2-9, Japanese troops on Zhanggufeng were subjected to persistent attacks. The superiority of the Soviet forces was such that one Japanese artillery officer calculated that the Russians fired more shells in one day than the Japanese did in the entire two-week battle. Despite this, the Japanese organized effective anti-tank defense. Soviet troops carried in their attacks big losses. Thousands of Red Army soldiers were killed or wounded, at least 9 tanks were completely burned, and 76 were damaged to one degree or another.
But despite repelling several assaults, it was clear that the Japanese would not be able to hold Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya without expanding the conflict. On August 10, Japanese Ambassador Mamoru Shigemitsu sued for peace. The Japanese considered that the incident had an “honorable” outcome for them, and on August 11, 1938, at 13:30 local time, they stopped fighting, yielding the heights to Soviet troops.
Losses in the battles on Khasan
For the battles on Lake Khasan, more than 6,500 Soviet soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. 26 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 95 received the Order of Lenin.
According to the data at that time, Soviet losses amounted to 792 dead and missing and 3,279 wounded. It is now believed that the number of those killed was significantly higher. The Japanese claimed to have destroyed or damaged about a hundred enemy tanks and 30 artillery pieces. It is difficult to assess how accurate these figures are, but Soviet armored vehicle losses undoubtedly numbered in the dozens. Japanese losses, according to the General Staff, amounted to 526 killed and missing, plus 913 wounded. Soviet sources increased Japanese casualties to 2,500. In any case, the Red Army suffered significantly more casualties. Responsibility for this was assigned to Vasily Blucher. On October 22, 1938, he was arrested by the NKVD and apparently tortured to death.
Destroyed Soviet tank. Fighting on Lake Khasan, 1938
The following year (1939) another Soviet-Japanese clash occurred on the Khalkhin Gol River. For the Japanese, it had a much more disastrous result, leading to the defeat of their 6th Army.
Upon completion World War II The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946) indicted thirteen high-ranking Japanese officials for crimes against peace for their role in starting the fighting at Lake Khasan.
Having been defeated during the intervention against Soviet Russia, in 1922 the Japanese were forced to evacuate from Vladivostok, but in the future they did not lose hope of subjugating the vast Asian territories of the USSR, right up to the Urals. By the early 1930s. in Japanese ruling circles The militarists took over. Japanese troops repeatedly staged military provocations against the Soviet Union from the territory of Manchuria they occupied in 1931-1932. In the summer of 1938, Japan with large military forces violated the Soviet border in the south of Primorye near Lake. Hassan. The 19th Infantry Division took part directly in the invasion. In addition, the 15th and 20th infantry divisions and other units were moving towards the combat area. On July 29, 1938, Japanese troops, after a series of attacks, throwing back the border units, captured the tactically advantageous Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills, relying on which they threatened the entire Posyet region. Troops of the future 39th Rifle Corps (formed on August 2, 1938, commander - corps commander G.N. Stern) took part in repelling the Japanese invasion. As soon as the provocation became known, the 40th Infantry Division of Colonel V.K. was concentrated in the conflict area. Bazarova. On July 31, the Primorsky Army and the Pacific Fleet were put on alert. The 32nd Infantry Division (Colonel N.E. Berzarin) and the 2nd Mechanized Brigade were additionally sent to the Lake Khasan area. The 2nd Mechanized Brigade was formed in April 1932 in Kyiv, and in 1934 it was transferred to the Far East. In October 1938, it was reorganized into the 42nd Light Tank Brigade. Just before the start of the conflict, Colonel A.P. took command of the brigade. Panfilov. The brigade was armed with, among other things, 94 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks. The brigade also includes a company of fire-reinforced HT-26s (5 serviceable units). In addition, the 32nd Rifle Division had a 32nd separate tank battalion (Major M.V. Alimov) with T-26s. The same battalion (Senior Lieutenant Sitnikov) was in the 40th Rifle Division. With considerable difficulty, the attack was repulsed and the border was restored, however, this incident revealed shortcomings in the management and training of troops. Miscalculations were used to justify repression. Many commanders, including one of the five first Marshals of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher were arrested and then shot.
ENTRY IN I.M.MAISKY’S DIARY OF APRIL 12, 1938 ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH SUN FO
Sun Fo spent 6 weeks in Moscow. Negotiated with the Soviet government about assistance to China. He left satisfied and expressed gratitude to me for the careful implementation of the agreements we concluded in Moscow. However, Sun Fo apparently did not immediately become satisfied with the Moscow negotiations. As far as I could understand from his somewhat vague explanations in this part (in general, he speaks very clearly, precisely and frankly), on his way to Moscow, he hoped to convince the Soviet government of the need for a military action by the USSR against Japan in alliance with China. The Soviet government rejected such a proposal, but promised energetic assistance by sending weapons, airplanes, etc. The results are visible in the course of military operations in China. There is no doubt that Chinese successes three weeks is largely due to the arrival of our aircraft, our tanks, our artillery, etc. It is not surprising that Sun Fo now feels almost triumphant. The details of his decisive conversation with Comrade are curious. “I was told,” Sun Fo said, “that I would see your leader on a certain day, but they did not indicate the exact date. I got ready. I'm sitting at the embassy and waiting. Evening comes - 8 o'clock, 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock... Nothing!.. Somewhat disappointed, I decided to go to bed. He undressed and climbed into bed. Suddenly, at a quarter to twelve they came for me: “Please, they are waiting for you!” I jumped up, got dressed and drove off. Along with Stalin were Molotov and Voroshilov. At the end, Mikoyan and Yezhov also came. Our conversation lasted from 12 at night to 5 1/2 in the morning. And then everything was decided.” It was during this conversation, according to Sun Fo, that the Soviet government rejected direct military participation of the USSR in the fight against Japan. The motives put forward by Comrade Stalin in defense of such a line of behavior, as transmitted by Sun Fo, boil down to the following: 1) a military action by the USSR would immediately unite the entire Japanese nation, which is now far from united in supporting Japanese aggression in China; 2) a military offensive by the USSR, on the contrary, could frighten the right-wing elements in China and, thus, split the united national front that has now been created there; 3) a military offensive by the USSR with the prospect of our victory would frighten England and the USA and could turn the current sympathy of both countries for China into its opposite; 4) a military offensive by the USSR - and this is especially important - would be used by Germany to attack our country in Europe, and this would unleash world war. For all the above reasons, Comrade Stalin considers an open military action by the USSR against Japan inappropriate. But he is ready to help China in every possible way by supplying weapons, etc. (Sun Fo is the head of the Chinese special mission sent to the USSR, England and France; Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant, millionaire). Published: Sokolov V.V. two meetings between Sun Fo and I.V. Stalin in 1938-1939. // New and recent history. 1999. N6.
HEAD OF THE PODGORNAYA BORDER POST P. TERESHKIN
On July 29, the head of the political department of the district, divisional commissar Bogdanov, and Colonel Grebnik arrived at the height of Zaozernaya. ...At the beginning of the conversation, Lieutenant Makhalin urgently called me by phone. I reported to Bogdanov. In response: “Let them act independently, do not allow the Japanese into our territory...”. Makhalin calls again and in an excited voice says: “A large detachment of Japanese violated the border and began to attack the border detachment’s locations, we will fight to the death, avenge us!” The connection was interrupted. I asked permission from divisional commissar Bogdanov to hold Makhalin’s group with heavy machine gun fire. I was refused this with the reasoning that this would cause retaliatory actions by the Japanese in the area of Zaozernaya Heights. Then I sent 2 squads under the command of Chernopyatko and Bataroshin to help Lieutenant Makhalin. Soon, divisional commissar Bogdanov and department head Grebnik left for Posiet. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union P.F. Tereshkina
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0071, August 4, 1938
In recent days, the Japanese in the Posyet region suddenly attacked our border units and captured part of Soviet territory near Lake Khasan. This new military provocation met with due resistance on our part. However, the Japanese stubbornly cling to Soviet territory, despite heavy losses of their troops. The provocative actions of the Japanese military are obviously calculated on our peacefulness and restraint. The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union and the Red Army will endlessly tolerate the brazen provocations of their military, which, under the guise of local border incidents, began to seize entire chunks of Soviet territory. We don’t want a single inch of foreign land, including Manchurian and Korean, but we will never give up even an inch of our own, Soviet land, to anyone, including the Japanese invaders! In order to be ready to repel provocative attacks by the Japanese-Manchus and in order to be ready at any moment to deliver a powerful blow to the burrowing, insolent Japanese aggressors along the entire front, immediately bring the troops of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District to full combat readiness, for which I order: 1 Immediately return all command, political, commanding and Red Army personnel from all types of work, secondment and vacation to their units. 2. The Military Council of the DKFront take measures to cover the borders of the front. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that if a new provocation arises from the Japanese-Manchus, then the covering troops with aircraft and tanks must be ready, upon special orders from Moscow, for an immediate powerful, crushing blow. 3. Bring the air forces of the DKFront and the Western Military District to full combat readiness: a) relocate air units to field airfields, providing them with air defense systems and reliable communications, having strong fists for powerful strikes; b) establish constant duty of fighter flights in full readiness for immediate departure; c) provide units at field airfields with bombs, ammunition for at least 2 sorties, at remote airfields for 5 sorties and fuel for 5 sorties; d) provide all flight personnel with oxygen devices for high-altitude flights and required quantity oxygen; check and seal devices; e) The military councils of the DKFront, ZabVO, 1st and 2nd armies and the Khabarovsk group immediately, through special flight technical groups, together with the command, verify the readiness of the aircraft’s equipment, weapons and instruments. This check should be carried out at least four times a month. Commanders and commissars of air units should check daily; f) commanders and commissars of air units ensure the speed of refueling aircraft, hanging bombs and filling with cartridges; g) all commanders of the air forces of the specified front, armies, district and Khabarovsk group immediately have the stock of bombs, aircraft cartridges, fuel and technical personnel in charge of storing weapons and fuel checked, immediately eliminating all discovered shortcomings. 4. A. The Military Councils of the Democratic Front and the Western Military District should put all fortified areas on full combat readiness, reinforcing them, if necessary, with field troops. B. In fortified areas, their commandants: a) immediately install fully weapons and equipment in all structures; b) fill military installations with the required standard amount of ammunition and property; c) install wire barriers in important directions and build anti-tank obstacles; d) fully provide combat installations, command posts and field troops occupying fortified areas with communications means; e) establish a permanent military guard, patrol and observation service. 5. Rifle, cavalry and tank units must be placed in camps or bivouacs with measures combat support(security, duty units, air surveillance and air defense), having reliable communications within the formation. 6. In tank units, put ammunition in combat vehicles, have tanks constantly refueled and fully ready for immediate action. 7. In rifle and cavalry units: a) restore the full regular number of units in the units; b) check the readiness of mobilized plans for formations and units; c) issue the weapons and ammunition assigned to the soldiers to the units, where they are stored in a sealed form under the responsibility of the duty officer; d) transported supplies of ammunition should be placed in charging boxes and carts; e) commission repair horses no younger than 3 years old, check forging. Reforge horse train with old forging; f) have weapons and other property ready for quick delivery. 8. At air defense points, install artillery and machine gun units in position, relocate fighter aircraft to operational airfields and raise the VNOS system, checking the connection of VNOS posts with command posts and airfields of the fighter unit. 9. Fully provide transport parts with rubber, spare parts and fuel. 10. The military councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd armies, the Khabarovsk group and the Western Military District: a) fully provide the units with all required property and ammunition according to wartime standards at the expense of the front-line (district, army) warehouses; b) put warehouses in order, and first of all, ammunition warehouses: dismantle the property stored in them, check the readiness of warehouses for the rapid release of property, review the security of warehouses and strengthen the main ones at the expense of secondary objects; c) conduct combat alerts of units and subunits. When raising units on combat alert, check their equipment and material security to the smallest detail in accordance with established standards and report cards. Simultaneously produce tactical exercises as part of formations in which units raised on combat alert will act, seeking from each commander, soldier and staff excellent knowledge of the terrain and combat conditions in their sector. Monitor the organization of communications at all levels of the headquarters service; d) reverse special attention for training in night operations and repelling surprise enemy attacks at night and in fog, training their units in operations at night and in fog. I would like to draw the special attention of the entire command staff to this; e) in support units of border troops: 1) commanders of support units to develop on the ground, together with commanders of border units, a plan for border defense in their sectors. Provide technical communication between support units and the command of border units and with their direct superiors; 2) strengthen continuous military surveillance abroad, especially be vigilant at night; 3) study in detail the topography of their plots on the territory of the USSR; 4) store weapons and ammunition of support units in units, ensuring their uninterrupted food supply. 11. All measures to bring units into full combat readiness must be carried out while maintaining military secrets. 12. Commanders and commissars of all military formations should check all units and eliminate all detected deficiencies on the spot. The results of verifications and the measures taken must be reported in code to the command of units and formations, the Military Councils of the DKFront, the 1st and 2nd Armies, the Khabarovsk Army Group of Forces and the ZabVO once every five days, and the command of the DKFront and the ZabVO must be reported to the General Staff of the Red Army within the same period. Report receipt of this order and its communication to the executors no later than 24 hours on 08/06/38.37. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Army Commander 1st Rank B. Shaposhnikov
Present: Voroshilov, Stalin, Shchadenko... Blucher. Listened: About the events on the lake. Hassan. The Main Military Council, having heard a report from the NGO on the situation in the DKF [Far Eastern Red Banner Front] in connection with the events at Lake. Khasan, as well as the explanations of the front commander Comrade Blucher and the deputy front commander, member of the military council Mazepov, and having discussed this issue, we came to the following conclusions: 1. Combat operations near the lake. Khasan were a comprehensive test of the mobilization and combat readiness of not only those units that directly took part in them, but also of all DCF troops without exception. 2. The events of these few days revealed huge shortcomings in the composition of the DCF. The combat training of the troops, headquarters and command and control personnel of the front turned out to be at an unacceptably low level. The military units were torn apart and incapable of combat; The supply of military units is not organized. It was discovered that the Far Eastern theater was poorly prepared for war (roads, bridges, communications). Storage, conservation and accounting of mobilization and emergency reserves, both in front-line warehouses and military units, found themselves in a chaotic state. In addition to all this, it was discovered that the most important directives of the Main Military Council and NGOs were criminally not followed by the front command for a long time. As a result of this unacceptable state of the front troops, we suffered significant losses in this relatively small clash - 408 people. killed and 2807 wounded. These losses cannot be justified either by the extremely difficult terrain in which our troops had to operate, or by the three times greater losses of the Japanese. The number of our troops, the participation of our aviation and tanks in operations gave us such advantages that our losses in battles could be much smaller... Moreover, the percentage of losses of command and political personnel is unnaturally high - about 40%, which once again proves that The Japanese were defeated and thrown beyond our borders only thanks to the fighting enthusiasm of the fighters, junior commanders, middle and senior command and political personnel, who were ready to sacrifice themselves, defending the honor and inviolability of the territory of their great socialist Motherland, as well as thanks to the skillful management of operations against the Japanese, i.e. Stern and the correct leadership of Comrade Rychagov in the actions of our aviation (...) During the period of hostilities, we had to resort to cobbling together units from different units and individual fighters, allowing harmful organizational improvisation, creating all kinds of confusion, which could not but affect the actions of our troops. The troops advanced to the border on a combat alert completely unprepared... In many cases, entire artillery batteries found themselves at the front without shells, spare barrels for machine guns were not fitted in advance, rifles were issued unsighted, and many soldiers, and even one of the rifle units of the 32nd division , arrived at the front without rifles or gas masks at all. Despite the huge reserves of clothing, many soldiers were sent into battle in completely worn-out shoes, half-footed, and a large number of Red Army soldiers were without overcoats. Commanders and staffs lacked maps of the combat area. All types of troops, especially the infantry, showed an inability to act on the battlefield, to maneuver, to combine movement and fire, to apply themselves to the terrain... tank units were used ineptly, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in materiel. The culprit for these major shortcomings and for the excessive losses we suffered in a relatively small clash are the commanders, commissars and chiefs of all levels of the DKF and, first of all, the commander of the DKF, Marshal Blucher... The Main Military Council decides: 1. The administration of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front is to be disbanded. 2. Marshal Blucher should be removed from the post of commander of the DKF troops and left at the disposal of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. 3. Create two separate armies from the DKF troops, directly subordinate to the NPO... RGVA. F. 4. Op. 18. D. 46. L. 183-189 Blucher V. (1890-1938). Since 1929, commander of the Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army. In the summer of 1938 - commander of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front. Arrested and shot in 1938. Rehabilitated after 1953. Stern G. (1900-1941). In 1938 - chief of staff of the Far Eastern Front. In 1941 - Colonel General, Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the NPO of the USSR. Arrested on June 7, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954. Rychagov P. (1911-1941) - Lieutenant General of Aviation (1940). In 1938 - commander of the Air Force of the Primorsky Group of the Far Eastern Front, 1st Separate Red Banner Army. In 1940 - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force. Arrested on June 24, 1941 on charges of participation in an anti-Soviet military conspiratorial organization. Shot without trial on October 28, 1941. Rehabilitated in 1954.
ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE OF THE USSR No. 0169, September 8, 1938
On the imposition of penalties on the command of the Far Eastern Red Banner Front for violating the orders of the NKO On August 7, 1938, during the period of hot battles with the Japanese in the area of Lake Khasan, the deputy commander of the DKFront, corps commander Comrade Filatov, signed an order on the disbandment of medical battalions and field hospitals in the rifle divisions located in battles. The Military Council of the 1st Army delayed the execution of this order. On August 17, the corps commander, Comrade Filatov, made another gross mistake - he ordered the deputy commander of the front air force to provide a DB-3 aircraft for the transfer of a representative of the NKVD from Khabarovsk to the city of Chita, thereby violating the orders of NKO No. 022 of 1934 and [No. 022] of 1936, categorically prohibiting the use of combat aircraft as transport vehicles. Asked on my orders why the plane was provided, and even the DB-3, Comrade Filatov reported that he had given the order to provide the plane, but did not indicate the type of plane; Meanwhile, Comrade Senatorov reported to me that Comrade Filatov’s written order specifically indicated DB-3. Thus, Comrade Filatov did not find the courage to admit his mistake, did not tell the truth, trying to shift the blame to Comrade Senatorov. In turn, the deputy commander of the DKFront Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Comrade Senatorov, having received and executed the order of the Corps Commander Comrade Filatov to send an aircraft for the specified purpose, did not report to him about the illegality of this order. Wine vol. Filatov and Senatorov is aggravated all the more so because they, having violated my orders, also did not take the necessary measures to organize this flight, and the plane crashed on the way back from Chita to Khabarovsk and 3 crew members were killed. For a frivolous attitude towards service and violation of NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and No. 022 of 1936, I severely reprimand Comrade Commander Filatov. I put Colonel Comrade Senatorov on notice for violating NKO orders No. 022 of 1934 and 1936. I warn you that for the use of combat aircraft for purposes not related to combat and training missions, I will severely punish those responsible. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov (1900, Odessa - August 19, 1945, Dairen, Empire of Japan) - a prominent figure in the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. Commissioner of State Security 3rd rank (corresponding to the rank of lieutenant general). In 1938, he fled to Manchuria and actively collaborated with Japanese intelligence. Abroad, he covered in detail his participation in the NKVD and prepared an assassination attempt on Stalin.
Born in Odessa in the family of a Jewish tailor. He studied at a state-owned primary school (1908-1915), taking evening general education courses. He worked as an assistant in an automobile accessories office.
On June 9, Lyushkov informed Deputy G.M. Osinin-Vinnitsky about his departure to the border Posyet to meet with a particularly important agent. On the night of June 13, he arrived at the location of the 59th border detachment, ostensibly to inspect posts and the border strip. Lyushkov was dressed in field uniform when receiving awards. Having ordered the head of the outpost to accompany him, he moved on foot to one of the sections of the border. Upon arrival, Lyushkov announced to the escort that he had a meeting on the “other side” with a particularly important Manchurian illegal agent, and since no one should know him by sight, he would go on alone, and the head of the outpost should go half a kilometer towards Soviet territory and wait for the conditional signal. Lyushkov left, and the head of the outpost did as ordered, but after waiting for him for more than two hours, he raised the alarm. The outpost was raised in arms, and more than 100 border guards combed the area until the morning. For more than a week, before news came from Japan, Lyushkov was considered missing, namely that he was kidnapped (killed) by the Japanese. Lyushkov had by that time crossed the border and on June 14 at approximately 5:30 near the city of Hunchun he surrendered to the Manchu border guards and asked for political asylum. Afterwards he was transported to Japan and collaborated with the Japanese military department[
Here is what Koizumi Koichiro writes about the information that Lyushkov conveyed to Japanese intelligence:
The information that Lyushkov provided was extremely valuable to us. Information about the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East, their deployment, the construction of defensive structures, and the most important fortresses and fortifications fell into our hands.
In July 1945, on the eve of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan, he was transferred from Tokyo to the location of the Japanese military mission in Dairen (China) to work in the interests of the Kwantung Army. On August 16, the command of the Kwantung Army announced surrender. On August 19, 1945, Lyushkov was invited to the head of the Dairen military mission, Yutaka Takeoka, who suggested that he commit suicide (apparently to hide the Japanese intelligence data known to Lyushkov from the Soviet Union). Lyushkov refused and was shot by Takeoka
Judas the Jew's death from a dog from his own masters
From 1936 to 1938, more than 300 incidents were noted on the Soviet-Japanese border, the most famous of which occurred at the junction of the borders of the USSR, Manchuria and Korea at Lake Khasan in July-August 1938.
At the origins of the conflict
The conflict in the Lake Khasan area was caused by a number of both foreign policy factors and very difficult relations within the ruling elite of Japan. An important detail was the rivalry within the Japanese military-political machine itself, when funds were distributed to strengthen the army, and the presence of even an imaginary military threat could give the command of the Japanese Korean Army a good opportunity to remind itself, given that the priority at that time was the operations of Japanese troops in China, which never brought the desired result.
Another headache for Tokyo was the military aid flowing from the USSR to China. In this case, it was possible to exert military and political pressure by organizing a large-scale military provocation with a visible external effect. All that remained was to find a weak spot on the Soviet border, where an invasion could be successfully carried out and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops could be tested. And such an area was found 35 km from Vladivostok.
And while on the Japanese side the border was approached by a railroad and several highways, on the Soviet side there was only one dirt road. . It is noteworthy that until 1938, this area, where there really was no clear boundary marking, was of no interest to anyone, and suddenly in July 1938, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively took up this problem.
After the refusal of the Soviet side to withdraw troops and the incident with the death of a Japanese gendarme, shot by a Soviet border guard in the disputed area, tension began to increase day by day.
On July 29, the Japanese launched an attack on the Soviet border post, but after a hot battle they were driven back. On the evening of July 31, the attack was repeated, and here the Japanese troops already managed to wedge 4 kilometers deep into Soviet territory. The first attempts to drive out the Japanese with the 40th Infantry Division were unsuccessful. However, everything was not going well for the Japanese either - every day the conflict grew, threatening to escalate into a big war, for which Japan, stuck in China, was not ready.
Richard Sorge reported to Moscow: “The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show Soviet Union that Japan is still capable of displaying its power."
Meanwhile, in difficult off-road conditions and poor readiness of individual units, the concentration of forces of the 39th Rifle Corps continued. With great difficulty, they managed to gather 15 thousand people, 1014 machine guns, 237 guns, and 285 tanks in the combat area. In total, the 39th Rifle Corps consisted of up to 32 thousand people, 609 guns and 345 tanks. 250 aircraft were sent to provide air support.
Hostages of provocation
If in the first days of the conflict, due to poor visibility and, apparently, the hope that the conflict can still be resolved diplomatically, Soviet aviation was not used, then starting from August 5, Japanese positions were subjected to massive air strikes.
Aviation, including TB-3 heavy bombers, was brought in to destroy Japanese fortifications. The fighters carried out a series of assault strikes on Japanese troops. Moreover, the targets of Soviet aviation were located not only on the captured hills, but also deep in Korean territory.
It was later noted: “To defeat Japanese infantry in the enemy’s trenches and artillery, high-explosive bombs were mainly used - 50, 82 and 100 kg, in total 3,651 bombs were dropped. 6 pieces of high-explosive bombs 1000 kg on the battlefield 08/06/38. were used solely for the purpose of moral influence on the enemy infantry, and these bombs were dropped into the enemy infantry areas after these areas had been thoroughly hit by groups of SB-bombs FAB-50 and 100. The enemy infantry rushed about in the defensive zone, not finding cover, since almost the entire main line of their defense was covered with heavy fire from the explosions of bombs from our aircraft. 6 bombs of 1000 kg, dropped during this period in the area of the Zaozernaya height, shook the air with strong explosions, the roar of these bombs exploding across the valleys and mountains of Korea was heard tens of kilometers away. After the explosion of 1000 kg of bombs, the Zaozernaya height was covered with smoke and dust for several minutes. It must be assumed that in those areas where these bombs were dropped, the Japanese infantry were 100% incapacitated from shell shock and stones thrown out of the craters by the explosion of the bombs.”
Having completed 1003 sorties, Soviet aviation lost two aircraft - one SB and one I-15. The Japanese, having no more than 18-20 anti-aircraft guns in the conflict area, could not provide serious resistance. And throwing your own aviation into battle meant starting a large-scale war, for which neither the command of the Korean Army nor Tokyo were ready. From this moment on, the Japanese side began to frantically search for a way out of the current situation, which required both saving face and stopping hostilities, which no longer promised anything good for the Japanese infantry.
Denouement
The denouement came when Soviet troops launched a new offensive on August 8, having overwhelming military-technical superiority. The attack by tanks and infantry was carried out based on military expediency and without taking into account compliance with the border. As a result, Soviet troops managed to capture Bezymyannaya and a number of other heights, and also gain a foothold near the top of Zaozernaya, where the Soviet flag was hoisted.
On August 10, the chief of staff of the 19th telegraphed the chief of staff of the Korean Army: “Every day the combat effectiveness of the division is declining. The enemy suffered great damage. He is using new methods of combat and increasing artillery fire. If this continues, there is a danger that the fighting will escalate into even more fierce battles. Within one to three days it is necessary to decide on further actions divisions... Until now, Japanese troops have already demonstrated their power to the enemy, and therefore, while it is still possible, it is necessary to take measures to resolve the conflict diplomatically.”
On the same day, armistice negotiations began in Moscow and at noon on August 11, hostilities were stopped. Strategically and politically, the Japanese test of strength, and by and large, the military adventure ended in failure. Not being prepared for a major war with the USSR, the Japanese units in the Khasan area found themselves hostage to the created situation, when further expansion of the conflict was impossible, and it was also impossible to retreat while preserving the prestige of the army.
The Hassan conflict did not lead to a reduction in USSR military assistance to China. At the same time, the battles on Khasan revealed a number of weaknesses of both the troops of both the Far Eastern Military District and the Red Army as a whole. The Soviet troops apparently suffered even greater losses than the enemy; at the initial stage of the fighting, the interaction between the infantry, tank units and artillery turned out to be weak. Not on high level turned out to be reconnaissance that failed to reveal enemy positions.
The losses of the Red Army amounted to 759 people killed, 100 people died in hospitals, 95 people missing and 6 people killed in accidents. 2752 people was injured or sick (dysentery and colds). The Japanese admitted the loss to 650 killed and 2,500 wounded. At the same time, the battles on Khasan were not the last military clash between the USSR and Japan in the Far East. Less than a year later, an undeclared war began in Mongolia on Khalkhin Gol, where, however, the forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army, rather than the Korean ones, would be involved.
